Take a different look: how concrete and abstract mindsets affect individuals' judgments and decisions

Taking a different look or a new perspective, studying a problem from afar or close up can affect individuals’ judgment and decision-making. Construal Level Theory argues that depending on whether individuals construe on a more abstract (higher) versus more concrete (lower) level, they will attend to different pieces of information, which may result in different outcomes. This dissertation builds on Construal Level Theory and uncovers open questions concerning judgments of truth, diversity, dishonesty, and the use of decision-making aids. It aims at offering answers to these questions, which have so far not been considered from a Construal Level Theory perspective. Jaffé and Greifeneder (2017) find that the negativity bias regarding judgments of truth might attenuate or even reverse under high compared to low construal level. Looking at diversity, Jaffé, Rudert, and Greifeneder (2017) show that individuals might appreciate working with a dissimilar other under high construal level, but prefer a more similar counterpart under low construal level. Looking at dishonest behavior, Jaffé, Greifeneder, and Reinhard (2017) highlight that Machiavellianism has a stronger impact under high compared to low construal level. Finally, Jaffé, Reutner, and Greifeneder (2017) look at decision-making aids and provide support for the notion that a simple device like a coin flip might catalyze decisions, allowing for more affect-driven decisions where individuals might have been undecided before. In sum, the research projects of this dissertation advance our knowledge in regards to how and in which contexts abstract and concrete mindsets affect individuals’ judgments and decisions

Less than I expected and oh so true? On the interplay between expectations and framing effects in judgments of truth

This article investigates the negativity bias in truth judgments, which holds that negatively (vs. positively) framed statements are more likely to be judged true. Throughout four studies we find that expectations moderate the negativity bias. In particular, Study 1 failed to replicate the negativity bias with standard items. In Study 2 we investigated individuals' expectations regarding the statements. When systematically adjusting the percentages in negatively framed statements to be lower than expected, a negativity bias occurred in Study 3. Building on this knowledge in Study 4, we systematically decreased and increased percentages in both framing conditions, investigating the impact of under- versus overestimation. While expectations had no consistent effects for positive frames, overestimation (vs. underestimation) led to a higher likelihood of perceived truth in the negative framing condition. Results are discussed in context of current research on language and social psychology as well as post-truth politics

Secretive and close? How sharing secrets may impact perceptions of distance

Having secrets is incredibly common. However, secrecy has only recently started to receive more attention in research. What has largely been neglected so far are the consequences of secret-sharing for the relationship between sharer and receiver. In this project, we aim to fill this gap. Previous research has shown that closeness can make secret-sharing more likely. Building on research from the self-disclosure and relationship literature, we experimentally investigate whether secret-sharing might in turn increase perceptions of closeness. In addition, we test the valence of the secrets shared as potential driver of the hypothesized effect, as negative secrets might signal a high level of trust, but might also present a burden to the receiver. To provide a holistic picture, we build on a variety of methods to investigate three perspectives: Study 1 focuses on the receiver and tests whether another person sharing secrets (vs. nonconfidential information) decreases distance in the eyes of the receiver. Study 2 investigates lay theories and tests how an observer perceives the relationship between two people who share secrets (vs. nonconfidential information). Study 3 tests whether these lay theories about sharing secrets are predictive of behavior, and how a sharer might choose secrets of negative or positive valence to decrease perceived distance on the receiver's side. Our results will contribute to the understanding of how sharing secrets affects the way individuals think about each other, how close they feel to each other, and how they interact with each other

You should go for diversity, but I'd rather stay with similar others: Social distance modulates the preference for diversity

Organizations often state that they value diversity. The workforce, however, is often quite homogeneous, reflecting a striking mismatch between aspirations and reality. Based on the distinction between desirability and feasibility concerns, we provide a psychological argument for this mismatch. We hypothesize that social distance influences individuals' choices regarding diversity. When being socially more distant, individuals prefer to assemble a diverse team, due to a stronger impact of pro-diversity desirability concerns. In contrast, when being socially close, individuals prefer similar team members, due to a stronger weighing of anti-diversity feasibility concerns. Four studies investigate the different decision outcomes when being socially distant compared to close. Study 1 shows that working in a diverse group is perceived as desirable, but less feasible. Study 2 investigates the impact of psychological distance on individuals' choices of working with a more different (when being socially distant) or similar partner (when being socially close). Study 3 shows that participants created a more diverse team for another person (distance condition) than for themselves (proximity condition). In Study 4, participants did not create a more diverse group for a stranger (distance condition) than for a friend (adjusted proximity condition), however, participants weighted feasibility concerns less strongly for strangers than for friends. Implications for diversity research and practice are discussed

