Local and global interactions in an evolutionary resource game

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Individual payoffs are affected by both global factors, namely, aggregate harvest and resource stock level, and local factors, such as the imposition of sanctions on neighbors by enforcers. The evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation, based on local interaction or locally available information. Numerous types of equilibria exist in these settings. An important new finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors. We discuss how the results contrast with the non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and Somanathan (American Economic Review 86(4):766–789, 1996)

Environment, Inequality and Collective Action

Efficiency is the hallmark of environmental economics, and though economists are concerned with the environment, primarily because it challenges the efficiency of competitive markets, until now, limited attention has been paid to distributional issues. This excellent collection of essays identifies and addresses key issues surrounding the inequality-environment relationship such as: * Does increasing economic inequality lead to better or worse environmental quality? * Which individual or social features play a role in determining the differentiated impact of changes in the environment? * What impact does economic inequality or social segmentation have on collective action? * How important is the complex economic and social institution in which the inequality-environment takes place? With an impressive array of contributors and an excellent mix of popular and noteworthy topics, this latest addition to the Routledge Siena Studies in Political Economy series will prove essential to economists with an interest in the environment and will be useful to readers with a more general environmental studies background

Equity, efficiency and inequality traps: A research agenda

This paper discusses a research agenda that arises from unanswered questions and unresolved issues considered in the World Bank’s World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development. After formalizing the key concepts of equity; equality of opportunity; and efficiency, and proposing a definition for an equitable development policy, the paper discusses the concept of inequality traps, around which the research agenda is structured. Four broad groups of research questions are highlighted: those revolving around the measurement of inequality of opportunity and the diagnostics for the existence of an inequality trap; those dealing with the causes of inequality traps; the quantification of their efficiency costs; and those related to how institutions (including governments) evolve to overcome inequality traps. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007equity, equality of opportunity, inequality traps.,

Inequality and mobility

Intergenerational mobility, Inequality, Educational policy,