Unrepresentative information - The case of newspaper reporting on campaign finance

This article examines evidence of sampling or statistical bias in newspaper reporting on campaign finance. We compile all stories from the five largest circulation newspapers in the United States that mention a dollar amount for campaign expenditures, contributions, or receipts from 1996 to 2000. We compare these figures to those recorded by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The average figures reported in newspapers exceed the figures from the FEC by as much as eightfold. Press reports also focus excessively on corporate contributions and soft money, rather than on the more common types of donors-individual-and types of contributions-hard money. We further find that these biases are reflected in public perceptions of money in elections. Survey respondents overstate the amount of money raised and the share from different groups by roughly the amount found in newspapers, and better-educated people (those most likely to read newspapers) showed the greatest discrepancy between their beliefs and the facts

Testing Models of Distributive Politics using Exit Polls to Measure Voters Preferences and Partisanship

This paper tests various hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distribution of federal spending across U.S. states over the period 1978-2002. We improve on previous work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that are Democrats, Republicans, and independents, or liberals, conservatives and moderates. We find no evidence that the allocation of federal spending to the states is distorted by strategic manipulation to win electoral support. States with many swing voters are not advantaged compared to states with more loyal voters, nor do “battleground states” attract more federal funds. Moreover, we find that spending has little or no effect on voters’ choices, whereas partisanship and ideology have massive effects.Ideological attitudes, partisanship, distributive politics, federal budget

Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should or Could to Stop Online Fraud?

In April 1998, the FTC released a consumer alert pertaining to the increasing problem of online auction fraud. As the number of online auction participants increased, online auction fraud was becoming more prevalent. The FTC requested comments regarding methods that would be appropriate for curbing the increase in consumer deception. Many in the online auction industry proposed voluntary self-regulation. This Note exposes the inadequacy of industry self-regulation by analogizing online auction abuse with the misuse and near downfall of the 900-number industry. This Note proposes that only a regime of strict industry guidelines that the FTC initiates will halt online industry abuse

Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?

In this paper, we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy-buying, but are rather a form of political participation and consumption. We summarize the data on campaign spending, and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals, not special interests, are the main source of campaign contributions. Moreover, we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good, dependent upon income, and campaign contributions as a percent of GDP have not risen appreciably in over 100 years: if anything, they have probably fallen. We then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators' votes. Finally, we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects, there is little relationship between money and legislator votes. Thus, the question is not why there is so little money politics, but rather why organized interests give at all. We conclude by offering potential answers to this question.

Partisan Bias in Economic News: Evidence on the Agenda-Setting Behavior of U.S. Newspapers

We study the agenda-setting political behavior of a large sample of U.S. newspapers during the last decade, and the behavior of smaller samples for longer time periods. Our purpose is to examine the intensity of coverage of economic issues as a function of the underlying economic conditions and the political affiliation of the incumbent president, focusing on unemployment, inflation, the federal budget and the trade deficit. We investigate whether there is any significant correlation between the endorsement policy of newspapers, and the differential coverage of bad/good economic news as a function of the president's political affiliation. We find evidence that newspapers with pro-Democratic endorsement pattern systematically give more coverage to high unemployment when the incumbent president is a Republican than when the president is Democratic, compared to newspapers with pro-Republican endorsement pattern. This result is not driven by the partisanship of readers. There is on the contrary no evidence of a partisan bias -- or at least of a bias that is correlated with the endorsement policy -- for stories on inflation, budget deficit or trade deficit.

TESTING MODELS OF DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICSUSING EXIT POLLS TO MEASURE VOTERPREFERENCES AND PARTISANSHIP

This paper tests various hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distributionof federal spending across U.S. states over the period 1978-2002. We improve onprevious work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that areDemocrats, Republicans, and independents, or liberals, conservatives and moderates. Wefind no evidence for the "swing voter" hypothesis { that is, no significant associationbetween the amount of federal funds a state receives and the fraction of independents ormoderates in the state. We also find no evidence for the "battleground state" hypothesis -no significant association between the amount of federal funds and the degree of partisanbalance in a state. Modest support is found for the \partisan supporters" hypothesis, whichconjectures that politicians will favour areas that contain a large percentage of their coresupporters.Electoral competition, swing voter, partisanship, election closeness, USFederal Spending.

The Effects of Redistricting on Incumbents

We analyze the effects of redistricting on the electoral fortunes of incumbent legislators, using voting data on U.S. congressional districts, state legislative districts, and statewide races. We find little evidence that redistricting helps incumbents in U.S. legislative elections. If anything, redrawing district lines reduces the average vote margin of those in districted offices compared with offices that are not districted, reduces electoral security, and increases turnover in the legislature.Governmen