Effects of the private-label invasion in food industries

Using supermarket scanner data, we test a variety of hypotheses from trade journals about the invasion of private-label food products. According to conventional industry wisdom, name-brand firms defended their brands against new private-label products by lowering their prices, engaging in additional promotional activities, and increasingly differentiating their products. Our empirical evidence is inconsistent with these beliefs.private label; entry; price; promotional activity; differentiation; supermarket

The Public Resource Management Game

Use of public resources for private economic gain is a longstanding, contested political issue. Public resources generate benefits beyond commodity uses, including recreation, environmental and ecological conservation and preservation, and existence and aesthetic values. We analyze this problem using a dynamic resource use game. Low use fees let commodity users capture more of the marginal benefit from private use. This increases the incentive to comply with government regulations. Optimal contracts therefore include public use fees that are lower than private rates. The optimal policy also includes random monitoring to prevent strategic learning and cheating on the use agreements and to avoid wasteful efforts to disguise noncompliant behavior. An optimal policy also includes a penalty for cheating beyond terminating the use contract. This penalty must be large enough that the commodity user who would gain the most from noncompliance experiences a negative expected net return.Renewable resources, public resources policy, optimal contracts

Effects of the private-label invasion in food industries

Using supermarket scanner data, we test a variety of hypotheses from trade journals about the invasion of private-label food products. According to conventional industry wisdom, name-brand firms defended their brands against new private-label products by lowering their prices, engaging in additional promotional activities, and increasingly differentiating their products. Our empirical evidence is inconsistent with these beliefs

Effects of the private-label invasion in food industries

Using supermarket scanner data, we test a variety of hypotheses from trade journals about the invasion of private-label food products. According to conventional industry wisdom, name-brand firms defended their brands against new private-label products by lowering their prices, engaging in additional promotional activities, and increasingly differentiating their products. Our empirical evidence is inconsistent with these beliefs

The Environmental Impacts of Subsidized Crop Insurance

A partial equilibrium model of stochastic crop production is used to analyze the environmental impacts of popular subsidized crop insurance programs. Land use is unchanged only when an actuarially fair, perfectly separating insurance contract is offered. For the more typical pooling equilibrium contracts, however, land with a minimum quality that is stricly lower than the minimum quality without insurance will be added to production. In such cases, the environment will be adversely effected. If economically marginal land is also environmentally marginal, pooling crop insurance policies disproportionately contribute to the degradation of the environment. Popular subsidies merely exacerbate the problem

Information Disclosure Policies: Evidence from the Electricity Industry

A "third wave" of environmental policy has recently emerged that emphasizes information provision as an integral part of the risk mitigation strategy. While theory suggests that information programs may correct market failures and improve welfare, the empirical effectiveness of these programs remains largely undetermined. We show that mandatory information disclosure programs in the electricity industry achieve stated policy goals. We find that the average proportion of fossil fuels decreases and the average proportion of clean fuels increases in response to disclosure programs. However, the programs also produce unintended consequences. Customer composition and pre-existing fuel mix significantly affect program response, suggesting that effective information disclosure policies may not be efficient

Grazing Fees versus Stewardship on Federal Lands

Livestock grazing on public lands continues to be a source of intense conflict and debate. We analyze this problem using a dynamic game. Low grazing fees let ranchers capture more rent from grazing. This increases the incentive to comply with federally mandated regulations. Optimal grazing contracts therefore include grazing fees that are lower than competitive private rates. The optimal policy also includes random monitoring to prevent strategic learning by cheating ranchers and avoid wasteful efforts to disguise noncompliant behavior. Finally, an optimal policy includes a penalty for cheating beyond terminating the lease. This penalty must be large enough that the rancher who would profit the most from cheating experiences a negative expected net return