Should the government provide insurance for catastrophes?

This paper evaluates the need for a government role in insuring natural and man-made catastrophes in the United States. Although insurance markets have been stressed by major natural catastrophes, such as Hurricane Katrina, government involvement in the market for natural catastrophe insurance should be minimized to avoid crowding-out more efficient private market solutions, such as catastrophe bonds. Instead, government should facilitate the development of the private market by reducing regulatory barriers. The National Flood Insurance Program has failed to cover most property owners exposed to floods and is facing severe financial difficulties. The program needs to be drastically revised or replaced by private market alternatives, such as federal "make available" requirements with a federal reinsurance backstop. A federal role may be appropriate to insure against mega-terrorist events. However, any program should be minimally intrusive and carry a positive premium to avoid crowding-out private market alternatives.Insurance, Government

An Asian Option to the Valuation of Insurance Futures Contracts

While insurers have a variety of instruments readily available to hedge the risk of assets and interest rate sensitive liabilities, until recently reinsurance was the only mechanism for hedging underwriting risk. The insurance futures contracts introduced in December 1992 by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) offer insurers an alternative to reinsurance as a hedging device for under-writing risk. These instruments have the usual features of liquidity, anonymity, and low transaction costs that characterize futures contracts. Unlike reinsurance, hedging through futures has the advantage of reversibility since any position may be closed before the maturity of the futures contract if the overall exposure of the insurer has diminished. Reversing a reinsurance transaction exposes the insurer to relatively high transactions costs as well as additional charges to protect the reinsurer against adverse selection. Because futures contracts are based on losses incurred by a pool of a least 10 insurance companies selected by the Insurance Services Officer, the potential for adverse selection and the accompanying administrative costs are greatly diminished relative to a reinsurance contract. Unlike most futures contracts traded on the CBOT, insurance futures are based on an accumulation of insurance loss payments over a period of time rather than the price of a commodity or asset at the end of a period of time. The classical relationships between the spot price and the futures price do not hold. The fact that the futures price at maturity will reflect a sum of claim payments entails a structural similarity between this contract and an Asian option, for which the underlying asset is an average, i.e., a sum of spot prices (up to a multiplicative constant). Thus, it would be incorrect to price these instruments using standard futures pricing techniques. Geman and Yor (1992, 1993) investigate the exact solution of this problem. The authors apply the Geman-Yor approach to the valuation of the insurance catastrophe futures contracts offered by the CBOT. In their model, the state variable is assumed to be a geometric Brownian motion - the claims process. The payoff on the insurance futures contract is determined by the accumulation or integral of the state variable. The authors believe there is a significant systematic component to insurance losses, especially those involving catastrophes. Insurers should be able to reduce risk by trading futures contracts. In their view the primary reason for limited trading of insurance futures is the lack of information on the loss index. There is very little information to support parameter estimation or to assist traders in forming expectations. In the authors' view, the CBOT's current offerings are unlikely to be successful unless the information problem is solved.

Comparison of Frontier Efficiency Methods: An Application to the U.S. Life Insurance Industry

The objective of this paper is to provide new information on the performance of efficiency estimation methods by applying a wide range of econometric and mathematical programming techniques to a sample of U.S. life insurers. Average efficiencies differ significantly across methods. The efficiency rankings are well-preserved among the econometric methods; but the rankings are less consistent between the econometric and mathematical programming methods and between the data envelopment analysis and free disposal hull techniques. Thus, the choice of estimation method can have a significant effect on the conclusions of an efficiency study. Most of the insurers in the sample display either increasing or decreasing returns to scale, and stock and mutual insurers are found to be equally efficient after controlling for firm size. Key words: Efficiency estimation, stochastic frontiers, data envelopment analysis, free disposal hull, life insurance industry, organizational form.

