58 research outputs found
Reference distorted prices
I show that when consumers (mis)perceive prices relative to reference prices, budgets turn out to be soft, prices tend to be lower and the average quality of goods sold decreases. These observations provide explanations for decentralized purchase decisions, for people being happy with a purchase even when they have paid their valuation, and for why trade might a¤ect high quality local firms unfairly.
A labor market with targeted wage offers
We model a market for highly skilled workers, such as the academic job market. The outputs of ?rm-worker matches are heterogeneous and common knowledge. Wage setting is synchronous with search: ?rms simultaneously make one personalized offer each to the worker of their choice. With large frictions (delay costs), efficient coordination is not possible, but for small frictions efficient matching with Diamond-type monopsony wages is an equilibrium.
Endogenous bargaining power
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomes into a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom based on individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limit of a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a function of the parties’ relative power. We examine the connection between ASC and asymmetric Nash solutions. We show the connection between the power of the parties embodied in the ASC solution and the bias in the SWF that would select ASC as an asymmetric Nash solution.Bargaining, conflict, disagreement
Markets for professional services: queues and mediocrity
We analyze a dynamic, decentralized market with endogenous entry, where in each period the active professionals supply one unit of an indivisible service at varying degrees of quality. The customers that have entered the market are randomly matched with the active professionals and prices are set by (complete information) pair-wise bargaining. In its unique steady state, the market leads to an excess diversity of quality and customers may have to suffer costly delays. Notably, efficiency is not regained as per period delay costs disappear. We also show that a professional college setting licensing rules will improve welfare (and even Consumer Surplus), relative to the free market, whenever the inefficiency is caused by a large enough excess supply.
Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict
We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.Coalition formation, conflict, alliance
Revealed cardinal preference
I prove that as long as we allow the marginal utility for money lamda to vary between purchases (similarly to the budget) then the quasi-linear and the ordinal budget-constrained models rationalize the same data. However, we know that lamda is approximately constant. I provide a simple constructive proof for the necessary and sufficient condition for the constant lambda rationalization, which I argue should replace the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference in empirical studies of consumer behavior.
Tractable valuations under uncertainty
I put forward a concise and intuitive formula for the calculation of the valuation for a good in the presence of the expectation that further, related, goods will soon become available. This valuation is tractable in the sense that it does not require the explicit resolution of the consumerís life-time problem
Cooperation, Competition, and Welfare in a Matching Market
We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases welfare because more agents find themselves in a cooperative relationship. We characterize the conditions for which increasing competition increases overall welfare. In particular, this is always the case when the incentives for defection are high
Exclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Nonmonotone Participation in Optional Intermediation
In many decentralised markets, the traders who benefit most from an exchange
do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily afford them.
At the same time, employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who
benefit little from trade. Together, these decisions amount to non-monotone
participation choices in intermediation: only traders of middle “type” employ
intermediaries, while the rest, the high and the low types, prefer to search for
a trading partner directly. We provide a theoretical foundation for this, hitherto
unexplained, phenomenon. We build a dynamic matching model, where
a trader’s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her
type. We also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence
of non-monotone equilibria
The marginal utility of money: A modern Marshallian approach to consumer choice
We reformulate neoclassical consumer choice by focusing on lamda, the marginal utility of money. As the opportunity cost of current expenditure, lamda is approximated by the slope of the indirect utility function of the continuation. We argue that lamda can largely supplant the role of an arbitrary budget constraint in partial equilibrium analysis. The result is a better grounded, more flexible and more intuitive approach to consumer choice.budget constraint, separability, value for money
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