The New Grand Bourgeoisie under Post-Communism: Central Europe, Russia and China Compared

In the former socialist redistributive economies, the transition to market economy and the conversion to private ownership followed different trajectories. The paper offers an overview on how a new class of grand bourgeoisie was formed in three differentpost-socialism, transitional economies, wealth, privatization, bourgeoisie

Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des Projekts einer neuen Klasse in Osteuropa: Selbstkritische Überlegungen zu »Die Intelligenz auf dem Weg zur Klassenmacht«

1974 vertraten Szelenyi und Konrad die Ansicht, daß sich die Intellektuellen in Osteuropa auf dem Weg zur Klassenherrschaft befänden. Hier interpretiert Szelenyi seine damaligen Thesen als Reaktion auf die Reformen der 60er Jahre. Daß sich seine Prognosen nicht realisierten,führt er einerseits auf den von ihm unterschätzten Widerstand der Bürokratie gegen jede Teilung der Macht zurück. Andererseits fand seit 1975 mit der Entstehung kleiner Privatunternehmen ein unvorhergesehener sozialer Wandel statt, der eine sowohl im privaten Marktsektor als auch im bürokratisch gesteuerten Bereich begründete »duale« Klassenstruktur mit sich brachte. Sich daraus ergebende mögliche Bündniskonstellationen diskutiert Szeleny am Ende seines Artikels

The Utopia of Postsocialist Theory and the Ironic View of History in Neoclassical Sociology

Michael Burawoy offers three thought-provoking criticisms of our book, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe: (1) that we abandon class analysis, (2) that we do not suggest an alternative to the present capitalist order, and, therefore, (3) that our “neoclassical sociology” abandons the critical vision of classical sociology. At this abstract level, we plead not guilty to all three charges. Moving beyond these abstractions, we reformulate Burawoy’s criticisms empirically, and ask the following questions: 1. Is interclass struggle the central cause of social change in the transformation from communism to capitalism? 2. Using social scientific tools, can we identify a noncapitalist (or to be less shy about it, a socialist) alternative to the “actually existing” socioeconomic systems of the postcommunist world? 3. Is it necessary to have a vantage point “outside” a system to critically analyze its mechanisms and dynamics? Burawoy answers these questions in the affirmative; our answer to each is an emphatic no

The gendered effects of foreign investment and prolonged state ownership on mortality in Hungary: an indirect demographic, retrospective cohort study.

BACKGROUND: Research on the health outcomes of globalisation and economic transition has yielded conflicting results, partly due to methodological and data limitations. Specifically, the outcomes of changes in foreign investment and state ownership need to be examined using multilevel data, linking macro-effects and micro-effects. We exploited the natural experiment offered by the Hungarian economic transition by means of a multilevel study designed to address these gaps in the scientific literature. METHODS: For this indirect demographic, retrospective cohort study, we collected multilevel data related to Hungary between 1995 and 2004 from the PrivMort database and other sources at the town, company, and individual level to assess the relation between the dominant company ownership of a town and mortality. We grouped towns into three ownership categories: dominant state, domestic private, and foreign ownership. We did population surveys in these towns to collect data on vital status and other characteristics of survey respondents' relatives. We assessed the relation between dominant ownership and mortality at the individual level. We used discrete-time survival modelling, adjusting for town-level and individual-level confounders, with clustered SEs. FINDINGS: Of 83 eligible towns identified, we randomly selected 52 for inclusion in the analysis and analysed ownership data from 262 companies within these towns. Additionally, between June 16, 2014, and Dec 22, 2014, we collected data on 78 622 individuals from the 52 towns, of whom 27 694 were considered eligible. After multivariable adjustment, we found that women living in towns with prolonged state ownership had significantly lower odds of dying than women living in towns dominated by domestic private ownership (odds ratio [OR] 0·74, 95% CI 0·61-0·90) or by foreign investment (OR 0·80, 0·69-0·92). INTERPRETATION: Prolonged state ownership was associated with protection of life chances during the post-socialist transformation for women. The indirect economic benefits of foreign investment do not translate automatically into better health without appropriate industrial and social policies. FUNDING: The European Research Council

Mortality in Transition: Study Protocol of the PrivMort Project, a multilevel convenience cohort study.

BACKGROUND: Previous research using routine data identified rapid mass privatisation as an important driver of mortality crisis following the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe. However, existing studies on the mortality crisis relying on individual level or routine data cannot assess both distal (societal) and proximal (individual) causes of mortality simultaneously. The aim of the PrivMort Project is to overcome these limitations and to investigate the role of societal factors (particularly rapid mass privatisation) and individual-level factors (e.g. alcohol consumption) in the mortality changes in post-communist countries. METHODS: The PrivMort conducts large-sample surveys in Russia, Belarus and Hungary. The approach is unique in comparing towns that have undergone rapid privatisation of their key industrial enterprises with those that experienced more gradual forms of privatisation, employing a multi-level retrospective cohort design that combines data on the industrial characteristics of the towns, socio-economic descriptions of the communities, settlement-level data, individual socio-economic characteristics, and individuals' health behaviour. It then incorporates data on mortality of different types of relatives of survey respondents, employing a retrospective demographic approach, which enables linkage of historical patterns of mortality to exposures, based on experiences of family members. By May 2016, 63,073 respondents provided information on themselves and 205,607 relatives, of whom 102,971 had died. The settlement-level dataset contains information on 539 settlements and 12,082 enterprises in these settlements in Russia, 96 settlements and 271 enterprises in Belarus, and 52 settlement and 148 enterprises in Hungary. DISCUSSION: In addition to reinforcing existing evidence linking smoking, hazardous drinking and unemployment to mortality, the PrivMort dataset will investigate the variation in transition experiences for individual respondents and their families across settlements characterized by differing contextual factors, including industrial characteristics, simultaneously providing information about how excess mortality is distributed across settlements with various privatization strategies.The study was funded by European Research Council (a competitive externally peer reviewed Advanced Grant Scheme, grant agreement No. 269036).This is the final version of the article. It first appeared from BioMed Central at http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12889-016-3249-

Embracing the Market: Entry into Self-Employment in Transitional China, 1978-1996

This paper introduces labor market transition as an intervening process by which the macro institutional transition to a market economy alters social stratification outcome. Rather than directly addressing income distribution, it examines the pattern of workers’ entry into self-employment in reform-era China (1978-1996), focusing on rural-urban differences and the temporal trend. Analyses of data from a national representative survey in China show that education, party membership and cadre status all deter urban workers’ entry into self-employment, while education promotes rural workers’ entry into self-employment. As marketization proceeds, the rate of entry into self-employment increases in both rural and urban China, but urban workers are increasingly more likely to take advantages of the new market opportunities. In urban China, college graduates and cadres are still less likely to be involved in self-employment, but they are becoming more likely to do so in the later phase of reform. The diversity of transition scenarios is attributed to rural-urban differences in labor market structures.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39897/3/wp512.pd

La position de l'intelligentsia dans la structure de classe des sociétés socialistes d'État

