Iraq: the neocon strategy

As is well known, in the months after 11 September 2001, the United States developed its strategy for a ‘global war on terror’. This strategy, the Bush Doctrine, signaled a strong preparedness to act unilaterally and pre-emptively and identified an ‘axis of evil’ — Iraq, Iran and North Korea — as its principal target. These states were singled out because they were deemed to be most likely to equip terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Architecture of Security

We cannot expect in East Asia over the foreseeable future to see the sort of conflation of sovereign states that has occurred in Europe. We must anticipate that, for the foreseeable future, the requirement will be for the sensible management and containment of competitive instincts. The establishment of a multilateral security body in East Asia that includes all the key players, and which the major powers invest with the authority to tackle the shaping of the regional security order, remains a critical piece of unfinished business

The cruise missile and arms control

In 1972 the United States made the rather surprising announcement that it would develop a submarine-launched strategic cruise missile. Within a short time the cruise missile was being labeled as one of the most significant weapons developments of the decade with major applications in theatre and tactical as well as strategic roles. The characteristics of a cruise missile are such that its range and type of warhead - and therefore its role - cannot be reliably determined by external inspection, monitoring test flights or noting the platform on which it is deployed. Largely because of this ambiguity, the cruise missile became one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations on a second strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II). More generally, the cruise missile played an instrumental role in widening the scope of these negotiations to include long-range in theatre nuclear systems that occupy the gray area between strategic and battlefield weapons. In this monograph Mr Huisken makes a detailed examination of the role played by cruise missiles in SALT II and offers some thoughts on their implications for SALT III

ANZUS : life after 50 : alliance management in the 21st century

Australia's alliance with the United States, officially concluded on 1 September 1951, has become deeply embedded in this country's defence and security posture. In its particular field, the alliance is right up there with the Hills hoist, Victa mower and sunburn cream used in the opening ceremony for Sydney 2000 to give an impressionistic suggestion of where we had been as a society over about the same period. As one would expect with an arrangement that has survived for half a century, public support for the alliance has been consistently robust and is currently as strong or stronger than it has ever been. Within Australia's strategic and foreign policy community, the alliance has been scrutinised and evaluated quite regularly. Does it impinge on Australia's sovereignty? Does it hinder or enhance our foreign and defence policy interests? Does it involve the risk of entanglements that we would prefer to avoid? Do the benefits outweigh any actual or potential costs or risks? While there is a broad spectrum of views, there is clearly strong mainstream support for the alliance from within this community. At the same time, a common theme in the commentary over recent years has been that the end of the Cold War has had or will have a significant effect on the character of the alliance and make management of the relationship more complex. I share this view. The discussion below attempts to explore why this is the case and its likely ramifications. The most prominent sceptic in recent times has been former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. See 'Fraser urges cut in defence ties with US, The Australian, 21 May 2001, p.5. Earlier commentaries that are at least sceptical about the value of the alliance include Graeme Cheeseman, The Search for self Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam, (Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1993)Graeme Cheeseman and Michael McKinley, 'Memories Lost: Promise, Disappointment and Contradictions in the Australian-United States Defence Relationship', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.46, No.2, November 1992. See, for example Desmond Ball, 'The US-Australian Alliance: History and Prospects', Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Working Paper No.330, January 1999Paul Dibb, 'Will America's Alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region Endure?, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre Australian National University, Working Paper No.345, May 2000and William T. Tow, 'The Future of Alliances: AUSMIN as a Case Study', in Desmond Ball, editor, Maintaining the Strategic Edge: The Defence of Australia in 2015, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1999