Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights

The growth effects of intellectual property right (IPR) protection are examined in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. Stronger IPR protection, which reduces the probability of imitation, raises the reward for innovation. However, stronger protection reduces the number of competitive sectors, in which it is easier to innovate than in monopolistic sectors, thus concentrating researchers into fewer competitive sectors. As R&D projects take time until they are completed, concentration of R&D activity in a field raises the possibility of duplication of innovation, thereby hindering growth. In several settings, we show that imperfect, rather than perfect, protection maximizes growth.intellectual property rights, endogenous growth, quality ladder, imitation, leapfrogging, duplication.

A Welfare Analysis of Global Patent Protection in a Model with Endogenous Innovation and Foreign Direct Investment

This paper constructs a North-South quality-ladder model in which foreign direct investment (FDI) is determined by the endogenous location choice of firms, and examines analytically how strengthening patent protection in the South affects welfare in the South. Strengthening patent protection increases the Southfs welfare by enhancing innovation and FDI, but it also allows the firms with patents to charge higher prices for their goods, which decreases welfare. However, the model shows that the former positive welfare effect outweighs the latter negative effect. Moreover, introducing the strictest form of patent protection in the South, that is, harmonizing patent protection in the South with that in the North, may maximize welfare in the South as well as in the North. Further, a similar result can also be obtained in a nonscale effect model.foreign direct investment, innovation, intellectual property rights protection, welfare analysis

Dynamic Analysis of Innovation and International Transfer of Technology through Licensing

This paper develops a quality-ladder type dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous innovation and technology licensing as a major source of international technology transfer in developing countries. Examining the dynamic characteristics of the model fully, we explore the short- and long-run effects of both an improvement in the probability of reaching a licensing agreement with a given effort and an increase in the license fee rate. The model shows that the former promotes innovation and technology transfers in both the long and short run, while the latter discourages them.Innovation; Licensing; Technology transfer

Welfare Analysis of Free Entry in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

This paper presents a welfare analysis of free entry equilibrium in dynamic general equilibrium environments with oligopolistic competition. First, we show that a marginal decrease in the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium improves social welfare. Second, we show that if a government can control the number of entrants intertemporally so as to maximize the level of social welfare, the number of entrants under free entry may be less than the second-best number of entrants. Capital accumulation plays an important role in determining whether excess entry occurs.Excess entry; Oligopolistic competition; Dynamic general equilibrium

Innovation by Heterogeneous Leaders

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model in which both leaders and followers conduct R&D activities and in which leaders have different quality leads over their followers, determined by a random draw, and thus have different profit flows. We show that leaders with larger quality leads make smaller R&D investments; this result is consistent with the actual behaviors of some previous leader firms such as Sony and Eastman–Kodak. Moreover, we show that subsidizing followers’ R&D can promote leaders’ aggregate R&D, because promotion of followers’ R&D decreases (increases) the number of leaders with larger (smaller) quality leads and smaller (larger) R&D investments.* Revised： [15-30, 2015

Innovation, Licensing, and Imitation: The Effects of Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Industrial Policy

This paper examines the long-run effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and industrial policies on innovation and technology transfer using a North-South quality ladder model where licensing is the main mode of technology transfer to developing countries. We show that the governments of developing countries can promote innovation and technology transfer by strengthening IPR protection, which is enforced by restricting the imitation of products. Moreover, the results also imply that subsidies on the cost of license negotiation can promote innovation and technology transfer, whereas subsidies on the cost of R&D have no effect.Licensing; Imitation; Innovation; Intellectual property rights;

Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment : A Welfare Analysis

* Revised： [13-15, 2013