Does Research on Nature of Science and Social Justice Intersect? Exploring Theoretical and Practical Convergence for Science Education

Even though enhancement of students’ understanding of social justice is thought to contribute to good citizenship, contextualising social justice in science education remains challenging for teachers because social justice is not conventionally a common feature of science teaching and learning. A separate issue in science education concerns a vast body of work on nature of science (NOS) elated to understanding of and about science. Understanding NOS is thought to contribute to scientific literacy as well as citizenship. Although social justice and NOS literatures share similar themes such as citizenship goals, the precise intersection of these literatures remains relatively understudied. In this chapter, we present an argument about how contemporary conceptualizations of NOS as well as NOS instruction might be used to promote goals related to social justice. In so doing, we aim to contribute to NOS literature by drawing on theories of social justice grounded in political philosophy. We trace the potential overlap of social justice and NOS concepts and draw out example recommendations for curriculum statements and practical teaching as well as practical teaching and learning approaches. Overall, we advocate the promotion of educational goals related to social justice through NOS instruction

Reconsidering the Carnap-Kuhn Connection

Recently, some philosophers of science (e.g., Gürol Irzik, Michael Friedman) have challenged the ‘received view’ on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn, suggesting that there is a close affinity (rather than opposition) between their philosophical views. In support of this argument, these authors cite Carnap and Kuhn’s similar views on incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific revolutions. Against this revisionist view, I argue that the philosophical relationship between Carnap and Kuhn should be regarded as opposed rather than complementary. In particular, I argue that a consideration of the fundamentally disparate nature of the broader philosophical projects of Carnap (logic of science) and Kuhn (providing a theory of scientific revolutions)renders the alleged similarities between their views superficial in comparison to their fundamental differences. In defense of the received view, I suggest that Carnap and Kuhn are model representatives of two contrasting styles of doing philosophy of science, viz., logical analysis and historical analysis respectively. This analysis clarifies the role played by Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the demise of logical empiricism in the second half of the twentieth-century

Whorfian variations on Kantian themes: Kuhn's linguistic turn

Thomas Kuhn's post-1980 writings have increasingly emphasized the role played by language in the characterization of scientific revolutions and incommensurability. We argue that Kuhn's 'linguistic turn' can be understood best against the background of a Whorfian conception of language and certain neo-Kantian themes. While this enables Kuhn to refine and unify his earlier views, it also creates some difficulties. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserve