Cortisol and alpha-Amylase Secretion Patterns between and within Depressed and Non-Depressed Individuals

ObjectivesAssociations between biological stress markers and depression are inconsistent across studies. We assessed whether inter- and intra-individual variability explain these inconsistencies.MethodsPair-matched depressed and non-depressed participants (N = 30) collected saliva thrice a day for 30 days, resulting in 90 measurements per individual. The relationships between measures of stress-system function and depression were examined at the group level by means of mixed model analyses, and at the individual level by means of pair-matched comparisons. The analyses were repeated after adjusting for time-varying lifestyle factors by means of time-series regression analyses.ResultsCortisol and α-amylase levels were higher, the α-amylase/cortisol ratio larger, and the daily cortisol slope steeper in the depressed compared to the non-depressed group. Adjusting for lifestyle factors and antidepressant use reduced the associations under study. In 40%-60% of the matched comparisons, depressed individuals had higher cortisol and α-amylase levels, a larger α-amylase/cortisol ratio, and a steeper daily slope than their non-depressed match, regardless of adjustment.ConclusionsOur group-level findings were mostly in line with the literature but generalization to individuals appeared troublesome. Findings of studies on this topic should be interpreted with care, because in clinical practice the focus is on individuals instead of groups

Conceiving “personality”: Psychologist’s challenges and basic fundamentals of the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals

Scientists exploring individuals, as such scientists are individuals themselves and thus not independent from their objects of research, encounter profound challenges; in particular, high risks for anthropo-, ethno- and ego-centric biases and various fallacies in reasoning. The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) aims to tackle these challenges by exploring and making explicit the philosophical presuppositions that are being made and the metatheories and methodologies that are used in the field. This article introduces basic fundamentals of the TPS-Paradigm including the epistemological principle of complementarity and metatheoretical concepts for exploring individuals as living organisms. Centrally, the TPS-Paradigm considers three metatheoretical properties (spatial location in relation to individuals’ bodies, temporal extension, and physicality versus “non-physicality”) that can be conceived in different forms for various kinds of phenomena explored in individuals (morphology, physiology, behaviour, the psyche, semiotic representations, artificially modified outer appearances and contexts). These properties, as they determine the phenomena’s accessibility in everyday life and research, are used to elaborate philosophy-of-science foundations and to derive general methodological implications for the elementary problem of phenomenon-methodology matching and for scientific quantification of the various kinds of phenomena studied. On the basis of these foundations, the article explores the metatheories and methodologies that are used or needed to empirically study each given kind of phenomenon in individuals in general. Building on these general implications, the article derives special implications for exploring individuals’ “personality”, which the TPS-Paradigm conceives of as individual-specificity in all of the various kinds of phenomena studied in individuals

Personality psychology: Lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts reveal only half of the story—Why it is time for a paradigm shift

This article develops a comprehensive philosophy-of-science for personality psychology that goes far beyond the scope of the lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts that currently prevail. One of the field’s most important guiding scientific assumptions, the lexical hypothesis, is analysed from meta-theoretical viewpoints to reveal that it explicitly describes two sets of phenomena that must be clearly differentiated: 1) lexical repertoires and the representations that they encode and 2) the kinds of phenomena that are represented. Thus far, personality psychologists largely explored only the former, but have seriously neglected studying the latter. Meta-theoretical analyses of these different kinds of phenomena and their distinct natures, commonalities, differences, and interrelations reveal that personality psychology’s focus on lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts entails a) erroneous meta-theoretical assumptions about what the phenomena being studied actually are, and thus how they can be analysed and interpreted, b) that contemporary personality psychology is largely based on everyday psychological knowledge, and c) a fundamental circularity in the scientific explanations used in trait psychology. These findings seriously challenge the widespread assumptions about the causal and universal status of the phenomena described by prominent personality models. The current state of knowledge about the lexical hypothesis is reviewed, and implications for personality psychology are discussed. Ten desiderata for future research are outlined to overcome the current paradigmatic fixations that are substantially hampering intellectual innovation and progress in the field

Living with a body separate from the self. the experience of the body in chronic benign low back pain: an interpretative phenomenological analysis

This paper presents an in‐depth, idiographic study exploring the personal experience of chronic benign low back pain in relation to the participant's body and sense of self. Semi‐structured interviews were conducted with patients and the resultant transcripts subjected to interpretative phenomenological analysis. One theme is presented in detail: ‘Living with a body separate from the self’, whereby when out of pain the body has little salience to the self yet when in pain it is consciously excluded from the self. The complex and paradoxical relationship between the body, chronic pain and the self is explored and evidence is provided to argue that the embodied unpleasantness of chronic pain involves an assault upon and a defence of a preferred or desirable self. The results are considered in relation to relevant themes in the extant literature