The Question Concerning Technology in Compliance

In this symposium Essay, I apply insights from philosophy and psychology to argue that modes of achieving compliance that focus on technology undermine, and are undermined by, modes of achieving compliance that focus on culture. Insisting on both may mean succeeding at neither. How an organization resolves this apparent contradiction in program design, like the broader question of optimal corporate governance arrangements, is highly idiosyncratic. Firms should therefore be accorded maximum freedom in designing their compliance programs, rather than being forced by enforcement authorities into a set of de facto mandatory compliance structures

The Question Concerning Technology in Compliance

In this symposium Essay, I apply insights from philosophy and psychology to argue that modes of achieving compliance that focus on technology undermine, and are undermined by, modes of achieving compliance that focus on culture. Insisting on both may mean succeeding at neither. How an organization resolves this apparent contradiction in program design, like the broader question of optimal corporate governance arrangements, is highly idiosyncratic. Firms should therefore be accorded maximum freedom in designing their compliance programs, rather than being forced by enforcement authorities into a set of de facto mandatory compliance structures

The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors\u27 & Officers\u27 Liability Insurer

This article reports the results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors\u27 and officers\u27 liability insurance (D&O insurance) companies in American corporate governance. Economic theory provides three reasons to expect D&O insurers to serve as corporate governance monitors: first, monitoring provides insurers with a way to manage moral hazard; second, monitoring provides benefits to shareholders who might not otherwise need the risk distribution that D&O insurance provides; and third, the bonding provided by risk distribution gives insurers a comparative advantage in monitoring. Nevertheless, we find that D&O insurers neither monitor corporate governance during the life of the insurance contract nor manage litigation defense costs once claims arise. Our findings raise significant questions about the value of D&O insurance for shareholders as well as the deterrent effect of corporate and securities liability. After exploring various explanations for these findings, we conclude that the absence of monitoring is due, at least in part, to the agency problem in the corporate context. Our analysis thus suggests that the existing form of corporate D&O insurance both results from and contributes to the relatively weak constraints on corporate managers. Corporate managers buy D&O coverage for self-serving reasons, and the coverage itself because it does not control moral hazard, reduces the extent to which shareholder litigation aligns managers\u27and shareholders\u27 incentives

The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors\u27 & Officers\u27 Liability Insurer

This article reports the results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors\u27 and officers\u27 liability insurance (D&O insurance) companies in American corporate governance. Economic theory provides three reasons to expect D&O insurers to serve as corporate governance monitors: first, monitoring provides insurers with a way to manage moral hazard; second, monitoring provides benefits to shareholders who might not otherwise need the risk distribution that D&O insurance provides; and third, the bonding provided by risk distribution gives insurers a comparative advantage in monitoring. Nevertheless, we find that D&O insurers neither monitor corporate governance during the life of the insurance contract nor manage litigation defense costs once claims arise. Our findings raise significant questions about the value of D&O insurance for shareholders as well as the deterrent effect of corporate and securities liability. After exploring various explanations for these findings, we conclude that the absence of monitoring is due, at least in part, to the agency problem in the corporate context. Our analysis thus suggests that the existing form of corporate D&O insurance both results from and contributes to the relatively weak constraints on corporate managers. Corporate managers buy D&O coverage for self-serving reasons, and the coverage itself because it does not control moral hazard, reduces the extent to which shareholder litigation aligns managers\u27and shareholders\u27 incentives