Measuring media plurality: lessons from the UK

This article considers the rationales for, and techniques used to promote, media pluralism. It examines why structural regulation is so controversial, with specific reference to the uncertainties surrounding cause and effect in the media field and the technical and economic complexity of media markets. The paper then considers how UK strategy on media ownership controls has evolved over the last thirty years, increasingly reliant on the 'media plurality' test incorporated in the Enterprise Act 2002. It suggests that a radical re-appraisal of the test is necessary in light of the perceived risk of political intervention and the length and uncertainty surrounding the two investigations that have taken place to date. The paper examines the innovative ?share of reference? test developed by Ofcom in the News Corporation/BSkyB takeover bid and contrasts it with techniques employed in the United States and a number of European countries. It suggests that, of the various forms of measurement that can be employed in this context, consumer exposure appears best able to address converging media markets and provide, an admittedly indirect, indication of media influence. It similarly suggests that fixed ownership limits, though currently out of fashion, provide a relatively clear and effective form of control, reducing potential concerns over agency capture and political influence. It concludes by identifying certain areas where further coordinated research is desirable and notes the potential role that can be played by the European Union in this context

Another piece of the puzzle: Firms’ investment in training as production of optimal skills inventory

Abstract Background By applying the inventory theory to hiring skilled workers under uncertainty, the authors explain how firms decide on their optimum investment in an “inventory of skills.” This paper investigates the conditions under which firms are willing to make investments in a skilled workforce themselves rather than relying on skills produced within the education system or by other companies. By applying inventory theory to investments into apprenticeship training, the authors explain how firms decide on producing an optimum “inventory of skills” today to meet future demand. The authors derive hypotheses on how much firms are willing to invest in having a larger inventory of skilled workers depending on different types of inventory costs (overage costs, underage costs, demand structure). Methods The authors use data from the BIBB Cost–Benefit-Survey 2012/2013, which comprises detailed information on different costs and benefits of training investments from the firm’s perspective. The study applies a negative binomial estimation model. Results Results are threefold: firms are willing to invest in a larger inventory of skilled workers, i.e., to train more apprentices, first, if the costs of producing and retaining an excessive number of skilled workers (overage costs) are lower, second, if the costs of being short of skilled workers (underage costs) are higher, and third, given an identical cost structure, if it is more likely that the demand for skilled workers may be high in the future. Even more important is the relationship of the three: the combination of a firm’s critical ratio (underage costs in relation to overage costs) with its demand structure (industry volatility) is associated with a higher inventory of skills. Conclusion The findings (particularly the relation of underage and overage costs, in combination with the demand structure) have important policy implications for firms’ incentives to invest in apprenticeship training