Slot Machine Stopping Decisions: Evidence for Prospect Theory Preferences?

This paper examines the stopping decisions of individual slot machine players using a unique casino dataset, asking whether the relationship between quitting behavior and winnings can be most easily reconciled using neoclassical expected utility theory (EU) or a prospect theory value function (PT) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). I assume that slot machine players have a utility of gambling (Conlisk, 1993) which motivates their visit to the casino, and preferences over winnings which may (PT) or may not (EU) depend on a reference-point level of winnings. Using the fact that outcomes of individual slot machine bets are independent draws, the central limit theorem is applied to assess whether gamblers quit approximately randomly as EU predicts, or whether quitting was concentrated disproportionately at some reference level of winnings as PT predicts. By comparing the data to simulations which match broad features in the data, statistical tests find substantial excess kurtosis (4 th moment) in final stopping distributions, thus rejecting that winnings are distributed normally and providing support for PT preferences. In addition, winnings distributions are positively skewed (3 rd moment) – this implies that people are more likely to quit with winnings above the reference point than below it, providing support for diminishing sensitivity of the PT value function’s gains and loss segments. 1 [email protected]. Comments are welcome. I am grateful to my advisor Vincent Crawford for encouragement and guidance, Julie Cullen for invaluable input, and an anonymous casino which generously allowed me to use their data for this study. For helpful comments and conversations, I also thank Gray Calhoun, Rachel Croson, Chulyoung Kim, Craig McIntosh, Juanjuan Meng, Joel Sobel, and participants in the Micro theory lunch seminar. All errors are my own.

Keeping up with the Neighbors: Social Interaction in a Production Economy

It is well-documented that individuals care about how others around them are doing. This paper studies a production economy in which consumers provide labor supply to a representative firm to earn income for consumption, and their utility depends on their own leisure time, their own consumption level, as well as their neighbors’ consumption levels. We characterize the unique equilibrium for such an economy, allowing for three different types of effects of the neighborhood size: linear effect, zero effect, and nonlinear effect. Four network structures (empty network, ring network, star network, and core-periphery network) with different production technologies are analyzed. Our work contributes to a better understanding of the general equilibrium effect of social preferences and network structures