Coöperatie in spelshows

In this chapter, we argue that game shows can be a useful source of data to study cooperative behavior. The unique combination of well-defined decision problems and large stakes makes game show data complementary to both experimental and field data. Over the past years, a number of TV shows have employed a vari- ant of the prisoner’s dilemma. We summarize the results of five different studies that use these shows to test a broad range of hypotheses. Finally, we discuss caveats of game show data, and contend that the potential problems are mostly not very different from those with experimental and field data

Can the Market Divide and Multiply? A Case of 807 Percent Mispricing

This paper documents a strong violation of the law of one price surrounding a large rights issue. If prices are right, the relation between the prices of shares and rights follows the outcome of a simple calculation. In the case of Royal Imtech N.V. in 2014, prices deviated sharply and persistently from the theoretical prediction. Throughout the term of the rights, investors were buying shares at prices that were many times what they should have been given the price of the rights. Short-selling constraints in the form of high recall risk and lacking stock lending supply are the most likely explanation for the failure of arbitrage as a safeguard of market efficiency. Still, it remains remarkable that investors were buying large volumes of shares at highly inflated prices in the presence of a cheap, perfect substitute

Standing united or falling divided? High stakes bargaining in a TV game show

We examine high stakes three-person bargaining in a game show where contestants bargain over a large money amount that is split into three unequal shares. We find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make concessions, and take home larger amounts. Contestants who announce that they will not back down do well relative to others, but they do not secure larger absolute amounts and they harm others. There is no evidence of a first-mover advantage and little evidence that demographic characteristics matter

Incentives, Performance and Choking in Darts

This paper examines the effect of incentives on the performance of darts players. We analyze four data sets comprising a total of 123,402 darts matches of professional, amateur, and youth players. The game of darts offers an attractive natural research setting, because performance can be observed at the individual level and without the obscuring effects of risk considerations and the behavior of others. We find that amateur and youth players perform better under moderately higher incentives, but choke when the incentives are really high. Professional players similarly display better performance under higher incentives, but appear less susceptible of choking. These results speak to a growing literature on the limits of increasing incentives as a recipe for better performance

Gender and Willingness to Compete for High Stakes

We examine gender differences in willingness to compete, using data from a TV game show where in each episode the winner of an elimination competition in expectation wins hundreds of thousands of euros. At several stages of the elimination competition, contestants face a choice between continuing to compete and opting out in exchange for a comparatively modest prize. When there is no strategic interaction embedded in this choice, we observe the well-known pattern that women compete less than men, but this difference derives entirely from women avoiding competition against men. When there is strategic interaction and contestants should factor in their opponents’ willingness to compete, women again tend to avoid competing against men; men then seem to anticipate the lower competitiveness of female opponents, as evidenced by their greater propensity to compete against women. Ability differences are unlikely to explain these results. Our findings show that the gender difference in willingness to compete that is well-documented in the experimental economics literature also occurs in a quasi-experimental real-world setting with exceptionally high stakes, and underline the importance of the gender of competitors

Does Losing Lead to Winning? An Empirical Analysis for Four Sports

Berger and Pope (2011) show that being slightly behind increases the likelihood of winning in professional (National Basketball Association; NBA) and collegiate (National Collegiate Athletic Association; NCAA) basketball. We extend their analysis to large samples of Australian football, American football, and rugby matches, but find no evidence of such an effect for these three sports. When we revisit the phenomenon for basketball, we only find supportive evidence for NBA matches from the period analyzed in Berger and Pope (2011). There is no significant effect for NBA matches from outside this sample period, for NCAA matches, or for matches from the Women’s National Basketball Association. High-powered meta-analyses across the different sports and competitions do not reject the null hypothesis of no effect of being slightly behind on winning. The confidence intervals suggest that the true effect, if existent at all, is likely relatively small