Catalyzing decisions: How a coin flip strengthens affective reactions

When individuals are undecided between options, they may flip a coin or use other aids that produce random outcomes to support decision-making. Such aids lead to clear suggestions, which, interestingly, individuals do not necessarily follow. Instead when looking at the outcome, individuals sometimes appear to like or dislike the suggestion, and then decide according to this feeling. In this manuscript we argue that such a decision aid can function as a catalyst. As it points to one option over the other, individuals focus on obtaining this option and engage in a more vivid representation of the same. By imagining obtaining the option, feelings related to the option become stronger, which then drive feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the outcome of the decision aid. We provide support for this phenomenon throughout two studies. Study 1 indicates that using a catalyst leads to stronger feelings. Study 2 replicates this finding using a different catalyst, and rules out alternative explanations. Here, participants report that after having used a catalyst, they experienced a stronger feeling of suddenly knowing what they want compared to the control group that did not use a catalyst. Implications of these results for research and practice are discussed

Truth or Tale? How Construal Level and Judgment Mode Affect Confidence and Accuracy in Deception Detection

Previous research has indicated that individuals typically perform quite poorly in discerning truths from lies, and that confidence in judged veracity is not predictive of objective accuracy. In this experiment, we investigated the joint influence of construal level and judgment mode on detection accuracy and confidence. Participants (N = 161) watched eight videotaped true and false statements while adopting a high or low level of construal, and received instructions to detect the deceptiveness of the statements either before (online judgments) or after (offline judgments) watching the videos. Contrary to our predictions, construal level and judgment mode did not influence detection accuracy independently or interactively. However, low level participants were less confident when making judgments offline as opposed to online, whereas the confidence of high level participants was unaffected by judgment mode. Implications for deception detection research and practice are discussed

Negative is true here and now, but not so much there and then: On the impact of psychological distance on the negativity bias

How do people judge the veracity of a message? The negativity bias in judgments of truth describes the phenomenon that the same message is more likely judged as true when framed negatively compared to positively. This manuscript investigates the negativity bias in conditions of psychological proximity and the possibility that the bias decreases when distance increases. This notion is informed by construal level theory, which holds that negative information is more salient and weighed more strongly in conditions of psychological proximity compared to distance. Against this background, we hypothesize that a negativity bias likely occurs in conditions of proximity. With increasing psychological distance, however, positively compared to negatively framed information is more likely to be judged true, therefore attenuating or even reversing the bias. Two studies provide preliminary yet weak support for this hypothesis. A final registered study put the preliminary conclusions to a critical test and yielded consistent results: We find a significant interaction between frame and distance, indicating a descriptive trend for a negativity bias in conditions of proximity, yet a positivity bias in conditions of distance. This interaction illustrates that psychological distance may impact the negativity bias in truth judgments

Can that be True or is it Just Fake News? New perspectives on the negativity bias in judgments of truth

In this chapter, we discuss the negativity bias in judgments of truth. This bias pertains to the finding that negatively compared to positively framed but content-wise identical statements are more likely to be judged as true. Deep-diving into the concept of the negativity bias, we speculate about potential moderators of the negativity bias that may critically impact individuals' tendency to believe a certain framing to be true. More specifically, we present current findings on (1) expectations in regards to the frequency of occurrence of the facts mentioned in the statements, (2) the source of the negativity, more specifically concept valence versus negation as a driver of the effect, and (3) psychological distance or individuals' construal level. All of these factors might critically impact whether or not individuals are likely to show a negativity bias in judgments of truth. We highlight why it is important in post-truth times to better understand how individuals come to make their judgments of truth. Furthermore, we conclude that insights into the malleability of truth judgments and how slight adjustments in the framing, content, or semantics of information impact evaluations are important to know for both those who intend to bias and those who intend to debias

Solve the dilemma by spinning a penny? On using randomdecision-making aids

When people find it difficult to make a decision, they may opt to let chance de cide. Flipping a coin, rolling a die, or using a counting-out rhyme are well-known decision aids. When individuals direc tly follow the aid's suggestion, the decision aid acts as a decider . But when the decision aid elicits a felt response, such as liking or disliking th e aid's suggestion, and individuals act upon this response, the decision aid serves as a catalyst . This manuscript investigates whether and how many individuals apply these two strategies. In four studies (total N = 1135), we focus on coin flips as one of the most common decision aids and place an emphasis on the catalyst strategy. We examine (1) the freq uency of previous experiences and future willingness to use a coin flip to make decisions, (2) which affective reactions accompan y the coin flip when using it as catalyst, and (3) the circumstances under which individuals are more versus less likely to a ccept the use of a random decision-making aid to come to a decision. These results illustrate the catalyst phenomenon but a lso highlight the boundary conditions of individuals' willingness to use randomness as an aid for decision making. We discuss d irections for future research as well as potential applications