DataSheet_1_David against Goliath? The rise of coastal states at the Indian Ocean Tuna commission.pdf

Tuna regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) have long suffered from the domination of distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) in decision-making processes. The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) is no exception. In recent years, coastal states of the Indian Ocean (IO) have tried to change this dynamic - led by countries like the Maldives, Kenya, South Africa, and Australia - to deliver greater benefits to the region, including East Africa. These countries are gathered under the informal group of G16 and have increasingly improved their involvement in the IOTC. Here, we ask how the rise of the G16 benefited coastal States through participation and collective understanding in the Indian Ocean. To do this, we analyzed proposals submitted by the G16 for conservation and management measures and the participant lists of the Commission meetings in the past ten years. Our results show that, individually and collectively, the G16 has played a significant role in shaping the IOTC’s rules. The coastal States have established a good representation, with only a handful of Members absent in some years. Unveiling the efforts of coastal countries is essential to guide further capacity building in the region in terms of negotiations. We also call for international oversight of the actions of DWFNs, such as the EU, whose efforts often differ markedly from their claims of being sustainability champions. The G16’s work is essential to keep the coastal States of the Indian Ocean in the driver’s seat for managing Indian Ocean fisheries to benefit future generations.</p

Table_1_Subsidies and allocation: A legacy of distortion and intergenerational loss.DOCX

One of the greatest threats to the conservation of transboundary stocks is the failure of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) to equitably allocate future fishing opportunities. Across RFMOs, catch history remains the principal criterion for catch allocations, despite being recognized as a critical barrier to governance stability. This paper examines if and how subsidies have driven catch histories, thereby perpetuating the legacy of unfair resource competition between distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) and coastal States, and how this affects ongoing allocation negotiations in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). Using limited publicly available data on subsidies to Indian Ocean tuna fleets, we show that subsidies have inflated catch histories of many DWFN's. As long as historical catch remains the key allocation criterion, future fishing opportunities will continue to be skewed in favor of DWFNs, in turn marginalizing half of the IOTC member States, which collectively account for a paltry 4% of the current catch. Without better transparency in past subsidies data, accounting for this distortion will be difficult. We provide alternative allocation options for consideration, with our analysis showing that re-attributing DWFN catch to the coastal State in whose waters it was caught may begin to alleviate this historical injustice.</p