The Role of Risk Management and Governance in Determining Audit Demand

Most prior research into audit fees has been based on a theoretical model which treats audit fees as the by-product of a production function ignoring potential demand forces that may drive the level of the audit fee. Inspired by prior 'anomalous' results, we take a different perspective by focusing on demand factors that may affect the level of the audit fee. Using data collected from a sample of listed companies in Belgium, we consider both disclosures about risk and risk management and actual decisions about corporate governance to examine whether audit fees are higher when these demand forces exist. In general, we expect that external auditing will increase in situations where there are multiple stakeholders with individual risk profiles who can shift some of the cost of monitoring to other stakeholders. Consistent with our theory and expectations, our results indicate that audit fees are higher when a company has an audit committee, discloses a relatively high level of financial risk management, and has a larger proportion of independent Board Members. Audit fees are lower when a company discloses a relatively high level of compliance risk management. The latter result indicates that controls are only complementary as long as they are voluntary, as mandated controls act as substitutes for non-mandated controls. Copyright 2006 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

A Comparative Analysis of Auditor, Manager and Financial Analyst Interpretations of "SFAS 5" Disclosure Guidelines

This study examines empirically whether financial analysts (users), as well as managers (preparers) and external auditors ascribe different interpretations to the SFAS 5 disclosure criteria. We find: (1) financial analysts are, on average, more conservative than managers and auditors in their numerical interpretations of both the 'remote' and 'probable' verbal phrases; (2) managers and auditors share very similar numerical interpretations of these verbal phrases; (3) audit partners' numerical interpretations of the 'remote' region are between those of managers and users, whereas audit managers align their numerical interpretations with those of managers. One danger is that preparers of financial statements may omit loss contingency information that users consider valuable. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2004.

The Effect of Corporate Status on External Audit Fees: Evidence From the UK

This paper simultaneously examines, for the first time, the determinants of external audit fees of UK companies drawn from the quoted sector (Main Market, the Alternative Investment Market and Ofex), and the unquoted sector (public and private limited companies). The paper also provides new evidence on the effects of corporate failure and the persistence of the big four and mid-tier auditor premiums across the public and private corporate sectors. After controlling for firm size, audit risk and complexity, we find that quoted and unquoted public limited companies have significantly higher audit fees than their private limited counterparts. Our estimates imply that relative premiums for market/corporate form are as follows: Main Market over AIM, 6.8%; AIM over Ofex, 19.5%; Ofex over unquoted plc, 15.5%; and unquoted plc over private, 16.7%. However, despite indications in prior US research to the contrary, we find no evidence that insolvent firms that failed were charged higher audit fees in the year preceding failure. A positive relationship is also found between audit and consultancy fees - a result that persists using an instrumental variables approach to control for endogeneity. Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.