Reinsurance and dividend management

Includes bibliographical references.In this dissertation we set to find the dual optimal policy of a dividend payout scheme for shareholders with a risk-averse utility function and the retention level of received premiums for an insurance company with the option of reinsurance. We set the problem as a stochastic control problem. We then solve the resulting second-order partial differential equation known as Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. We find out that the optimal retention level is linear with the current reserve up to a point whereupon it is optimal for the insurance company to retain all business. As for the optimal dividend payout scheme, we find out that it is optimal for the company not to declare dividends and we make further explorations of this result

Objects Strangely Familiar: Symbolism and Literary Allusion in the Novels of Gary Crew

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Diversification in Private Equity Funds:On Knowledge-sharing, Risk-aversion and Limited-attention

This paper examines diversification as a source of value creation and destruction in private equity. The literature has focused on the `diversification discount' in corporations. It has not analyzed diversification in PE-funds, where diversification might increase value by ameliorating managerial risk aversion and by facilitating knowledge sharing. Thus, I examine a sample of 1505 PE-funds to show that industry and geographic diversification increases PE-fund returns on average, this is likely due to knowledge-sharing/learning, and is not due to mere risk-reduction or endogeneity. Diversification can also destroy value if it spreads staff too thinly across industries/regions or is motivated by risk-aversion over performance bonuses.

High Frequency Trading, Information, and Takeovers

This paper (1) proposes new variables to detect informed high-frequency trading (HFT), (2) shows that HFT can help to predict takeover targets, and (3) shows that HFT in uences target announcement announcement returns. Prior literature suggests that informed trade may occur before takeovers, but has not examined the role of HFT and has relied on monthly measures of informed trade (such as PIN or the spread components). I propose microstructure-based variables to detect HFT that are derived from hazard modeling and from VWAP trading algorithms. I show that these can help predict takeover targets and are significantly related to target announcement returns. This highlights the existence of pre-takeover informed trade and the need to control for it when analyzing takeover returns.

Diversification in Private Equity Funds:On Knowledge-sharing, Risk-aversion and Limited-attention

This paper examines diversification as a source of value creation and destruction in private equity. The literature has focused on the `diversification discount' in corporations. It has not analyzed diversification in PE-funds, where diversification might increase value by ameliorating managerial risk aversion and by facilitating knowledge sharing. Thus, I examine a sample of 1505 PE-funds to show that industry and geographic diversification increases PE-fund returns on average, this is likely due to knowledge-sharing/learning, and is not due to mere risk-reduction or endogeneity. Diversification can also destroy value if it spreads staff too thinly across industries/regions or is motivated by risk-aversion over performance bonuses.

Anti-Takeover Provisions as a Source of Innovation and Value Creation

Managers are risk averse. Excessive risk-aversion can destroy shareholder wealth. A key source of risk is the threat of an opportunistic takeover designed to take advantage of depressed market prices. This is especially the case in innovative or hard-to-value (`HtV') companies whose price may be depressed due to valuation difficulties rather than managerial under-performance. For these HtV firms, the threat of an opportunistic takeover can destroy value by inducing agency con icts of managerial risk aversion. managers and regulators argue that ATPs can ameliorate this problem. This article presents a theoretical model and empirical results that show that for HtV firms, ATPs encourage managers to make value-creating takeovers and increase innovation and do not induce agency con icts of managerial entrenchment. This implies that for innovative or hard-to-value firms, ATPs can ameliorate managerial risk aversion and encourage value-creation.