Productivity and Technical Efficiency in the Italian Insurance Industry

The purpose of this paper is to partially fill the gap in the existing literature by conducting an analysis of technical efficiency and productivity growth in the Italian insurance industry. The analysis makes use of a detailed data base on Italian life and non-life insurance companies over the period 1985-1993, provided by the Associazione Nazaionale fra le Impress Assicurazioni, the association of insurance companies. The authors measure technical efficiency, changes in technical efficiency over time, and technical changes over time for a sample of Italian insurers, and use the results to test hypotheses regarding industrial organization and to analyze trends associated with structural developments in the market. Data development analysis (DEA) is used to estimate product frontiers for each year of the sample. A production frontier gives the minimum inputs required to produce any given output vector. An important reason for conducting the analysis presented is to provide benchmark statistics to facilitate comparisons of efficiency and productivity under the new European regulatory regime when data on more recent periods become available. In addition, the production frontier results are used to test hypotheses about two major issues in industrial organization - the coexistence of alternative product distribution systems, and organizational forms in an industry. The results indicated that technical efficiency in the Italian insurance industry ranged from 70 to 78 percent during the sample period. There was almost no efficiency change over the sample period. However, productivity declined significantly over the sample period, with a cumulative decline of about 25 percent. The decline was attributable almost exclusively to technological regress, implying that insurers needed more inputs to produce their outputs at the end of the sample period that they did at the beginning. Although improvement in both technical efficiency and technical change appear to be needed, the main problem at present appears to be the adverse shift in the production frontier. Although the sources of the technical regress characterizing the Italian industry are not entirely clear, this phenomenon has been observed in at least one other financial services industry that experienced deregulation and growth in new products and distribution systems - the Spanish savings banks. In a dynamically changing environment, many insurers may be adopting new approaches to producing their outputs. This provides more opportunities for firms to make mistakes in the choice of technology, perhaps leading to excessive consumption of inputs even by "best practice" firms. An increase in the complexity of insurance products and markets could have a similar effect. As firms become more experienced at operating in the new environment and the initial false-starts in the adoption of new technology have been corrected, the productivity of the Italian insurance industry can be expected to improve. The increase in competition resulting from deregulation should reinforce this process, as firms that fail to improve are likely to be penalized the by the market.

The Basis Risk of Catastrophic-Loss Index Securities

This paper analyzes the basis risk of catastrophic-loss (CAT) index derivatives, which securitize losses from catastrophic events such as hurricanes and earthquakes. We analyze the hedging effectiveness of these instruments for 255 insurers writing 93 percent of the insured residential property values in Florida, the state most severely affected by exposure to hurricanes. County-level losses are simulated for each insurer using a sophisticated model developed by Applied Insurance Research. We analyze basis risk by measuring the effectiveness of hedge portfolios, consisting of a short position each insurer's own catastrophic losses and a long position in CAT-index call spreads, in reducing insurer loss volatility, value-at-risk, and expected losses above specified thresholds. Two types of loss indices are used -- a statewide index based on insurance losses in four quadrants of the state. The principal finding is that firms in the three largest Florida market-share quartiles can hedge almost as effectively using the intra-state index contracts as they can using contracts that settle on their own losses. Hedging with the statewide contracts is effective only for insurers with the largest market shares and for smaller insurers that are highly diversified throughout the state. The results also support the agency-theoretic hypotheses that mutual insurers are more diversified than stocks and that unaffiliated single firms are more diversified than insurers that are members of groups.

Deregulation, Consolidation, and Efficiency: Evidence From the Spanish Insurance Industry

This paper provides new information on the effects of deregulation and consolidation in financial services markets by analyzing the Spanish insurance industry. The sample period 1989-1998 spans the introduction of the European Union’s Third Generation Insurance Directives, which deregulated the EU insurance market. Deregulation has led to dramatic changes in the Spanish insurance market; the number of firms declined by 35 percent and average firm size increased by 275 percent. We analyze the causes and effects of consolidation using modern frontier efficiency analysis to estimate cost, technical, and allocative efficiency, as well as using Malmquist analysis to measure total factor productivity change. The results show that many small, inefficient, and financially under-performing firms were eliminated from the market due to insolvency or liquidation and that acquirers in the mergers and acquisitions market prefer relatively efficient target firms. As a result, the market experienced significant growth in total factor productivity over the sample period. Consolidation reduced the number of firms operating with increasing returns to scale but also increased the number operating with decreasing returns to scale. Hence, many large firms should focus on improving efficiency rather than on further growth.

