Vicarious Learning from Human Models in Monkeys

We examined whether monkeys can learn by observing a human model, through vicarious learning. Two monkeys observed a human model demonstrating an object–reward association and consuming food found underneath an object. The monkeys observed human models as they solved more than 30 learning problems. For each problem, the human models made a choice between two objects, one of which concealed a piece of apple. In the test phase afterwards, the monkeys made a choice of their own. Learning was apparent from the first trial of the test phase, confirming the ability of monkeys to learn by vicarious observation of human models

Speed has an effect on multiple-object tracking independently of the number of close encounters between targets and distractors

Multiple-object tracking (MOT) studies have shown that tracking ability declines as object speed increases. However, this might be attributed solely to the increased number of times that target and distractor objects usually pass close to each other (“close encounters”) when speed is increased, resulting in more target–distractor confusions. The present study investigates whether speed itself affects MOT ability by using displays in which the number of close encounters is held constant across speeds. Observers viewed several pairs of disks, and each pair rotated about the pair’s midpoint and, also, about the center of the display at varying speeds. Results showed that even with the number of close encounters held constant across speeds, increased speed impairs tracking performance, and the effect of speed is greater when the number of targets to be tracked is large. Moreover, neither the effect of number of distractors nor the effect of target–distractor distance was dependent on speed, when speed was isolated from the typical concomitant increase in close encounters. These results imply that increased speed does not impair tracking solely by increasing close encounters. Rather, they support the view that speed affects MOT capacity by requiring more attentional resources to track at higher speeds

Are women better mindreaders? Sex differences in neural correlates of mentalizing detected with functional MRI

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The ability to mentalize, i.e. develop a Theory of Mind (ToM), enables us to anticipate and build a model of the thoughts, emotions and intentions of others. It has long been hypothesised that women differ from men in their mentalizing abilities. In the present fMRI study we examined the impact of (1) gender (women vs. men) and (2) game partner (human vs. computer) on ToM associated neural activity in the medial prefrontal cortex. Groups of men (n = 12) and women (n = 12) interacted in an iterated classical prisoner's dilemma forced choice situation with alleged human and computer partners who were outside the scanner.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Both the conditions of playing against putative human as well as computer partners led to activity increases in mPFC, ACC and rTPJ, constituting the classic ToM network. However, mPFC/ACC activity was more pronounced when participants believed they were playing against the alleged human partner. Differences in the medial frontal lobe activation related to the sex of the participants could be demonstrated for the human partner > computer partner contrast.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Our data demonstrate differences in medial prefrontal brain activation during a ToM task depending on both the gender of participants and the game partner.</p

Can Monkeys Make Investments Based on Maximized Pay-off?

Animals can maximize benefits but it is not known if they adjust their investment according to expected pay-offs. We investigated whether monkeys can use different investment strategies in an exchange task. We tested eight capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and thirteen macaques (Macaca fascicularis, Macaca tonkeana) in an experiment where they could adapt their investment to the food amounts proposed by two different experimenters. One, the doubling partner, returned a reward that was twice the amount given by the subject, whereas the other, the fixed partner, always returned a constant amount regardless of the amount given. To maximize pay-offs, subjects should invest a maximal amount with the first partner and a minimal amount with the second. When tested with the fixed partner only, one third of monkeys learned to remove a maximal amount of food for immediate consumption before investing a minimal one. With both partners, most subjects failed to maximize pay-offs by using different decision rules with each partner' quality. A single Tonkean macaque succeeded in investing a maximal amount to one experimenter and a minimal amount to the other. The fact that only one of over 21 subjects learned to maximize benefits in adapting investment according to experimenters' quality indicates that such a task is difficult for monkeys, albeit not impossible

Evidence for Two Numerical Systems That Are Similar in Humans and Guppies

Background: Humans and non-human animals share an approximate non-verbal system for representing and comparing numerosities that has no upper limit and for which accuracy is dependent on the numerical ratio. Current evidence indicates that the mechanism for keeping track of individual objects can also be used for numerical purposes; if so, its accuracy will be independent of numerical ratio, but its capacity is limited to the number of items that can be tracked, about four. There is, however, growing controversy as to whether two separate number systems are present in other vertebrate species. Methodology/Principal Findings: In this study, we compared the ability of undergraduate students and guppies to discriminate the same numerical ratios, both within and beyond the small number range. In both students and fish the performance was ratio-independent for the numbers 1–4, while it steadily increased with numerical distance when larger numbers were presented. Conclusions/Significance: Our results suggest that two distinct systems underlie quantity discrimination in both humans and fish, implying that the building blocks of uniquely human mathematical abilities may be evolutionarily ancient, datin

Causality and continuity close the gaps in event representations

International audienceImagine you see a video of someone pulling back their leg to kick a soccer ball, and then a soccer ball soaring toward a goal. You would likely infer that these scenes are two parts of the same event, and this inference would likely cause you to remember having seen the moment the person kicked the soccer ball, even if that information was never actually presented (Strickland & Keil, 2011, Cognition, 121[3], 409–415). What cues trigger people to "fill in" causal events from incomplete information? Is it due to the experience they have had with soccer balls being kicked toward goals? Is it the visual similarity of the object in both halves of the video? Or is it the mere spatiotemporal continuity of the event? In three experiments, we tested these different potential mechanisms underlying the "filling-in" effect. Experiment 1 showed that filling in occurs equally in familiar and unfamiliar contexts, indicating that familiarity with specific event schemas is unnecessary to trigger false memory. Experiment 2 showed that the visible continuation of a launched object’s trajectory is all that is required to trigger filling in, regardless of other occurrences in the second half of the scene. Finally, Experiment 3 found that, using naturalistic videos, this filling-in effect is more heavily affected if the object’s trajectory is discontinuous in space/time compared with if the object undergoes a noticeable transformation. Together, these findings indicate that the spontaneous formation of causal event representations is driven by object representation systems that prioritize spatiotemporal information over other object features