Market structure, competition, and pricing in United States international telephone service markets

Abstract—Several national governments argue international telephone prices are high because of asymmetric competition and inefficiencies in the accounting arrangements that govern the telecommunications services trade. This paper develops a model of U.S. international telephone pricing that allows for the accounting rate system and contains market-structure variables for both the U.S. and foreign ends of bilateral markets. Model estimation is on 39 bilateral telephone markets from 1991 through 1994. Parameter estimates reveal that settlement rates, market concentration, competition at either end of the bilateral market, and ownership are significant determinants of prices. These findings support initiatives promoting accounting-rate reductions and increased competition.United States international telephone service markets

Trade imbalance in international message telephone services

An econometric model is estimated to identify determinants of trade imbalance in international message telephone services markets. Results indicate that asymmetric market structure is important in explaining bilateral market imbalances for high income country pairs. For low and high income country pairs, GDP per capita is the dominant cause of traffic imbalances. The findings suggest that telecommunications liberalization policies are effective in reducing distortions in international traffic flows and settlement payments. However, liberalization should be accompanied by developmental programmes that enhance income per capita and telecommunications network investment in developing countries. Such programmes may be effective in providing a more equitable distribution of the gains from telecommunications reform across countries.Trade imbalance; international message telephone services

Understanding European Union international message telephone services demand

This study provides a contemporary understanding of demand relations in European Union (EU) international message telephone service (IMTS) markets prior to full liberalization at January 1 1998. Point-to-point demand equations that relate IMTS demand to prices, income, population and distance are estimated on bilateral market data for ten EU countries from 1990 to 1995. Model estimates suggest price elasticities of outgoing and incoming demand between 20.175 and 20.456, and 20.215 and 20.674, respectively. These elasticity estimates provide an empirical base from which to calculate welfare gains from the full deregulation of EU IMTS markets after 1998.Elasticity; European Union; International telephone demand

LRR Focus: Global Solidarity Trips Sprint

[Excerpt] Leaders of CWA, working with and through the Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone International (PTTI), have denounced the La Conexion firings at international conferences, raised the alarm on the information superhighway, and pushed the story in the world\u27s media outlets. The result? From the top brass to the rank and file, union members all over the world have heard about the firings at La Conexion

Consequences of Vertical Separation and Monopoly: Evidence from the Telecom Privatizations

Two common policy instruments used by governments around the world to increase the availability of basic telephony (i.e., local, long distance, and international service) have been: (1) award monopoly rights on basic services to cross-subsidize residential local telephony; and (2) separate vertically (i.e., structural separation) the owner of the local fixed network from the provider of long distance or international telephone services. I use data from a panel of 67 countries during the seven years following the privatization of the telephone monopoly and find that contrary to wide spread beliefs: (1) monopoly on basic services is not associated with lower residential telephony prices; quite the opposite, monopoly increases residential local prices; (2) monopoly does not help universal service provision and lowers the use of international telephony; and (3) mandatory vertical separation reduces international telephony usage and the number of fixed lines in service. In summary, monopoly and vertical separation harm those consumers that were precisely designed to help: the downstream (business) users of international telephony and the upstream users of residential local telephony.

International Telephone Calls: Global and Regional Patterns

This study examines patterns in international telephone communications, documenting a close relationship between international call volume aggregated by nation and indicators of global connectivity including volume of international trade, tourism and migration. In addition, the analysis documents the existence of a set of national “communities” of callers. The clear orientation of large portions of the world to former colonial powers (e.g., West Africa and North Africa to France), and the separation of the Muslim Middle East and the Chinese-speaking nations of East and Southeast Asia from other calling communities suggest the importance of continuing historic and cultural influences on information flows

Communication Gear Shift

At 8:30 A.M. the telephone rang. It was the signal that telephone communication had been established between the international trainees at TVA and Gardner Advertising Co., St. Louis

HOLDING A TRIAL VIA PRIVATE TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORK

Today the use of telecommunication techniques are becoming more and more important in criminal case cooperation. In recent decades there had been a great shift of perspectives in the field of telecommunication. Modern telecommunication possibilities like video- and telephone conference calls are already in use in the questioning of the witness and the hearing of the expert. The Hungarian Criminal Procedure Law introduced the use of closed cicuit telecommunications network. Besides conducting processes swiftly and supporting witness and victim protection, this institution can have a significant role in fulfilling international Legal Aid requests as well. The Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union regulates hearing by videoconference and telephone conference. The Hungarian criminal procedure legislation is fully consistent with the provisions of the Convention of the European Union.telecommunication, criminal procedure law, witness and victim protection, interrogation