Arming the Outlaws: On the moral limits of the arms trade

There is a general presumption against arming outlaw states. But can that presumption sometimes be overturned? The argument considered here maintains that outlaw states can have legitimate security interests and that transferring weapons to these states can be an appropriate way of promoting those interests. Weapons enable governments to engage in wrongful oppression and aggression, but they also enable them to fend off predators in a manner that can be beneficial to their citizens. It clearly does not follow from the fact that a state is oppressive or aggressive that it will never be a victim of wrongful aggression itself, and while an outlaw state’s primary aim in repelling such aggression will often be the preservation of its own power, its defensive manoeuvres will sometimes also serve its citizens’ interests. In short, supplying weapons to outlaw states may sometimes contribute to the protection of innocents

The Allocation of Merit Pay in Academia: A Case Study

This paper investigates whether the widespread awarding of faculty merit pay at a large public university accurately reflects productivity. We show that pairwise voting on a quality standard by a committee can in theory be consistent with observed allocation patterns. However, the data indicate only nominal adherence to a quality standard. Departments with more severe compression issues are more likely to award merit pay as a countermeasure and some departments appear to be motivated by nonpecuniary incentives. Much of the variance in merit pay allocation remains unexplained. These results suggest reform is needed to improve transparency in the merit system.merit, faculty compensation

A model-independent maximum range for the liquidity correction of TIPS yields

We derive a model-independent maximum range for the admissible liquidity risk premium in real Treasury bonds—also known as Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). The range is constructed using additional information in the inflation swap market and a set of simple theoretical assumptions. As an application, we construct a lower bound to estimates of the inflation risk premium the Treasury receives from TIPS by deducting their maximum liquidity premium. This conservative measure of the benefit to the Treasury of issuing TIPS is positive on average at the ten-year maturity for our sample period.Inflation (Finance) ; Inflation-indexed bonds

Fair Trade, Formal Equality, and Preferential Treatment

In this paper I criticize the claim that fair trade entails a commitment to an ideal of formal equality according to which all members of the trade regime are to receive and offer equal, or uniform, treatment. I first elaborate on the idea of formal equality and its rationales, identify several positive arguments for departing from formal equality, and respond to a number of objections to “special and differential treatment” for poor countries. I then consider in more detail one specific element of formal equality in the trade regime, namely, the principle of reciprocity. Several distinct reciprocity principles are identified, none of which, I argue, should be regarded as a requirement of fairness. Next I consider a more recent interpretation of formal equality that requires trading countries to “harmonize” domestic laws and policies. I argue that harmonization is not required by fairness

Selling Arms and Expressing Harm

According to an argument commonly made by politicians, selling weapons to oppressive and aggressive regimes can sometimes be permissible because the sale renders the victims of these regimes no worse-off than they would have been had the sale not been made. We can refer to this argument as the inconsequence argument. My primary aim in this paper is to identify one reason why the inconsequence argument will often not succeed in vindicating arms sales to oppressive and aggressive regimes. The inconsequence argument will often not succeed because arms sales to oppressive and aggressive regimes often do make the victims of these regimes worse-off than they would have been had the sales not gone ahead. The victims of these regimes are often made worse-off in virtue of the fact that arms sales can generate expressed harms, which, unlike some of the material harms often engendered by such sales, are additive (rather than substitutive) in character. As I shall explain, expressed harms are similar to, but also significantly different from, expressive harms. The differences are important, for they allow us to construct a reply that can answer the inconsequence argument on its own (consequentialist) terms