Citizens’ ideology drives ideological polarization and partisanship in U.S state legislatures

The increasing partisanship and polarization present Congress has been subject to a great deal of study and many explanations as to its causes have been put forward. Justin H. Kirkland takes a different line in investigating polarization, by looking at how it varies between state legislatures. Using survey and roll call vote data from across the country, he argues that in those states with more ideologically disparate populations, legislative districts will become more extreme as people sort into them. This in turn will lead to their legislators expressing a higher degree of partisanship in the state legislature

The Relational Determinants of Legislative Success: Strong and Weak Ties Between Legislators

In the repeated interactions of a legislative session, legislators develop working relationships that can be used in the pursuit of legislative goals. I develop a theory of influence diffusion across a legislative network of relations based on strategic actors building relationships in order to increase legislative success. Building on sociological theory initially developed by Granovetter, my research indicates that it is the weak ties between legislators that are the most useful in increasing legislative success. I test my theory using state legislative data from eight state legislatures, along with a second analysis of the US House of Representatives. Empirical analysis provides consistent support for the notion that weak ties lead to legislative success

The relational nature of legislating

Since the economic revolution of the 1970's legislative scholars have produced important works examining the relationships between policy preferences and individual choices in a legislature. This focus on understanding individual preferences versus outcomes has led scholars to ignore potential inter-legislator influences on choices. In other words, in the study of relationships between a bill and a legislator scholarship has overlooked the importance of the relationship between one legislator and another legislator. These studies represent an effort to push our theoretical understanding of inter-legislator dynamics forward and build a more comprehensive understanding of how legislators influence, collaborate with, and cooperate with one another. Taken together they provide a unified picture of influence diffusion across a chamber by examining both how relationships between legislators affect outcomes and how institutions affect the formation of legislative relationships. Building on seminal sociological work on the importance of tie strength towards achieving an exogenous goal, I generate a novel theory of influence in a legislature. It will turn out that only the weakest ties between legislators actually produce changes in the probability a legislator will experience success. This is because weak ties between legislators are attempts to generate novel cooperation and support. Strongly tied legislators are strongly tied because of implicit support, thus the observation of the relational tie tells us nothing about their behaviors we could not have learned before a legislative session ever began. Strong ties do not indicate cooperation, they indicate similarity. Weak ties, however, occur between legislators fundamentally different most of the time, but who cooperate on some legislation in order to improve its odds of survival. It will also turn out that the formation of these cooperative ties is fundamentally effected by the behavioral constraints of a chamber. In particular, the nature of an electoral district and the size of a legislative chamber will play key roles in the development of cooperative relationships between legislators

The Relational Determinants of Legislative Outcomes: Strong and Weak Ties Between Legislators

In the repeated interactions of a legislative session, legislators develop working relationships that can be used in the pursuit of legislative goals. I develop a theory of influence diffusion across a legislative network of relations based on strategic actors building relationships in order to increase legislative success. Building on sociological theory initially developed by Granovetter, my research indicates that it is the weak ties between legislators that are the most useful in increasing legislative success. I test my theory using state legislative data from eight state legislatures, along with a second analysis of the U.S. House of Representatives. Empirical analysis provides consistent support for the notion that weak ties lead to legislative success

Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in British Parliament

Strong party discipline is a core feature of Westminster parliamentary systems. Parties typically compel Members of Parliament (MPs) to support the party position regardless of MPs' individual preferences. Rebellion, however, does occur. Using an original dataset of MP votes and speeches in the British House of Commons from 1992 to 2015, coupled with new estimations of MPs' ideological positions within their party, we find evidence that MPs use rebellion to strategically differentiate themselves from their party. The strategy that MPs employ is contingent upon an interaction of ideological extremity with party control of government. Extremists are loyal when their party is in the opposition, but these same extremists become more likely to rebel when their party controls government. Additionally, they emphasize their rebellion through speeches. Existing models of rebellion and party discipline do not account for government agenda control and do not explain these patterns

Replication data for: The Relational Nature of Legislating: Strong and Weak Ties Between Legislators

In the repeated interactions of a legislative session, legislators develop working relationships that can be used in the pursuit of legislative goals. I develop a theory of influence diffusion across a legislative network of relations based on strategic actors building relationships in order to increase legislative success. Building on sociological theory initially developed by Granovetter, my research indicates that it is the weak ties between legislators that are the most useful in increasing legislative success. I test my theory using state legislative data from eight state legislatures, along with a second analysis of the U.S. House of Representatives. Empirical analysis provides consistent support for the notion that weak ties lead to legislative success

Replication data for: Ideological Heterogeneity and Legislative Polarization in the United States

Legislative parties respond to the changing preferences of the citizens they represent through the adaptation and replacement of their members. This creates an indirect electoral connection between the aggregate preferences of citizens and the aggregate behavior of legislative parties. In this research, I argue that legislators from moderate districts are the least likely to support their legislative parties and most likely to vote moderately during roll call votes. I also argue that states with low ideological variance among citizens are the most likely to have moderate districts. This implies that states with ideologically heterogeneous populations are more likely to have homogeneous, ideologically extreme legislative parties. Using measures of legislative ideal points and party cohesion from U.S. state legislative parties, empirical evidence largely supports my expectations. The polarization and internal homogeneity of state legislative parties is at least partly attributable to the citizens those parties represent

Replication data for: Wallet Based Redistricting: Evidence for the Concentration of Wealth in Majority Party Districts

This article examines the role of wealth in the redistricting process in state legislative contests. I argue that the decision by state redistricting mapmakers to pursue a “seat-swing” or “protection” strategy involves more than just a choice between where to move partisan voters. Redistricting may also allow parties to consider wealth as an additional resource to be concentrated or dispersed across legislative districts. To test this wealth-based hypothesis, I examine state redistricting plans in California and North Carolina. Logistic regression analyses of census block-group exchanges between state legislative districts reveal that income plays a significant role in redistricting decisions

Replication data for: Partisanship and Reciprocity in Cross-Chamber Legislative Interactions

The bicameral nature of most U.S. legislatures implies that it is often in the interest of legislators to collaborate on legislation across chamber lines. In this research, we offer a novel theory of collaboration between upper and lower chamber members in U.S. legislatures. We expect that exogenous characteristics like party, constituency, and joint committee membership characterize collaboration across legislative chambers. Additionally, we expect that endogenous patterns of reciprocity will also characterize choices about cross-chamber collaboration. Using data on cross-chamber bill sponsorship in legislatures in Texas, Colorado, Maine, and Oklahoma, empirical evidence largely corroborates our expectations. Cross-chamber collaborative choices are reciprocal, and reciprocity occurs both within and between parties