Motivation by Ideal

I offer an account of how ideals motivate us. My account suggests that although emulating an ideal is often rational, it can lead us to do irrational things

Anonymity in Predicting the Future

Consider an arbitrary set $S$ and an arbitrary function $f : \mathbb{R} \to S$. We think of the domain of $f$ as representing time, and for each $x \in \mathbb{R}$, we think of $f(x)$ as the state of some system at time $x$. Imagine that, at each time $x$, there is an agent who can see $f \upharpoonright (-\infty, x)$ and is trying to guess $f(x)$--in other words, the agent is trying to guess the present state of the system from its past history. In a 2008 paper, Christopher Hardin and Alan Taylor use the axiom of choice to construct a strategy that the agents can use to guarantee that, for every function $f$, all but countably many of them will guess correctly. In a 2013 monograph they introduce the idea of anonymous guessing strategies, in which the agents can see the past but don't know where they are located in time. In this paper we consider a number of variations on anonymity. For instance, what if, in addition to not knowing where they are located in time, agents also do not know the rate at which time is progressing? What if they have no sense of how much time elapses between any two events? We show that in some cases agents can still guess successfully, while in others they perform very poorly.Comment: 12 pages, 1 figur

On Gauss's first proof of the fundamental theorem of algebra

Carl Friedrich Gauss is often given credit for providing the first correct proof of the fundamental theorem of algebra in his 1799 doctoral dissertation. However, Gauss's proof contained a significant gap. In this paper, we give an elementary way of filling the gap in Gauss's proof.Comment: 9 pages, 1 figure. To appear in American Mathematical Monthl

Beyond Price

In nine lively essays, bioethicist J. David Velleman challenges the prevailing consensus about assisted suicide and reproductive technology, articulating an original approach to the ethics of creating and ending human lives. He argues that assistance in dying is appropriate only at the point where talk of suicide is not, and he raises moral objections to anonymous donor conception. In their place, Velleman champions a morality of valuing personhood over happiness in making end-of-life decisions, and respecting the personhood of future children in making decisions about procreation. These controversial views are defended with philosophical rigor while remaining accessible to the general reader. Written over Velleman's 30 years of undergraduate teaching in bioethics, the essays have never before been collected and made available to a non-academic audience. They will open new lines of debate on issues of intense public interest

Well‐Being And Time

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/138420/1/papq00410.pd

Beyond Price

In nine lively essays, bioethicist J. David Velleman challenges the prevailing consensus about assisted suicide and reproductive technology, articulating an original approach to the ethics of creating and ending human lives. He argues that assistance in dying is appropriate only at the point where talk of suicide is not, and he raises moral objections to anonymous donor conception. In their place, Velleman champions a morality of valuing personhood over happiness in making end-of-life decisions, and respecting the personhood of future children in making decisions about procreation. These controversial views are defended with philosophical rigor while remaining accessible to the general reader. Written over Velleman's 30 years of undergraduate teaching in bioethics, the essays have never before been collected and made available to a non-academic audience. They will open new lines of debate on issues of intense public interest