Decrypting the Trends of International Regulatory Competition in Cryptoassets

The icos market has challenged financial regulators in terms of determining fit with existing regimes and consideration for regulatory reform. Regulatory divergences have emerged in a number of jurisdictions and we discuss three dominant approaches in relation to hegemonic, self-regulatory and enabling regimes. These reflect different assumptions and regulators’ understandings of the cryptoasset industry, and we argue that the ‘terms for competition’ in relation to supply and demand side needs are still being discovered and are incomplete. This provides a unique opportunity for regulators to jettison familiar assumptions in relation to corporatized securities issuers or institutional investors in order to discover what governance needs are truly at stake. This may pose challenges for coherence with existing regulation but coherence should not itself be an obstacle for learning and potentially, reform. We also argue that signs of international regulatory coordination in relation to the Libra project are not necessarily reflective of a wider trend for the cryptoasset industry. This is because regulators can apply existing and familiar financial regulation paradigms more easily to the Libra Association, in particular its leading founding member Facebook. The cryptoasset market is still likely to give rise to diversity and should facilitate the discovery of new bases for regulatory thinking and policy, uncoordinated or otherwise

An Institutional Theory of Corporate Regulation

The regulation of corporate behaviour has persisted in spite of peaks of neo-liberalism in many developed jurisdictions of the world, including the UK. This paradox is described as ‘regulatory capitalism’ by a number of scholars. Of particular note is the proliferation of corporate regulation to govern ‘socially responsible’ behaviour in recent legislative reforms in the EU and UK. In seeking to answer the broader question of whether corporate regulation indeed effectively governs and moderates corporate behaviour, this paper focuses on the nature of corporate regulation. Although different pieces of corporate regulation purport to achieve different objectives and impose different types of obligations, this paper offers an institutional account of corporate regulation, specifically in relation to the UK’s regulatory capitalism, which is in the mould of a liberal market economy. We argue that the nature and effectiveness of corporate regulation crucially depends on the nature of ‘regulatory capitalism’ in the type of economic order under discussion. Regulatory capitalism in the UK is characterised by three key tenets which reflect the spirit of the liberal market economy embraced here. Over time, gaps have been revealed in the achievements of these tenets of regulatory capitalism, particularly in relation to social expectations of the regulation of corporate behaviour. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis 2007-9, we observe increasing legalisation in the EU and UK of CSR issues, framed in ‘new governance’ regulatory techniques. They hold promise for change in corporate conduct through deeper forms of corporate engagement and accountability but they appear at the same time relatively undemanding and susceptible to cosmetic compliance. By discussing key examples in new corporate regulation reforms in the EU and UK, we seek to understand why recent corporate regulation reforms seem to offer mixed and in some cases, relatively limited achievements in governing corporate behaviour. We argue that the institutional account of corporate regulation continues to be able to explain regulatory weaknesses and limited achievements, in spite of the deployment of ‘new governance’ regulatory techniques. This is because ‘new governance’ regulatory techniques are implemented within the ethos of regulatory capitalism which limits their potential to introduce paradigm shifts. However the limitations of these regulatory reforms highlight more sharply the institutional shifts that are needed in order to connect the efficacy of corporate regulation with meeting social expectations

Edging toward ‘reasonably’ good corporate governance

Over four decades, research and policy have created layers of understandings in the quest for “good” corporate governance. The corporate excesses of the 1970s sparked a search for market mechanisms and disclosure to empower shareholders. The UK-focused problems of the 1990s prompted board-centric, structural approaches, while the fall of Enron and many other companies in the early 2000s heightened emphasis on director independence and professionalism. With the financial crisis of 2007-09, however, came a turn in some policy approaches and in academic literature seeking a different way forward. This paper explores those four phases and the discourse each develops and then links each to assumptions about accountability and cognition. After the financial crisis came pointers n policy and practice away from narrow, rationalist prescriptions and toward what the philosopher Stephen Toulmin calls “reasonableness”. Acknowledging that heightens awareness of complexity and interdependence in corporate governance practice. The paper then articulates a research agenda concerning what “reasonable” corporate governance might entail

A new era in fintech payment innovations? A perspective from the institutions and regulation of payment systems

This article analyses the existing institutions and infrastructure for payments. Authoritative settlement based on central bank support is seen as being essential for both large value and retail payment systems; and, in the EU, UK, and US, the importance of regulating for the protection of consumers who use retail payment systems is recognised. In this institutional context, payment innovations (including Bitcoin and distributed ledger or autonomous organisation technologies) are assessed. It is suggested that, while competition at certain levels is likely to bring social benefits through commercial developments, the maintenance of public interest objectives necessarily delineates the scope of competition. While this might limit the disruptive impact of payment innovations, it is argued that, in the light of the public policy needs for a stable and efficient public infrastructure and the social needs of confidence and trust in a predictable and regulated payment system that meets commercial and social expectations such as in consumer protection, this is not necessarily undesirable

Characterization of a novel gyrovirus in human stool and chicken meat

BACKGROUND: Sequence-independent amplification of clinical specimens can lead to the identification of novel pathogens. OBJECTIVES: To identify novel viruses in human stool specimens from patients with diarrhea and to investigate the ecology and clinical significance of such viruses. STUDY DESIGN: Nucleic acid extracted from stool specimens from patients with diarrhea with no known etiology were subjected to random PCR amplification and Roche/454 pyrosequencing. Novel viruses identified were genetically and epidemiologically characterized. RESULTS: Four gyroviruses, chicken anemia virus (CAV), human gyrovirus (HGV)/avian gyrovirus 2 (AGV2), gyrovirus 3 (GyV3) and a novel gyrovirus (tentatively designated as gyrovirus 4 (GyV4)) were identified in human stool specimens. GyV4, as well as CAV and AGV2/HGV were also detected in chicken skin and meat used for human consumption. CONCLUSIONS: A novel gyrovirus (GyV4) was identified in human stool and in chicken meat sold for human consumption. This virus was phylogenetically distinct from previously reported gyroviruses in chicken and humans (chicken anemia virus, human gyrovirus, avian gyrovirus 2 and recently reported gyrovirus 3). The epidemiology and pathogenesis of this virus in humans and in chicken needs to be further investigated.link_to_OA_fulltex