Die Position der Intelligentsia in der Klassenstruktur der staatssozialistischen Gesellschaften. Der Autor, der die Klassenstruktur in den osteuropäischen, staatssozialistischen Gesellschaften beschreibt, geht von der Hypothese aus, dass die Verteilungsmechanismen dieselbe Rolle spiele, wie der Privatbesitz an Produktionsmitteln in den kapitalistichen Gesellschaften : die Abschopfung des Mehrwertes und die Ausbeutung der Produzenten ; jene die ein Interesse an der Verstärkung der Umverteilungsmacht haben, könnten die neue herrschende Klasse, die sich formiert, darstellen, die über die politische Elite bis zu den Bürokraten und Technokraten geht und tendeziell die Gesamtheit der Intelligentsia integriert. Im Unterschied zum Bürokraten, wie ihn Max Weber beschreibt, gibt der Intellektuelle der staatssozialistischen Gesellschaften vor, das Monopol eines teleologischen Wissens zu besitzen, um eine rationelle, sozial gerechte und wirtschaftlich gerechtfertigte Verteilung des Mehrproduktes vorzunehmen. Aus diesem Motiv heraus verlangt er die Macht. Die sozialistischen Gesellschaften und der Aufstieg der neuen herrschenden Klasse sind nicht das Produkt des marxistischen Ideals ; Im Gegenteil geht ailes so vor sich, als ob die Intellektuellen dièses Ideal benutzt hätten, um die Klassenherrschaft an sich zu reissen. Es ist kein Zufall, dass diese neue Sozialordnung in jenen Gesellschaften entstanden ist, wo es eine Intelligentsia gab (der russiche Ursprung des Begriffes ist signifikant), wo die Rolle der Intellektuellen nicht wie in den angelsächsischen Ländern in eine Expertenrolle verwandelt worden war, und wo das ' Modell der Intellektuellen als kritische Instanz dominierte. Die Unterscheidung der Intelligentsia von der politischen Elite erlaubt es, die Kämpfe, vor allem in der stalinistischen Epoche, zwischen der Klasse in einem weiteren Sinne und der engeren Elite zu vestehen, die die Machtausübung monopolisiert, d.h. die Macht, im Namen der Klasse zu handeln. Sie erlaubt es aber auch, den wirtschaftlichen Antagonismus zu verstehen, der nicht zwischen den «Parteibürokraten» und den «liberalen Intellektuellen» oder «Dissidenten» verläuft, sondern zwischen der Intelligentsia und der Arbeiterklasse. Wenn im heutigen Osteuropa das Klassenbewusstsein sehr niedrig ist und die Arbeiter nicht nur der Früchte ihrer Arbeit, sondern auch ihrer Klassenidentität beraubt werden,dann sicher deswegen, weil die Intelligentsia als herrschende Klasse nicht mehr die Fähigkeit besizt, fur die beherrschte Klasse organische Intellektuelle hervorzubringen, und nur Ideologen produziert, die in Richtung ihres Klasseninteress wirken, wobei die Ideologie der Klasssenlosigkeit eine besondere Rolle spielt.The position of the intelligentsia in the class structure of state socialist societies. The author, in describing the class structure of the state socialist societies of East Europe, puts forward the hypothesis that the mechanisms of redistribution play the same role in these societies as private ownership of the means of production does in capitalist societies - namely, to ensure the setting aside of surplus value and the expropriation of the producers. Those who have an interest in increasing the importance of such mechanisms may soon corne to constitute a new dominant class - larger than the political elite, the bureaucracy, or the techno-bureaucracy - which could potentially integrate all elements of the intelligentsia. Unlike the bureaucrat as he is described by Max Weber, the intellectual in state socialist societies contends that he has a monopoly on the teleological knowledge necessary to assure a rational, socially just, and economically efficient distribution of his society's surplus. It is on this basis that he claims power for himself. The socialist societies and the rise of the new dominant class are not the products of Marxist ideals ; on the contrary, it almost seems as if the intellectuals have profited from these ideals in order to seize power for their class. It is no accident that the new social organization has appeared in societies in which there already existed an intelligentsia (the Russian origin of the term is in itself significant) and in which the intellectuals had not been transformed, as in the Anglo-saxon countries, into professional relegated to the role of experts, but were considered, instead, to be social critics. The distinction between the intelligentsia as a class and the political elite makes it possible to understand the struggles which have opposed, notably during the Stalinist period, the class in the broad sense and the restricted elite