The 2011 Industrial Relations Reform and Nominal Wage Adjustments in Greece

This study investigates nominal contractual base-wage adjustments in Greece associated with the 2011 industrial relations reform which re-defined the limits within which base wages could oscillate and allowed workers’ associations to negotiate for wages at the firm level. The assessment covers the period 2010-2013 and is based on information extracted from the universe of firm-level contracts signed in this period. We found that firm-level contracts increased dramatically shortly after the reform, now covering a larger pool of workers, especially in larger firms, and are associated with higher base-wage reductions in the post-reform period. At the firm level, wage reductions are higher when workers are represented by a workers’ association rather than a typical trade union. In addition, a heterogeneous effect is uncovered regarding the factors that shape base-wage adjustments (firm size, profitability, structure of bargaining body and aggregate unemployment) between new and traditional forms of workers’ representation in collective bargaining

The 2011 Industrial Relations Reform and Nominal Wage Adjustments in Greece

This study investigates nominal contractual base-wage adjustments in Greece associated with the 2011 industrial relations reform which re-defined the limits within which base wages could oscillate and allowed workers’ associations to negotiate for wages at the firm level. The assessment covers the period 2010–2013 and is based on information extracted from the universe of firm-level contracts signed in this period. We found that firm-level contracts increased dramatically shortly after the reform, now covering a larger pool of workers, especially in larger firms, and are associated with higher base-wage reductions in the post-reform period. At the firm level, wage reductions are higher when workers are represented by a workers’ association rather than a typical trade union. In addition, a heterogeneous effect is uncovered regarding the factors that shape base-wage adjustments (firm size, profitability, structure of bargaining body and aggregate unemployment) between new and traditional forms of workers’ representation in collective bargaining

Firm-Level Collective Bargaining and Wages in Greece: A Quantile Decomposition Analysis

This article analyzes the effect of firm-level contracting on the wage structure in the Greek private sector. Using a matched employer-employee dataset for 2006, unconditional quantile regressions and relevant decomposition methods, we identify a wage premium associated with firm-level contracting, which follows a hump-shaped profile across the wage distribution. Further, the wage differential between workers under firm-level and broader-level collective agreements can be primarily attributed to the differences in the regime-specific wage setting structure, for those below the median of the unconditional wage distribution, and to differences in worker and firm-specific characteristics for those in the upper tail. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics

Multiple job-holding among male workers in Greece

This paper studies the incidence of multiple job-holding in Greece and contributes to the literature by examining its determinants, its variance across different regions and the effect of the business cycle on its occurrence. The empirical analysis highlights the importance of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives behind multiple job-holding, and reveals significant variations in its incidence across regions, with areas that have a large primary sector having higher multiple job-holding rates. Finally, multiple job-holding is found to be pro-cyclical, with the probability of holding a second job estimated to increase during economic expansions

Firm-Level Collective Bargaining and Wages in Greece: A Quantile Decomposition Analysis

This article analyzes the effect of firm-level contracting on the wage structure in the Greek private sector. Using a matched employer-employee dataset for 2006, unconditional quantile regressions and relevant decomposition methods, we identify a wage premium associated with firm-level contracting, which follows a hump-shaped profile across the wage distribution. Further, the wage differential between workers under firm-level and broader-level collective agreements can be primarily attributed to the differences in the regime-specific wage setting structure, for those below the median of the unconditional wage distribution, and to differences in worker and firm-specific characteristics for those in the upper tail. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics