The inescapable prisoner\u27s dilemma.

PhilosophyDoctor of Philosophy (PhD

Libertarianism and Luck

According to event-causal modest libertarian accounts of free action, the sort of control an agent requires to perform free actions consists in the action’s being nondeviantly and indeterministically caused by apt reasons of the agent. It has been argued that these modest views succumb to a problem of luck because they imply that, given exactly the same past up to the time of action, and the same laws of nature, at this time the agent could have performed a different action, or no action at all. Hence, it appears that whatever the agent does at this time as a result of indeterministic deliberation is a matter of freedom- or responsibility-undermining luck. In this paper, I argue that neither Robert Kane’s variant of modest libertarianism, which combines a form of non-traditional agent causation with indeterministic event causation, nor John Lemos’ weightings variant, in which agents perform intentional acts of assigning weights to their reasons, circumvents the luck objection

Divine and Conventional Frankfurt Examples

The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) says that you are morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for something you do only if you could have done otherwise. Frankfurt examples are putative counterexamples to PAP. These examples feature a failsafe mechanism that ensures that some agent cannot refrain from doing what she does without intervening in how she conducts herself, thereby supposedly sustaining the upshot that she is responsible for her behavior despite not being able to do otherwise. I introduce a Frankfurt example in which the agent who could not have done otherwise is God. Paying attention to the freedom requirements of moral obligation, the example is commissioned, first, to assess whether various statesof affairs that are unavoidable for God can be obligatory for God and for whichGod can be praiseworthy. The example is, next, used to unearth problems with conventional Frankfurt examples that feature human agents. I argue that conceptual connections between responsibility and obligation cast suspicion on these examples. Pertinent lessons that the divine Frankfurt example helps to reveal motivate the view that divine foreknowledge and determinism, assuming that both preclude freedom to do otherwise, may well imperil obligation and responsibility

Acerca de la viabilidad del semicompatibilismo

El semicompatibilismo respecto de la responsabilidad es la posición según la cual el determinismo es compatible con la responsabilidad moral, independientemente de si aquel excluye el tipo de libertad que requiere acceso a posibilidades alternativas. Sugiero que la respuesta a la pregunta acerca de si el semicompatibilismo es o no viable, descansa en si una variedad de principios normativos —atractivos prima facie— es verdadera o falsa. Presento un subconjunto de estos principios y, luego, rastreo algunas posiciones con respecto a la sostenibilidad del semicompatibilismo, dependiendo de cuál de estos principios, si acaso alguno, es verdadero. Concluyo que para muchos el precio de mantener el semicompatibilismo es demasiado alto porque hacerlo requiere abandonar uno o más principios de este subconjunto

Blameworthiness and Time

The following theses concerning moral obligation are widely accepted. Future Obligation: it is possible that at some time you are morally obligated to do something that you have not yet done but will do at a future time. Obligation-Changeability: it is possible that although it is obligatory, at some specified time, for you to do something later, at a time pursuant to this specified time you no longer have this obligation. The author argues that analogous theses concerning moral blameworthiness are true too: it’s possible that you may now be blameworthy for something you have not yet done but will do, and that blameworthiness can change with the passage of time.Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC

Obligation, Responsibility, and History

I argue that, each of the following, appropriately clarified to yield a noteworthy thesis, is true. (1) Moral obligation can affect moral responsibility. (2) Obligation succumbs to changes in responsibility. (3) Obligation is immune from changes in responsibility.Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council - Other Program

Obligation Incompatibilism and Blameworthiness

Obligation incompatibilism is the view that determinism precludes moral obligation. I argue for the following. (i) Two principles, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and ‘ought not’ is equivalent to ‘impermissible’, generate a powerful argument for obligation incompatibilism. (ii) Assuming conceptual ties between blameworthiness and impermissibility or belief in impermissibility, these principles also imperil blameworthiness provided determinism is true. If determinism undermines blameworthiness, it also undermines proposed justifications of punishment that presuppose blameworthiness. Allegedly blameworthiness-free justifications of punishment fare no better given their moral presuppositions. (iii) The most promising compatibilist reply to the argument for obligation incompatibilism should concede that obligation requires alternatives but of a variety that one can have even if determinism is true.Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC