Representationalism and the Intentionality of Moods

It seems hard to comprehend how, during mood experience, the ‘inner’ meets the ‘outer’. The objective of this paper is to show that a currently popular attempt at providing a neat solution to that problem fails. The attempt comes under the heading of representationalism, according to which the phenomenal aspects of mood are exhausted by its representational content. I examine three accounts of intentionality developed within the representationalist camp, and I show that they incur phenomenological and metaphysical costs. © 2017, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

Medical conditions in autism spectrum disorders

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a behaviourally defined syndrome where the etiology and pathophysiology is only partially understood. In a small proportion of children with the condition, a specific medical disorder is identified, but the causal significance in many instances is unclear. Currently, the medical conditions that are best established as probable causes of ASD include Fragile X syndrome, Tuberous Sclerosis and abnormalities of chromosome 15 involving the 15q11-13 region. Various other single gene mutations, genetic syndromes, chromosomal abnormalities and rare de novo copy number variants have been reported as being possibly implicated in etiology, as have several ante and post natal exposures and complications. However, in most instances the evidence base for an association with ASD is very limited and largely derives from case reports or findings from small, highly selected and uncontrolled case series. Not only therefore, is there uncertainty over whether the condition is associated, but the potential basis for the association is very poorly understood. In some cases the medical condition may be a consequence of autism or simply represent an associated feature deriving from an underlying shared etiology. Nevertheless, it is clear that in a growing proportion of individuals potentially causal medical conditions are being identified and clarification of their role in etio-pathogenesis is necessary. Indeed, investigations into the causal mechanisms underlying the association between conditions such as tuberous sclerosis, Fragile X and chromosome 15 abnormalities are beginning to cast light on the molecular and neurobiological pathways involved in the pathophysiology of ASD. It is evident therefore, that much can be learnt from the study of probably causal medical disorders as they represent simpler and more tractable model systems in which to investigate causal mechanisms. Recent advances in genetics, molecular and systems biology and neuroscience now mean that there are unparalleled opportunities to test causal hypotheses and gain fundamental insights into the nature of autism and its development

The real trouble with recalcitrant emotions

Cognitivists (sometimes called ‘Judgementalists’) about the emotions minimally hold that it is a necessary condition for being in an emotional state that one make a certain judgement or have a certain belief. For example, if I am angry with Sam, then I must believe that Sam has wronged me. Perhaps I must also elicit a certainly bodily response or undergo some relevant experience, but crucial to the view is the belief or judgement. In the face of ‘recalcitrant emotions’, this once very popular view has come under heavy criticism that has led many theorists to either abandon the view or to offer more nuanced representational views of the emotions. Against what seems to now be received wisdom, I argue that cognitivists have tools at their disposal that allow them to alleviate the apparent conflicts presented by cases of recalcitrance. But I also believe that cognitivists are still in trouble. Although cognitivists have a range of underexplored resources, their use comes at a high cost. In particular, cognitivists must adopt a widespread and thoroughgoing inaccessibility to our own thoughts and judgements that should strike one as implausible. It is mental opacity rather than mental conflict that is the real problem posed by recalcitrance

The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology

Emotion theory includes attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to states such as bodily feelings, beliefs-desire combinations, and evaluative judgements. Resistance to such approaches is motivated by the claim that emotions possess a sui generis phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel defends a new form of emotion reductivism which avoids positing irreducible emotional phenomenology by specifying emotions’ phenomenal character in terms of a combination of other phenomenologies. This article argues Kriegel’s approach, and similar proposals, are unsuccessful, since typical emotional experiences are constituted by sui generis feelings towards value