Strictness of Environmental Policy and Investment in Abatement

In this paper we model an oligopoly where .rms invest in abatement technologies and emissions are taxed by the government. We show that a stricter environmental policy does not necessarily lead to an increase in .rms.R&D investment into cleaner production methods. In fact, the emission-to-output ratio may be a U-shaped function of the environmental damage parameter. This result holds both when the government can commit and in the social optimum. When the government cannot commit, this relationship is ambiguous except in markets with few .rms. Our results further suggest that if the emission-to-output ratio is decreasing throughout, output is a U-shaped function of the environmental damage.Environmental innovation; environmental taxation; commitment; oligopoly

Entry and Exit in a Liberalised Market.

We analyze the determinants of entry and exit in the European Airline Markets in the post-liberalization period. Unlike previous studies, we find that the presence of charter or seasonal operators and the level of quality provided by the incumbents are relevant to explain entry and exit. Differential traits in the main low cost airlines' entry and exit behavior are also analysed.Entry, Exit, Airlines, Conditional Logit

Entry and exit by European low-cost and traditional carriers

The authors analyse the entry and exit activity in the UK-Europe airline markets and study the differential traits of three main airlines (British Airways, EasyJet and RyanAir) during 1997-2004. They find that entry and exit are more likely in large markets and in markets with a high number of incumbents. Already operating in the city-pair enhances the probability that the same firm will enter another route in the same city-pair. The existence of charter flights generates both entries and exits, while high seasonality generally discourages entry. Also, the level of service quality provided by the incumbents matters

R&D Subsidies, Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets

We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided

R&D Subsidies, Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets

We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided

Mixed oligopoly, cost-reducing research and development, and privatisation

We develop a mixed oligopoly model to examine the role of R&D subsidies and evaluate the welfare effects of privatization. In solving the oligopoly model we propose a novel use of aggregative games techniques. Our analysis reveals that privatization reduces the optimal R&D subsidy. Furthermore, privatization improves social welfare but only when the number of firms is sufficiently large. Implementing solely a subsidy to R&D does not lead to a ‘privatization neutrality theorem’ or, ‘irrelevance result’