Diversification in Private Equity Funds:On Knowledge-sharing, Risk-aversion and Limited-attention

This paper examines diversification as a source of value creation and destruction in private equity. The literature has focused on the `diversification discount' in corporations. It has not analyzed diversification in PE-funds, where diversification might increase value by ameliorating managerial risk aversion and by facilitating knowledge sharing. Thus, I examine a sample of 1505 PE-funds to show that industry and geographic diversification increases PE-fund returns on average, this is likely due to knowledge-sharing/learning, and is not due to mere risk-reduction or endogeneity. Diversification can also destroy value if it spreads staff too thinly across industries/regions or is motivated by risk-aversion over performance bonuses.

High Frequency Trading, Information, and Takeovers

This paper (1) proposes new variables to detect informed high-frequency trading (HFT), (2) shows that HFT can help to predict takeover targets, and (3) shows that HFT in uences target announcement announcement returns. Prior literature suggests that informed trade may occur before takeovers, but has not examined the role of HFT and has relied on monthly measures of informed trade (such as PIN or the spread components). I propose microstructure-based variables to detect HFT that are derived from hazard modeling and from VWAP trading algorithms. I show that these can help predict takeover targets and are significantly related to target announcement returns. This highlights the existence of pre-takeover informed trade and the need to control for it when analyzing takeover returns.

Diversification in Private Equity Funds:On Knowledge-sharing, Risk-aversion and Limited-attention

This paper examines diversification as a source of value creation and destruction in private equity. The literature has focused on the `diversification discount' in corporations. It has not analyzed diversification in PE-funds, where diversification might increase value by ameliorating managerial risk aversion and by facilitating knowledge sharing. Thus, I examine a sample of 1505 PE-funds to show that industry and geographic diversification increases PE-fund returns on average, this is likely due to knowledge-sharing/learning, and is not due to mere risk-reduction or endogeneity. Diversification can also destroy value if it spreads staff too thinly across industries/regions or is motivated by risk-aversion over performance bonuses.

Anti-Takeover Provisions as a Source of Innovation and Value Creation

Managers are risk averse. Excessive risk-aversion can destroy shareholder wealth. A key source of risk is the threat of an opportunistic takeover designed to take advantage of depressed market prices. This is especially the case in innovative or hard-to-value (`HtV') companies whose price may be depressed due to valuation difficulties rather than managerial under-performance. For these HtV firms, the threat of an opportunistic takeover can destroy value by inducing agency con icts of managerial risk aversion. managers and regulators argue that ATPs can ameliorate this problem. This article presents a theoretical model and empirical results that show that for HtV firms, ATPs encourage managers to make value-creating takeovers and increase innovation and do not induce agency con icts of managerial entrenchment. This implies that for innovative or hard-to-value firms, ATPs can ameliorate managerial risk aversion and encourage value-creation.

Diversification in Private Equity Funds: On Knowledge-sharing, Risk-aversion and Limited-attention

This paper examines diversification as a source of value creation and destruction in private equity. The literature has focused on the `diversification discount' in corporations. It has not analyzed diversification in PE-funds, where diversification might increase value by ameliorating managerial risk aversion and by facilitating knowledge sharing. Thus, I examine a sample of 1505 PE-funds to show that industry and geographic diversification increases PE-fund returns on average, this is likely due to knowledge-sharing/learning, and is not due to mere risk-reduction or endogeneity. Diversification can also destroy value if it spreads staff too thinly across industries/regions or is motivated by risk-aversion over performance bonuses.Diversification;Private Equity;Venture Capital

Internal and External Discipline Following Securities Class Actions

Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). While some literature has examined SEC actions, it has not examined SCAs, and has not examined external discipline and the managers's future employment prospects after either action. Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO/CFO turnover and CEO/CFO pay-cuts, and harm CEOs future job-prospects. This suggests that even if the law governing SCAs is sub-optimal, they can still induce internal and external discipline.Securities Class Actions;Securities Law;Governance;Ethics;Takeovers;Managerial Turnover;Fraud;Disclosure

Value Creation in Venture Capital and Private Equity

This thesis examines the drivers of value-creation and value-destruction in venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) funds. VC/PE funds have become an increasingly important financial intermediary. They are a key source of capital for young companies who might otherwise have difficulty raising funds from stock-markets or from lenders. VC/PE funds can also help larger companies to restructure and re-direct operations. However, not all VC/PE funds earn super-normal returns or succeed in fostering innovation and value-creation. Subsequently, this thesis examines the drivers of value-creation in VC/PE funds. This thesis highlights the skewness that is present in VC/PE funds returns. The thesis then examines the role of fund-level characteristics in determining VC/PE performance. The thesis focuses on the role of a fund s size and diversification. The thesis also examines typical incentive contracts between VC/PE funds and their investors, and shows that the traditional incentive schemes can lead to sub-optimal performance. The thesis then uses this background to examine the structure of Australia s Innovation Investment Fund scheme, which is designed to support VC funds in their investments in start-up companies. The main contributions of this thesis are to highlight the drivers of VC/PE fund performance and to propose ways to incentivize and select value-creating funds