Moving Stories: Agency, Emotion and Practical Rationality

What is it to be an agent? One influential line of thought, endorsed by G. E. M. Anscombe and David Velleman, among others, holds that agency depends on practical rationality—the ability to act for reasons, rather than being merely moved by causes. Over the past 25 years, Velleman has argued compellingly for a distinctive view of agency and the practical rationality with which he associates it. On Velleman’s conception, being an agent consists in having the capacity to be motivated by a drive to act for reasons. Your bodily movements qualify as genuine actions insofar as they are motivated in part by your desire to behave in a way that makes sense to yourself. However, there are at least two distinct ways of spelling out what this drive towards self-intelligibility consists in, both present in Velleman’s work. It might consist in a drive towards intelligibility in causal-psychological terms: roughly, a drive to maximize the rational coherence of your psychological states. Alternatively, it might consist in a drive towards narrative intelligibility: a drive to make your ongoing activity conform to a recognizable narrative structure, where that structure is understood emotionally. Velleman originally saw these options as basically equivalent, but later came to prioritize the drive towards causal-psychological intelligibility over that towards narrative intelligibility. I argue that this gets things the wrong way round—we should instead understand our capacities to render ourselves intelligible in causal-psychological terms as built upon a bedrock of emotionally suffused narrative understanding. In doing so, we resolve several problems for Velleman’s view, and pave the way for an embodied, embedded and affective account of practical rationality and agency. According to the picture that emerges, practical rationality is essential to agency, narrative understanding is essential to practical rationality, and the rhythms and structures patterning the ebb and flow of our emotional lives are essential to narrative understanding

Boolean Dynamics with Random Couplings

This paper reviews a class of generic dissipative dynamical systems called N-K models. In these models, the dynamics of N elements, defined as Boolean variables, develop step by step, clocked by a discrete time variable. Each of the N Boolean elements at a given time is given a value which depends upon K elements in the previous time step. We review the work of many authors on the behavior of the models, looking particularly at the structure and lengths of their cycles, the sizes of their basins of attraction, and the flow of information through the systems. In the limit of infinite N, there is a phase transition between a chaotic and an ordered phase, with a critical phase in between. We argue that the behavior of this system depends significantly on the topology of the network connections. If the elements are placed upon a lattice with dimension d, the system shows correlations related to the standard percolation or directed percolation phase transition on such a lattice. On the other hand, a very different behavior is seen in the Kauffman net in which all spins are equally likely to be coupled to a given spin. In this situation, coupling loops are mostly suppressed, and the behavior of the system is much more like that of a mean field theory. We also describe possible applications of the models to, for example, genetic networks, cell differentiation, evolution, democracy in social systems and neural networks.Comment: 69 pages, 16 figures, Submitted to Springer Applied Mathematical Sciences Serie

Folk psychological and neurocognitive ontologies

It is becoming increasingly clear that our folk psychological ontology of the mental is unlikely to map neatly on to the functional organisation of the brain, leading to the development of novel ‘cognitive ontologies’ that aim to better describe this organisation. While the debate over which of these ontologies to adopt is still ongoing, we ought to think carefully about what the consequences for folk psychology might be. One option would be to endorse a new form of eliminative materialism, replacing the old folk psychological ontology with a novel neurocognitive ontology. This approach assumes a literalist attitude towards folk psychology, where the folk psychological and neurocognitive ontologies represent competing and incompatible ways of categorising the mental. According to an alternative approach, folk psychology aims to describe coarse-grained behaviour rather than fine-grained mechanisms, and the two kinds of ontology are better thought of as having different aims and purposes. In this chapter I will argue that the latter (coarse-grained) approach is a better way to make sense of everyday folk psychological practice, and also offers a more constructive way to understand the relationship between folk psychological and neurocognitive ontologies. The folk psychological ontology of the mental might not be appropriate for describing the functional organisation of the brain, but rather than eliminating or revising it, we should instead recognise that it has a very different aim and purpose than neurocognitive ontologies

Tableau-based decision procedure for non-Fregean logic of sentential identity

Sentential Calculus with Identity (SCI) is an extension of classical propositional logic, featuring a new connective of identity between formulas. In SCI two formulas are said to be identical if they share the same denotation. In the semantics of the logic, truth values are distinguished from denotations, hence the identity connective is strictly stronger than classical equivalence. In this paper we present a sound, complete, and terminating algorithm deciding the satisfiability of SCI-formulas, based on labelled tableaux. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first implemented decision procedure for SCI which runs in NP, i.e., is complexity-optimal. The obtained complexity bound is a result of dividing derivation rules in the algorithm into two sets: decomposition and equality rules, whose interplay yields derivation trees with branches of polynomial length with respect to the size of the investigated formula. We describe an implementation of the procedure and compare its performance with implementations of other calculi for SCI (for which, however, the termination results were not established). We show possible refinements of our algorithm and discuss the possibility of extending it to other non-Fregean logics