I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience

In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three notions in question, under the labels of “for-me-ness”, “me-ness” and “mineness”. Next, I argue that these notions are not equivalent; in particular, there is no conceptual implication from for-me-ness to me-ness or mineness. Empirical considerations based on clinical cases additionally suggest that the three notions may also correspond to different properties (although the claim of conceptual non-equivalence does not depend on this further point). The aim is clarificatory, cautionary but also critical: I examine four existing arguments from subjective character that are fuelled by an undifferentiated use of the three notions, and find them to be flawed for this reason

The Cotard syndrome. Report of two patients: with a review of the extended spectrum of 'délire des négations'

The Cotard syndrome is characterized by the delusion where an individual insists that he has died or part of his body has decayed. Although described classically in schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, physical disorders including migraine, tumour and trauma have also been associated with the syndrome. Two new cases are described here, the one associated with arteriovenous malformations and the other with probable multiple sclerosis. The delusion has been embarrassing to each patient. Study of such cases may have wider implications for the understanding of the psychotic interpretation of body image, for example that occurring in anorexia nervosa