The expectations trap hypothesis

This article explores a hypothesis about the take-off in inflation in the early 1970s. According to the expectations trap hypothesis, the Fed was driven to high money growth by a fear of violating the expectations of high inflation that existed at the time. The authors argue that this hypothesis is more compelling than the Phillips curve hypothesis, according to which the Fed produced the high inflation as an unfortunate by product of a conscious decision to jump start a weak economy.Inflation (Finance) ; Phillips curve

Taylor rules in a limited participation model

The authors use the limited participation model of money to study Taylor rules' operating characteristics for setting the interest rate. Rules are evaluated according to their ability to protect the economy from bad outcomes like the burst of inflation observed in the 1970s. On the basis of their analysis, the authors argue for a rule that 1) raises the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with a rise in inflation; and 2) does not change the interest rate in response to a change in output relative to trend.Monetary policy ; Interest rates

The expectations trap hypothesis

The authors examine the inflation take-off of the early 1970s in terms of the expectations trap hypothesis, according to which fear of violating the public’s inflation expectations pushed the Fed into producing high inflation. This interpretation is compared with the Phillips curve hypothesis, according to which the Fed produced high inflation as the unfortunate byproduct of a conscious decision to jump-start a weak economy. Which hypothesis is more plausible has important implications for what should be done to prevent future inflation flare-ups.Inflation (Finance) ; Phillips curve ; Economic conditions - United States

The Expectations Trap Hypothesis

We explore a hypothesis about the take-off in inflation that occurred in the early 1970s. According to the expectations trap hypothesis, the Fed was pushed into producing the high inflation out of a fear of violating the public's inflation expectations. We compare this hypothesis with the Phillips curve hypothesis, according to which the Fed produced the high inflation as an unfortunate by-product of a conscious decision to jump-start a weak economy. Which hypothesis is more plausible has important implications for what needs to be done to prevent other inflation flare-ups.

Entry dynamics and the decline in exchange-rate pass-through

The degree of exchange-rate pass-through to import prices is low. An average passthrough estimate for the 1980s would be roughly 50 percent for the United States implying that, following a 10 percent depreciation of the dollar, a foreign exporter selling to the U.S. market would raise its price in the United States by 5 percent. Moreover, substantial evidence indicates that the degree of pass-through has since declined to about 30 percent. ; Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2010) demonstrate that, in the presence of pricing complementarity, trade integration spurred by lower costs for importers can account for a significant portion of the decline in pass-through. In our framework, pass-through declines solely because of markup adjustments along the intensive margin. ; In this paper, we model how the entry and exit decisions of exporting firms affect passthrough. This is particularly important since the decline in pass-through has occurred as a greater concentration of foreign firms are exporting to the United States. ; We find that the effect of entry on pass-through is quantitatively small and is more than offset by the adjustment of markups that arise only along the intensive margin. Even though entry has a relatively small impact on pass-through, it nevertheless plays an important role in accounting for the secular rise in imports relative to GDP. In particular, our model suggests that over 3/4 of the rise in the U.S. import share since the early 1980s is due to trade in new goods. ; Thus, a key insight of this paper is that adjustment of markups that occur along the intensive margin are quantitatively more important in accounting for secular changes in pass-through than adjustments that occur along the extensive margin.

Monetary policy in a financial crisis

What are the economic effects of an interest rate cut when an economy is in the midst of a financial crisis? Under what conditions will a cut stimulate output and employment, and raise welfare? Under which will it have the opposite effects? The authors answer these questions in a general class of open-economy models, modeling a financial crisis as a time when collateral constraints are suddenly binding. They find that when there are frictions in adjusting the level of output in the traded goods sector and the rate at which that output can be used in other parts of the economy, a cut in the interest rate is most likely to result in a welfare-reducing drop in output and employment. When these frictions are absent, a cut in the interest rate improves asset positions and promotes a welfare-increasing economic expansion.Financial crises ; Monetary policy ; Interest rates

Monetary policy in a financial crisis

What are the economic effects of an interest rate cut when an economy is in the midst of a financial crisis? Under what conditions will a cut stimulate output and employment, and raise welfare? Under what conditions will a cut have the opposite effects? We answer these questions in a general class of open economy models, where a financial crisis is modeled as a time when collateral constraints are suddenly binding. We find that when there are frictions in adjusting the level of output in the traded good sector and in adjusting the rate at which that output can be used in other parts of the economy, then a cut in the interest rate is most likely to result in a welfare-reducing fall in output and employment. When these frictions are absent, a cut in the interest rate improves asset positions and promotes a welfare-increasing economic expansion.Monetary policy ; Financial crises

Monetary Policy in an International Financial Crisis

We explore the role of monetary policy in the aftermath of a financial crisis. We develop a small open economy model with limited participation of households in a financial intermediary that provides liquidity to satisfy firms' working capital needs. Firms require two forms of working capital: domestic funds to pay for the wage bill and foreign funds to finance imports of intermediate goods. A shortage of either one of the sources of working capital acts as a drag on economic activity. In normal times, an interest rate cut is expansionary. In a financial crisis, collateral constraints bind and an expansion of domestic liquidity leads to a real exchange rate depreciation that further tightens the collateral constraint and offsets the traditional (expansionary) liquidity channel. In addition, the tightening of the collateral constraint places a premium on paying off foreign debt, reinforcing the contractionary effects of an interest rate cut. We study the conditions under which such monetary policy action is contractionary and relate them to recent emerging market crises.

Monetary Policy in a Financial Crisis

What are the economic effects of an interest rate cut when an economy is in the midst of a financial crisis? Under what conditions will a cut stimulate output and employment, and raise welfare? Under what conditions will a cut have the opposite e ffects? We answer these questions in a general class of open economy models, where a financial crisis is modeled as a time when collateral constraints are suddenly binding. We find that when there are frictions in adjusting the level of output in the traded good sector and in adjusting the rate at which that output can be used in other parts of the economy, then a cut in the interest rate is most likely to result in a welfare-reducing fall in output and employment. When these frictions are absent, a cut in the interest rate improves asset positions and promotes a welfare-increasing economic expansion.

The Transmission of Domestic Shocks in the Open Economy

This paper uses an open economy DSGE model to explore how trade openness affects the transmission of domestic shocks. For some calibrations, closed and open economies appear dramatically different, reminiscent of the implications of Mundell-Fleming style models. However, we argue such stark differences hinge on calibrations that impose an implausibly high trade price elasticity and Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Overall, our results suggest that the main effects of openness are on the composition of expenditure, and on the wedge between consumer and domestic prices, rather than on the response of aggregate output and domestic prices.