66 research outputs found
(Un)principled principals, (un)principled agents: The differential effects of managerial civil service reforms on corruption in developing and OECD countries
Do management practices have similar anticorruption effects in OECD and developing countries? Despite prominent cautions against âNew Zealandâ reforms which enhance managerial discretion in developing countries, scholars have not assessed this question statistically. Our article addresses this gap through a conjoint experiment with 6,500 public servants in three developing countries and one OECD country. Our experiment assesses Weberian relative to managerial approaches to recruitment, job stability, and pay. We argue that in developing countries with institutionalized corruption and weak rule of lawâyet not OECD countries without such featuresââunprincipledâ principals use managerial discretion over hiring, firing, and pay to favor âunprincipledâ bureaucratic agents who engage in corruption. Our results support this argument: managerial practices are associated with greater bureaucratic corruption in our surveyed developing countries, yet have little effect in our OECD country. Alleged âbest practicesâ in public management in OECD countries may thus be âworst practicesâ in developing countries
Exit, Voice, and Sabotage: Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals
Democratic backsliding has multiplied âunprincipledâ political principals: governments with weak commitment to the public interest. Why do some bureaucrats engage in voice and guerrilla sabotage to thwart policies against the public interest under âunprincipled principals,â yet others do not? Despite its centrality in contemporary governance, this conundrum has not seen quantitative research. We address this gap with survey evidence from 1,700 Brazilian public servants during the Temer Presidency, widely perceived to lack democratic legitimacy and integrity. We focus on one key explanator: public service motivation (PSM). We argue that bureaucrats with greater PSM are more likely to engage in voice and sabotage of âunprincipled policies,â and exit to avoid implementing âunprincipled policies.â Structural equation models support these hypotheses. Public service-motivated bureaucracies are thus short-run stalwarts against âunprincipledâ political principals. Over time, they look to depart, however, leaving âunprincipledâ principals a freer hand to pursue policies against the public interest
Solidifying system of democracy in the Central and Eastern European new EU members
The paper examines the requirements of an effective and legitimized democratic political system in the process of transition. The analysis and the conclusions are based on the Hungarian experience, which can carefully be applied to all Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Special focus is given to the relationship of legal certainty and the efficiency of the democratic system, to the tension between legalism and managerialism and to the characteristics of civil society organizations. In the conclusion special features of the transitional countries are pointed out
DistorçÔes de incentivo ao desempenho e redução de motivação no serviço pĂșblico federal no Brasil = Distortions of incentive to performance and reduction of motivation in the federal public service in Brazil
No atual sistema de cargos e carreiras do Poder Executivo federal brasileiro, servidores pĂșblicos que nĂŁo ocupam cargos de livre provimento tĂȘm duas maneiras preponderantes para alcançar um patamar salarial mais elevado: antiguidade ou aprovação em concurso pĂșblico para uma carreira mais bem remunerada. Neste artigo, sugerimos que essas maneiras de ascensĂŁo afetam negativamente a motivação para o serviço pĂșblico. Primeiro, elas transferem os incentivos dos servidores pĂșblicos em inĂcio de carreira de desempenho no trabalho para preparação para concursos de carreiras com salĂĄrios mais elevados, e simultaneamente os privam de outras formas de ascensĂŁo quando nos estĂĄgios intermediĂĄrios e avançados de suas carreiras. Segundo, elas geram desigualdade salarial entre carreiras, desmotivando servidores pĂșblicos com responsabilidades semelhantes em carreiras com remuneraçÔes inferiores. Dados de nosso survey com 2.800 servidores pĂșblicos de 14 instituiçÔes do Governo Federal oferecem indĂcios acerca da importĂąncia de reduzir essas distorçÔes de incentivo. // In the current structure of careers in the Brazilian Federal Government, public officials who do not
hold a DAS position have two predominant ways of reaching a higher salary level: years of service
and passing a written examination for a higher paid public service career. We argue in this paper
that these pathways affect in a negative way public service motivation. First, they shift incentives
of early career public officials from job performance towards preparing for higher paid career
exams, while depriving officials in middle and later stages of their careers of any advancement
opportunities. They also cause salary inequity between careers, demotivating officials with similar
responsibilities in lower paid careers. Through statistical analyses of data from an original survey
with 2,800 public servants in 14 federal government institutions in Brazil, our findings point to the
importance of reducing incentive distortions in Brazilâs public service
Responding to COVIDâ19 through Surveys of Public Servants
Responding to COVIDâ19 presents unprecedented challenges for public sector practitioners. Addressing those challenges requires knowledge about the problems that public sector workers face. This Viewpoint essay argues that timely, upâtoâdate surveys of public sector workers are essential tools for identifying problems, resolving bottlenecks, and enabling public sector workers to operate effectively during and in response to the challenges posed by the pandemic. This essay presents the COVIDâ19 Survey of Public Servants, which is currently being rolled out in several countries by the Global Survey of Public Servants Consortium to assist governments in strategically compiling evidence to operate effectively during the COVIDâ19 pandemic
- âŠ