Gender differences in moral judgment and the evaluation of gender-specified moral agents

Whether, and if so, how exactly gender differences are manifested in moral judgment has recently been at the center of much research on moral decision making. Previous research suggests that women are more deontological than men in personal, but not impersonal, moral dilemmas. However, typical personal and impersonal moral dilemmas differ along two dimensions: personal dilemmas are more emotionally salient than impersonal ones and involve a violation of Kant’s practical imperative that humans must never be used as a mere means, but only as ends. Thus, it remains unclear whether the reported gender difference is due to emotional salience or to the violation of the practical imperative. To answer this question, we explore gender differences in three moral dilemmas: a typical personal dilemma, a typical impersonal dilemma, and an intermediate dilemma, which is not as emotionally salient as typical personal moral dilemmas, but contains an equally strong violation of Kant’s practical imperative. While we replicate the result that women tend to embrace deontological ethics more than men in personal, but not impersonal, dilemmas, we find no gender differences in the intermediate situation. This suggests that gender differences in these type of dilemmas are driven by emotional salience, and not by the violation of the practical imperative. Additionally, we also explore whether people think that women should behave differently than men in these dilemmas. Across all three dilemmas, we find no statistically significant differences about how people think men and women should behave

To know or not to know? Looking at payoffs signals selfish behavior, but it does not actually mean so

Costs and benefits of everyday actions are often not known beforehand. In such situations, people can either make a choice “without looking” at the payoffs, or they can “look” and learn the exact payoffs involved before making the actual choice. Recent studies suggest that the mere act of looking at payoffs will be met with distrust by observers: “lookers” are both less trustworthy and perceived to be less trustworthy than “non-lookers”. Here we extend this line of work by changing the measure of pro-sociality: instead of trustworthiness, we consider altruism. Does “looking at payoffs” signal self-regarding preferences? Do observers’ beliefs match decision makers’ actions? Two experiments demonstrate that: (i) the level of altruism among “lookers” is not different from the level of altruism among “non-lookers”, but (ii) “lookers” are perceived to be less altruistic than “non-lookers”. These results hold both when the measure of altruism is the choice whether to help or not in the so-called “envelope game” (Experiment 1) or when the measure of altruism is the donation in a standard Dictator Game (Experiment 2). In sum, these results uncover a perception gap according to which looking at payoffs signals selfish behavior, but it does not actually mean so

Priming intuition disfavors instrumental harm but not impartial beneficence

Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgment is one of most pressing problems in psychological science. Some highly-cited studies suggest that reliance on intuition decreases utilitarian (expected welfare maximizing) judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas in which one has to decide whether to instrumentally harm (IH) one person to save a greater number of people. However, recent work suggests that such dilemmas are limited in that they fail to capture the positive, defining core of utilitarianism: commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). Accordingly, a new two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment has been proposed that distinguishes IH and IB components. The role of intuition on this new model has not been studied. Does relying on intuition disfavor utilitarian choices only along the dimension of instrumental harm or does it also do so along the dimension of impartial beneficence? To answer this question, we conducted three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) using conceptual priming of intuition versus deliberation on moral judgments. Our evidence converges on an interaction effect, with intuition decreasing utilitarian judgments in IH—as suggested by previous work—but failing to do so in IB. These findings bolster the recently proposed two-dimensional model of utilitarian moral judgment, and point to new avenues for future research

Does observability amplify sensitivity to moral frames? Evaluating a reputation-based account of moral preferences

A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power of a reputation-based account, which proposes that people respond to moral frames because they are motivated to look good in the eyes of others. Across four pre-registered experiments (total N = 9,601), we investigated whether reputational incentives amplify sensitivity to framing effects. Studies 1-3 manipulated (i) whether moral or neutral framing was used to describe a Trade-Off Game (in which participants chose between prioritizing equality or efficiency) and (ii) whether Trade-Off Game choices were observable to a social partner in a subsequent Trust Game. These studies found that observability does not significantly amplify sensitivity to moral framing. Study 4 ruled out the alternative explanation that the observability manipulation from Studies 1-3 is too weak to influence behavior. In Study 4, the same observability manipulation did significantly amplify sensitivity to normative information (about what others see as moral in the Trade-Off Game). Together, these results suggest that moral frames may tap into moral preferences that are relatively deeply internalized, such that the power of moral frames is not strongly enhanced by making the morally-framed behavior observable to others

