84 research outputs found
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Determination of the response function for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant criticality accident alarm system neutron detectors
Neutron-sensitive radiation detectors are used in the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant`s (PORTS) criticality accident alarm system (CAAS). The CAAS is composed of numerous detectors, electronics, and logic units. It uses a telemetry system to sound building evacuation horns and to provide remote alarm status in a central control facility. The ANSI Standard for a CAAS uses a free-in-air dose rate to define the detection criteria for a minimum accident-of-concern. Previously, the free-in-air absorbed dose rate from neutrons was used for determining the areal coverge of criticality detection within PORTS buildings handling fissile materials. However, the free-in-air dose rate does not accurately reflect the response of the neutron detectors in use at PORTS. Because the cost of placing additional CAAS detectors in areas of questionable coverage (based on a free-in-air absorbed dose rate) is high, the actual response function for the CAAS neutron detectors was determined. This report, which is organized into three major sections, discusses how the actual response function for the PORTS CAAS neutron detectors was determined. The CAAS neutron detectors are described in Section 2. The model of the detector system developed to facilitate calculation of the response function is discussed in Section 3. The results of the calculations, including confirmatory measurements with neutron sources, are given in Section 4
DNA Damage during G2 Phase Does Not Affect Cell Cycle Progression of the Green Alga Scenedesmus quadricauda
DNA damage is a threat to genomic integrity in all living organisms. Plants and green algae are particularly susceptible to DNA damage especially that caused by UV light, due to their light dependency for photosynthesis. For survival of a plant, and other eukaryotic cells, it is essential for an organism to continuously check the integrity of its genetic material and, when damaged, to repair it immediately. Cells therefore utilize a DNA damage response pathway that is responsible for sensing, reacting to and repairing damaged DNA. We have studied the effect of 5-fluorodeoxyuridine, zeocin, caffeine and combinations of these on the cell cycle of the green alga Scenedesmus quadricauda. The cells delayed S phase and underwent a permanent G2 phase block if DNA metabolism was affected prior to S phase; the G2 phase block imposed by zeocin was partially abolished by caffeine. No cell cycle block was observed if the treatment with zeocin occurred in G2 phase and the cells divided normally. CDKA and CDKB kinases regulate mitosis in S. quadricauda; their kinase activities were inhibited by Wee1. CDKA, CDKB protein levels were stabilized in the presence of zeocin. In contrast, the protein level of Wee1 was unaffected by DNA perturbing treatments. Wee1 therefore does not appear to be involved in the DNA damage response in S. quadricauda. Our results imply a specific reaction to DNA damage in S. quadricauda, with no cell cycle arrest, after experiencing DNA damage during G2 phase
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Analysis of criticality accident alarm system coverage of the X-744G, X-744H, X-342/344A and X-343 facilities at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Additional services for the uranium enrichment cascade process, such as UF{sub 6} feed, sampling, and material storage are provided by several ancillary Uranium Material Handling (UMH) facilities at the PORTS site. These facilities include the X-343 Feed Vaporization and Sampling Facility, the X-744G Bulk Non-Uranium Enrichment Service Activity (UESA) Storage Building, the X-744H Waste Separation and Storage Facility, the X-344A Toll Enrichment Services Facility and the X-342A Feed Vaporization and Fluorine Generation Facility. As uranium operations are performed within these facilities, the potential for a criticality accident exists. In the event of a criticality accident within a process facility at PORTS, a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is in place to detect the criticality accident and sound an alarm. In this report, an analysis was performed to provide verification that the existing CAAS at PORTS provides complete criticality accident coverage in the X-343, X-744G. X-744H. X-344A and X-342A facilities. The analysis has determined that all of the above-mentioned facilities have complete CAAS coverage
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Verification of criticality accident alarm system detector locations for the X-326 process cell floor
Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) detectors on the cell floor of the X-326 process building at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) are located at a height of 5 m above the cell floor. It has been suggested that this height be lowered to I m to alleviate accelerated system failures caused by the elevated temperatures at 5 m and to reduce the frequency of injury to maintenance personnel lifting the approximately 90-lb units into position. Work has been performed which analyzed the effect of relocating the CAAS detectors on the process floors of the X-333 and X-330 buildings from their current height to a height of 1 m{sup 1}. This earlier work was based on criticality accidents occurring in low enriched material (5% {sup 235}U) and was limited to the X-333 and X-330 buildings and the low enriched areas of X-326. It did not consider the residual higher enriched material in the X-326 building. This report analyzes the effect on criticality alarm coverage of lowering the CAAS detectors. This analysis is based on criticality accidents resulting from higher enriched material which may be present as ``hold-up`` in the process equipment within the X-326 building. The criticality accident alarm detectors at the PORTS facility are set to alarm at a neutron absorbed dose rate of 5 mrad/hr. The calculated absorbed dose rates presented in this report show that the detectors examined that produce an alarm for the given criticality event at their current height will also produce an alarm if located at a height of 1 meter. Therefore, lowering the detectors will not result in a loss of coverage within the building
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Evaluation of coverage of enriched UF{sub 6} cylinder storage lots by existing criticality accident alarms
The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) is leased from the US Department of Energy (DOE) by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), a government corporation formed in 1993. PORTS is in transition from regulation by DOE to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). One regulation is 10 CFR Part 76.89, which requires that criticality alarm systems be provided for the site. PORTS originally installed criticality accident alarm systems in all building for which nuclear criticality accidents were credible. Currently, however, alarm systems are not installed in the enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) cylinder storage lots. This report analyzes and documents the extent to which enriched UF{sub 6} cylinder storage lots at PORTS are covered by criticality detectors and alarms currently installed in adjacent buildings. Monte Carlo calculations are performed on simplified models of the cylinder storage lots and adjacent buildings. The storage lots modelled are X-745B, X-745C, X745D, X-745E, and X-745F. The criticality detectors modelled are located in building X-343, the building X-344A/X-342A complex, and portions of building X-330. These criticality detectors are those located closest to the cylinder storage lots. Results of this analysis indicate that the existing criticality detectors currently installed at PORTS are largely ineffective in detecting neutron radiation from criticality accidents in most of the cylinder storage lots at PORTS, except sometimes along portions of their peripheries
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