which claims to monopolize political power, that is to say, the power to act in the name of the class. It enables us to understand, as well, the major economic antagonism, the basis of friction between the classes ; for this antagonism is not between Party «bureaucrats» and «liberal intellectuals» or «dissidents», but between the intelligentsia as a whole and the working-class. Class consciousness is at a very low level in present-day East Europe, and the workers are dispossessed not only of their work but even of their class identity. This is undoubtedly because the intelligentsia, as dominant class, tends to lose its capacity for creating intellectuals who remain an organic part of the dominated class and to produce only ideologists who will act to further their basic class interests, the most important of which is the ideology of the absence of class.La position de l'intelligentsia dans la structure de classe des sociétés socialistes d'Etat. L'auteur qui se propose de décrire la structure de classe des sociétés socialistes d'Etat en Europe de l'Est fait l'hypothèse que les mécanismes de redistribution jouent dans ces sociétés le même rôle que la propriété privée des moyens de production dans les sociétés capitalistes, assurer le prélèvement de la plus-value et l'expropriation des producteurs ; ceux qui ont intérêt à accroître le pouvoir de redistribution pourraient constituer une nouvelle classe dominante, en voie de formation, plus large que l'élite politique, la bureaucratie ou la technobureaucratie, qui intégrerait potentiellement l'ensemble de l'intelligentsia. A la différence du bureaucrate, tel que le décrit Max Weber, l'intellectuel des sociétés socialistes d'Etat prétend détenir le monopole du savoir téleologique nécessaire pour assurer une distribution des excédents rationnelle, socialement juste et économiquement efficace, et c'est à ce titre qu'il revendique le pouvoir. Les sociétés socialistes et la montée de la nouvelle classe dominante ne sont pas le produit de l'idéal marxiste ; au contraire, tout se passe comme si les intellectuels avaient utilisé à leur profit cet idéal pour s'emparer du pouvoir de classe. Ce n'est pas un hasard si la nouvelle organisation sociale est apparue dans des sociétés où il existait une intelligentsia (l'origine russe du terme est elle-même significative), où les intellectuels n'avaient pas été transformés, comme dans les pays anglo-saxons, en professionals relégués dans un rôle d'experts, et où dominait le modèle de l'intellectuel comme critique social. La distinction entre l'intelligentsia comme classe et l'élite politique permet de comprendre à la fois les luttes qui ont opposé, notamment durant la période stalinienne, la classe au sens large et l'élite restreinte qui prétend monopoliser le pouvoir politique, c'est-à-dire le pouvoir d'agir au nom de la classe, et l'antagonisme économique majeur, fondement de l'opposition entre les classes, qui ne passe pas entre les «bureaucrates» du Parti et les «intellectuels libéraux» ou les «dissidents», mais bien entre l'intelligentsia et la classe ouvrière. Si la conscience de classe est à un niveau très bas dans l'Europe de l'Est contemporaine et si les ouvriers ne sont pas seulement dépossédés du produit de leur travail mais de leur identité de classe, c'est sans doute parce que l'intelligentsia, en tant que classe dominante, tend à perdre sa capacité de fournir les intellectuels organiques de la classe dominée et à produire seulement des idéologues qui iront dans le sens de ses intérêts de classe fondamentaux, le plus important d'entre eux étant l'idéologie de l'absence de classe.Szelenyi Ivan. La position de l'intelligentsia dans la structure de classe des sociétés socialistes d'État. In: Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. Vol. 22, juin 1978. Bureaucratie d’État et pouvoir des intellectuels. pp. 61-74

Pathways from and Crises after Communism Part 2. The Case of Former USSR and China

The transition from socialist redistributive economy to capitalist markets has proved to be a rockier road that anticipated. The degree and character of difficulties that the countries faced during the transition depended on the nature of the pathways taken. In this paper I distinguish three major trajectories various countries followed: Central European neo-liberalism; post USSR neo-patrimonial regime and the East Asian (Chinese and Vietnamese) transformation from below. Rather than distinguishing the “right way” from the “wrong way” I explore what the diff erent costs and benefi ts of the various pathways were at various stages of the transformation