Racial and Imperial Thinking in International Theory and Politics: Truman, Attlee and the Korean War

- Connects the background ideas of race and empire to world politics - Uses case of Truman and Attlee in the Korean War - Argues that liberal-realist internationalists’ assumptions about the US-led post-war order obscure those background ideas and fail to understand the character of the post-war order - Argues liberal-realist internationalism is akin to a legitimating ideology rather than an explanatory theory - Argues that such failings render liberal internationalism inadequate to explain or prescribe ways for the United States/West to manage the ‘rise of the rest’ today This article connects the background ideas of race and empire to world politics by looking at the world views and actions of Truman and Attlee in the Korean War. The article argues that liberal-realist internationalists’ assumptions about the US-led post-war order obscure those background ideas and fail to understand the character of the post-war order. I consider two kinds of ‘background ideas’—policy-makers’ and those embedded in liberal internationalism. Put together, these ideas render liberal-realist internationalism akin to a legitimating ideology rather than an explanatory theory. More broadly, and in the longer run, such failure to comprehend the character of the post-war order, and the roles of race, empire and periphery war in it, renders the theory inadequate to explain or prescribe ways for the United States/West to manage the ‘rise of the rest’ today

The 'knowledge politics' of democratic peace theory

How do academic ideas influence US foreign policy, under what conditions and with what consequences? This article traces the rise, ‘securitisation’ and political consequences of democratic peace theory (DPT) in the United States by exploring the work of Doyle, Diamond and Fukuyama. Ideas influence US foreign policy under different circumstances, but are most likely to do either during and after crises when the policy environment permits ‘new thinking’, or when these ideas have been developed through state-connected elite knowledge networks, or when they are (or appear paradigmatically congenial to) foreign policymakers’ mindsets, or, finally, when they become institutionally-embedded. The appropriation of DPT by foreign policymakers has categorised the world into antagonistic blocs – democratic/non-democratic zones of peace/turmoil – as the corollary to a renewed American mission to make the world ‘safer’ through ‘democracy’ promotion. The roles of networked organic intellectuals – in universities and think tanks, for instance – were particularly important in elevating DPT from the academy to national security managers

Energy security and shifting modes of governance

The concept of energy security fits uneasily into contemporary security debates. It is neither a clearly traditional nor a fully ‘non-traditional’ security issue. There are also limits to the social constructedness of the concept. This article argues that, while it is important to identify the differing securitizations of energy, these must be contextualized within the material realities and the differing historical modes of governance of the political economy of resources. This is essential for understanding the differing meanings accorded to energy security, the shifting modes through which energy is governed, and the extent to which energy security concerns drive international politics. In this context, contemporary concerns over energy security have both material and ideological dimensions: anxiety over the dual shift of power from West to East and from resource-importing to resource-exporting countries; and concern over the normative weakening of the neo-liberal mode of energy governance

Contested world order: The delegitimation of international governance

This article argues that the chief challenge to international governance is an emerging political cleavage, which pits nationalists against immigration, free trade, and international authority. While those on the radical left contest international governance for its limits, nationalists reject it in principle. A wide-ranging cultural and economic reaction has reshaped political conflict in Europe and the United States and is putting into question the legitimacy of the rule of law among states

Neoconservatism as Discourse:Virtue, Power and US Foreign Policy

Neoconservatism in US foreign policy is a hotly contested subject, yet most scholars broadly agree on what it is and where it comes from. From a consensus that it first emerged around the 1960s, these scholars view neoconservatism through what we call the ‘3Ps’ approach, defining it as a particular group of people (‘neocons’), an array of foreign policy preferences and/or an ideological commitment to a set of principles. While descriptively intuitive, this approach reifies neoconservatism in terms of its specific and often static ‘symptoms’ rather than its dynamic constitutions. These reifications may reveal what is emblematic of neoconservatism in its particular historical and political context, but they fail to offer deeper insights into what is constitutive of neoconservatism. Addressing this neglected question, this article dislodges neoconservatism from itsperceived home in the ‘3Ps’ and ontologically redefines it as a discourse. Adopting aFoucauldian approach of archaeological and genealogical discourse analysis, we trace itsdiscursive formations primarily to two powerful and historically enduring discourses ofthe American self — virtue and power — and illustrate how these discourses produce aparticular type of discursive fusion that is ‘neoconservatism’. We argue that to betterappreciate its continued effect on contemporary and future US foreign policy, we needto pay close attention to those seemingly innocuous yet deeply embedded discoursesabout the US and its place in the world, as well as to the people, policies and principlesconventionally associated with neoconservatism