The structure, conduct, and regulation of the property-liability insurance industry

Insurance industry

Can Insurers Pay for the "Big One"? Measuring the Capacity of an Insurance Market to Respond to Catastrophic Losses

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the capacity of the U.S. property-liability insurance industry to finance major catastrophic property losses. The topic is important because catastrophic events such as the Northridge earthquake and Hurricane Andrew have raised questions about the ability of the insurance industry to respond to the "Big One," usually defined as a hurricane or earthquake in the $100 billion range. At first glance, the U.S. property-liability insurance industry, with equity capital of more than$300 billion, should be able to sustain a loss of this magnitude. However, the reality could be different; depending on the distribution of damage and the spread of coverage as well as the correlations between insurer losses and industry losses. Thus, the prospect of a mega catastrophe brings the real threat of widespread insurance failures and unpaid insurance claims. Our theoretical analysis takes as its starting point the well-known article by Borch (1962), which shows that the Pareto optimal result in a market characterized by risk averse insurers is for each insurer to hold a proportion of the "market portfolio" of insurance contracts. Each insurer pays a proportion of total industry losses; and the industry behaves as a single firm, paying 100 percent of losses up to the point where industry net premiums and equity are exhausted. Borch's theorem gives rise to a natural definition of industry capacity as the amount of industry resources that are deliverable conditional on an industry loss of a given size. In our theoretical analysis, we show that the necessary condition for industry capacity to be maximized is that all insurers hold a proportionate share of the industry underwriting portfolio. The sufficient condition for capacity maximization, given a level of total resources in the industry, is for all insurers to hold a net of reinsurance underwriting portfolio which is perfectly correlated with aggregate industry losses. Based on these theoretical results, we derive an option-like model of insurer responses to catastrophes, leading to an insurer response-function where the total payout, conditional on total industry losses, is a function of the industry and company expected losses, industry and company standard deviation of losses, company net worth, and the correlation between industry and company losses. The industry response function is obtained by summing the company response functions, giving the capacity of the industry to respond to losses of various magnitudes. We utilize 1997 insurer financial statement data to estimate the capacity of the industry to respond to catastrophic losses. Two samples of insurers are utilized - a national sample, to measure the capacity of the industry as a whole to respond to a national event, and a Florida sample, to measure the capacity of the industry to respond to a Florida hurricane. The empirical analysis estimates the capacity of the industry to bear losses ranging from the expected value of loss up to a loss equal to total company resources. We develop a measure of industry efficiency equal to the difference between the loss that would be paid if the industry acts as a single firm and the actual estimated payment based on our option model. The results indicate that national industry efficiency ranges from about 78 to 85 percent, based on catastrophe losses ranging from zero to $300 billion, and from 70 to 77 percent, based on catastrophe losses ranging from$200 to $300 billion. The industry has more than adequate capacity to pay for catastrophes of moderate size. E.g., based on both the national and Florida samples, the industry could pay at least 98.6 percent of a$20 billion catastrophe. For a catastrophe of $100 billion, the industry could pay at least 92.8 percent. However, even if most losses would be paid for an event of this magnitude, a significant number of insolvencies would occur, disrupting the normal functioning of the insurance market, not only for property insurance but also for other coverages. We also compare the capacity of the industry to respond to catastrophic losses based on 1997 capitalization levels with its capacity based on 1991 capitalization levels. The comparison is motivated by the sharp increase in capitalizaiton following Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake. In 1991, the industry had$.88 in equity capital per dollar of incurred losses, whereas in 1997 this ratio had increased to $1.56. Capacity results based on our model indicate a dramatic increase in capacity between 1991 and 1997. For a catastrophe of$100 billion, our lower bound estimate of industry capacity in 1991 is only 79.6 percent, based on the national sample, compared to 92.8 percent in 1997. For the Florida sample, we estimate that insurers could have paid at least 72.2 percent of a $100 billion catastrophe in 1991 and 89.7 percent in 1997. Thus, the industry is clearly much better capitalized now than it was prior to Andrew. The results suggest that the gaps in catastrophic risk financing are presently not sufficient to justify Federal government intervention in private insurance markets in the form of Federally sponsored catastrophe reinsurance. However, even though the industry could adequately fund the "Big One," doing so would disrupt the functioning of insurance markets and cause price increases for all types of property-liability insurance. Thus, it appears that there is still a gap in capacity that provides a role for privately and publicly traded catastrophic loss derivative contracts.