Time pressure and honesty in a deception game

Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work

From outcome-based to language-based preferences

We review the literature on models that try to explain human behavior in social interactions described by normal-form games with monetary payoffs. We start by covering social and moral preferences. We then focus on the growing body of research showing that people react to the language in which actions are described, especially when it activates moral concerns. We conclude by arguing that behavioral economics is in the midst of a paradigm shift towards language-based preferences, which will require an exploration of new models and experimental setups

Hierarchical invasion of cooperation in complex networks

The emergence and survival of cooperation is one of the hardest problems still open in science. Several factors such as the existence of punishment, repeated interactions, topological effects and the formation of prestige may all contribute to explain the counter-intuitive prevalence of cooperation in natural and social systems. The characteristics of the interaction networks have been also signaled as an element favoring the persistence of cooperators. Here we consider the invasion dynamics of cooperative behaviors in complex topologies. The invasion of a heterogeneous network fully occupied by defectors is performed starting from nodes with a given number of connections (degree) k0. The system is then evolved within a Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the outcome is analyzed as a function of k0 and the degree k of the nodes adopting cooperation. Carried out using both numerical and analytical approaches, our results show that the invasion proceeds following preferentially a hierarchical order in the nodes from those with higher degree to those with lower degree. However, the invasion of cooperation will succeed only when the initial cooperators are numerous enough to form a cluster from which cooperation can spread. This implies that the initial condition has to be a suitable equilibrium between high degree and high numerosity. These findings have potential applications to the problem of promoting pro-social behaviors in complex networks

Na2V3O7, a frustrated nanotubular system with spin-1/2 diamond rings

Following the recent discussion on the puzzling nature of the interactions in the nanotubular system Na2V3O7, we present a detailed ab-initio microscopic analysis of its electronic and magnetic properties. By means of a non-trivial downfolding study we propose an effective model in terms of tubes of nine-site rings with the geometry of a spin-diamond necklace with frustrated inter-ring interactions. We show that this model provides a quantitative account of the observed magnetic behavior.Comment: 5 pages, 5 figures. Phys. Rev. Lett. (in press

Social heuristics and social roles: Intuition favors altruism for women but not for men

Are humans intuitively altruistic, or does altruism require self-control? A theory of social heuristics, whereby intuitive responses favor typically successful behaviors, suggests that the answer may depend on who you are. In particular, evidence suggests that women are expected to behave altruistically, and are punished for failing to be altruistic, to a much greater extent than men. Thus, women (but not men) may internalize altruism as their intuitive response. Indeed, a meta-analysis of 13 new experiments and 9 experiments from other groups found that promoting intuition increased giving in a Dictator Game among women, but not among men (Study 1). Furthermore, this effect was shown to be moderated by explicit sex role identification (Study 2, N=1,831): the more women described themselves using traditionally masculine attributes (e.g., dominance, independence) relative to traditionally feminine attributes (e.g., warmth, tenderness), the more deliberation reduced their altruism. Our findings shed light on the connection between gender and altruism, and highlight the importance of social heuristics in human prosociality

ELEMENTARY PRESERVICE TEACHERS’ KNOWLEDGE, PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS FRACTIONS: A MIXED-ANALYSIS

Previous research has shown knowledge, perceptions, and attitudes are essential factors during mathematics classroom instruction. The current study examined the effects of a 3-week fraction instructional unit using concrete models, problem-solving, and problem-posing to improve elementary preservice teachers’ knowledge, perceptions and attitudes towards fractions. A quasi-experiment design was implemented to gather data via closed-ended, open-ended, and essay tasks from a convenience sampling of 71 female elementary preservice teachers during pre- and post-assessments. The study discovered that the select preservice teachers were weak in the content knowledge specifically on unit-whole, part-whole, equivalent area, arithmetic operations, and ordering fractional values. In contrast, the incorporation of concrete models, problem-solving and problem-posing was effective in improving the preservice teachers’ level of pedagogical content knowledge, perceptions and attitudes towards fractions. Implications of the results and suggestions are discussed