Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion

Under the political theory of the liberal state, there is no adequate traditional justification for contracts of adhesion. Professor Macneil seeks to locate their legitimacy in the nature of modern bureaucracy. He demonstrates how this mode of legitimation sets limits for government intervention. In his conclusion, Professor Macneil emphasizes the significance of his analysis for a fuller understanding of the validity and the complex operation of contracts of adhesion

Relational Contracting In A Digital Age; Panel Discussion

If, as it has sometimes been argued, changes in contract rules and theory are strongly affected by changes in economic conditions, we should note that the world has changed a good deal since the early 1960s when relational contract theory began to bloom. The economic world of 2004 is very different from the world of 1964. Modern relational contract theory was born about the same time as its great theoretical competitor, the rational choice approach of the legal economists. It came before the vast changes wrought by the information revolution and the increased globalization of the economy. What has relational theory taught us over the past forty years? How has it changed and adapted in light of those great economic changes? Where is it going in the future? Those were the general topics at a panel discussion which took place June 8, 2004, at the Oxstalls campus of the University of Gloucestershire in Gloucester, England. It was part of a conference entitled, The Common Law of Contracts as a World Force in Two Ages of Revolution, which marked the 150th anniversary of one of the most famous contracts cases of all time, Hadley v. Baxendale, and is the theme of the present Symposium. The Conference\u27s object was to explore how the common law adapts to and influences the kind of revolutionary changes that have swept over our society in the past forty years, and which swept over England in the forty years before Hadley v. Baxendale

Bringing 'place' back in: regional clusters, project governance, and new product outcomes

We examine new product outcomes in the context of regional clusters. Based on past research on marketing relationships, clusters, and social networks, we propose that the overall configuration of a cluster helps promote particular governance practices among its members. These practices have distinct value-creating properties, and when they are brought to bear on a specific new product development project within a cluster, they promote performance outcomes like product novelty and speed to market. Ultimately, these performance effects are reinforced by the configuration of the cluster itself. In general, we propose that new product outcomes follow from complex interactions between a cluster's macro-level configuration and its micro-level governance processes. More broadly, our framework points to the importance of geographical variables and to the role of “place” in marketing decision-making

Gerschenkron revisited: The new corporate Russia

© 2015, Journal of Economic Issues / Association for Evolutionary Economics. Our analysis is based on firm-specific data compiled from the Russian Trading System stock exchange and SKRIN (CKP-H in Russian) database. We seek to identify the factors behind Russias dramatically improved corporate sector performance from the beginning of the 2000s to December 2007. We argue that improved long-term corporate performance was a consequence of several policy initiatives associated with the state-dominated banking sector, which enabled statesubsidized investment funds to be channeled from a structurally reengineered energy sector to targeted investment projects located in other industries. We claim that Russias industrial strategy closely conforms to Alexander Gerschenkrons catch-up theory