54 research outputs found
Manifest Quasi-Universals and Embedding Conceptual Clusters
We start this article with a discussion of the problematics involved in translating into modern English a (modern) Chinese text concerning a classical Chinese notion, namely qíng 情. Then, we suggest that it is necessary to distinguish between two levels on which a language is used. The first is the manifest level, where one finds family resemblance between, say, Chinese nù 怒 and English “anger”. The second is the generic level, where one finds qíng in classical Chinese, qínggaˇn in modern Chinese, and emotion(s) in English. We argue that the meanings of words at the generic level can only be accessed via the manifest level. It is misleading to directly identify and compare notions at the generic level (in this case, emotion(s) in English and qíng in Chinese). We call the connections at the manifest level “quasi-universals”, and we refer to the notions at the generic level as “embedding conceptual clusters”
Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry
© 2014 by HYLE and Jaap van Brakel. In this paper I assess the relation between philosophy of chemistry and (general) philosophy of science, focusing on those themes in the philosophy of chemistry that may bring about major revisions or extensions of current philosophy of science. Three themes can claim to make a unique contribution to philosophy of science: first, the variety of materials in the (natural and artificial) world; second, extending the world by making new stuff; and, third, specific features of the relations between chemistry and physics.status: publishe
Porespace models for transport phenomena in porous media: Review and evaluation
A preprint of this article can be found in chapter 1 of Capillary Liquid Transport in Porous Media (1975).status: publishe
Meaning, prototypes and the future of cognitive science
In this paper I evaluate the soundness of the prototype paradigm, in particular its basic assumption that there are pan-human psychological essences or core meanings that refer to basic-level natural kinds, explaining why, on the whole, human communication and learning are successful. Instead I argue that there are no particular pan-human basic elements for thought, meaning and cognition, neither prototypes, nor otherwise. To illuminate my view I draw on examples from anthropology. More generally I argue that the prototype paradigm exemplifies two assumptions that dominate cognitive science: (1) If human beings use words they mean something particular and what they mean can be discovered by scientific methods. (2) There is a fixed number of domains of categorization, each made up of a fixed number of basic categories. I suggest that these two assumptions lead to Brave New World. © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers.status: publishe
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