Endogenous Amenities and the Spatial Structure of Cities

This paper examines the endogenous dynamics of the social structure of a city where the spatial repartition of amenities is endogenously modified by the spatial repartition of social groups. We start from the fact that, in most European cities, central locations are occupied by rich households; while in American cities, they are occupied by poor households. In a standard urban model without amenities, for rich households to locate downtown, their unit transport cost must be very high compared to the poor. Bruckner et al. (1999) show that, when there are historical amenities mainly located in the city center, we no longer need a high differential between transport costs: if demand for amenities by the rich is strong enough, this advantage could attract the rich households in the city centre. This explanation fits well with the fact that the most European cities have a long history, with the consequence that they accumulated many amenities in their city centre. However, the paper by Brueckner et al. is purely static and does not explicitly consider the historical dimension of the process generating amenities. Our model explicitly takes account of time: at every period, the equilibrium spatial structure of the city is determined by the transport costs and by the spatial repartition of amenities; but, between periods, the spatial repartition of amenities changes, rich households generating local amenities in the locations they occupy, and then the spatial structure of the city changes. We show that this endogenous generation of local amenities has two consequences. The first one is that the city may have several long term equilibria. We explicitly analyse two of them: an “American equilibrium†with the poor living in the centre, and a “European equibrium†with the rich living in the centre. We show that the conditions for the existence of an European equilibrium are more restrictive. The second consequence is that, when the city develops, it may move from an American equilibrium to an European one. If the city starts without amenities, poor households locate in the city centre, rich households in the periphery. However, the production of new local amenities by the rich generates a lock in effect: rich go on occupying locations where they were living previously and, as the city develops, these locations become central ones.

Optimal Immigration Policy When the Public Good Is Rival

In this model, we characterize optimal immigration and fiscal policies in presence of a rival public good and heterogeneous discounting. Surprisingly, even if the government is benevolent towards natives only, it is optimal to keep borders open. Indeed, in the long run, patient natives hold the whole stock of capital, while impatient immigrants work. Moreover, since capital intensity is stationary, capital per native, consumption and the public good increase with the number of (immigrant) workers. This positive effect offsets the disutility deriving from the congestion of the public good. Howevern when we account for the costs associated to cultural heterogeneity, we find that it is optimal to regulate immigration inflows. We also interpret the long-run sensitivity of the optimal policy mix with respect to the fundamentals.Heterogenous discounting, public good, immigration policy, cycles.

Tax Interactions among Belgian Municipalities: Does Language Matter?

This paper tests the existence of strategic interactions among municipalities using a panel of Belgian local tax rates from 1985 to 2004. A special emphasis is put on the role of the language spoken in the various municipalities. Our results first confirm previous findings for Belgium suggesting that municipalities interact with each other over the two main local tax rates, the local surcharge on the (labour) income tax rate and the local surcharge on the property tax. Using tools of spatial econometrics and an original methodology for specifying weights matrices, we find out that municipalities are sensitive to tax rates set by their close neighbours only. We also reject the hypothesis that the language does not matter: in the within model and for the local income tax rate, the intensity of interactions is shown to be lower between municipalities speaking different languages than between municipalities speaking the same language. That observation is particularly relevant for today Belgium and might be viewed as a contribution to the ongoing debate on the regionalisation or partial decentralization of some taxes.tax interactions, panel data, spatial econometrics, local tax rates, tax competition, yardstick competition

A "winner" under any voting rule ? An experiment on the single transferable vote

In this paper, we expose the results of a voting experiment realised in 2007, during the French Presidential election. This experiment aimed at confronting the Single Transferable vote (SVT) procedure to two criteria : simplicity and the selection of a Condorcet-winner. Building on our electoral sample's preferences, we show that this voting procedure can design a different winner, depending on the vote counting process. With the vote counting process advocated by Hare, the winner is Nicolas Sarkozy, while the Coombs vote counting process has François Bayrou as winner. For these two vote counting processes, the details of the experiment are the same and it is shown that the simplicity criterion is respected. However, with regard to the Condorcet-winner criterion, the Coombs methods is the only one to elect the Condorcet-winner, i.e. François Bayrou.Field experiments, elections, Single Transferable Vote, voting system, Condorcet Winner.

Is the Division of Labour Limited by the Extent of the Market? Evidence From French Cities

This paper provides supportive evidence to the notion that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the (local) market. We first propose a theoretical model. Its main prediction is that scarce specialists occupations are over-represented in large cities. Using census data for French cities, we find strong empirical support for this prediction

A "winner" under any voting rule ? An experiment on the single transferable vote

URL des Documents de travail : http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CESFramDP2009.htmClassification JEL : C93, D72.Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2009.67 - ISSN : 1955-611XIn this paper, we expose the results of a voting experiment realised in 2007, during the French Presidential election. This experiment aimed at confronting the Single Transferable vote (SVT) procedure to two criteria : simplicity and the selection of a Condorcet-winner. Building on our electoral sample's preferences, we show that this voting procedure can design a different winner, depending on the vote counting process. With the vote counting process advocated by Hare, the winner is Nicolas Sarkozy, while the Coombs vote counting process has François Bayrou as winner. For these two vote counting processes, the details of the experiment are the same and it is shown that the simplicity criterion is respected. However, with regard to the Condorcet-winner criterion, the Coombs methods is the only one to elect the Condorcet-winner, i.e. François Bayrou.Dans cet article, nous présentons les résultats d'une expérience électorale réalisée durant l'élection présidentielle de 2007 qui avait pour objectifs de confronter le vote préférentiel transférable à deux critères : la simplicité et la sélection du vainqueur de Condorcet. A partir du profil des préférences des électeurs qui ont participé à cette expérience électorale, nous montrons que cette procédure de vote peut conduire à la désignation d'un vainqueur différent suivant la méthode de dépouillement employée. Avec la méthode de Hare, le vainqueur est N. Sarkozy, tandis que la méthode de Coombs conduit à l'élection de F. Bayrou. Pour ces deux méthodes, les modalités pratiques du scrutin restent les mêmes et l'expérience a montré que ce processus répond bien au critère de simplicité. Par contre, au regard du principe de Condorcet, seule la méthode de Coombs, pour ce profil des préférences a conduit à l'élection du vaniqueur de Condorcet, à savoir F. Bayrou

Économétrie et données spatiales : une introduction à la pratique

Econometrics on spatial data : a beginner's guide. This contribution is an introduction to the main topics of spatial econometrics. We start analyzing the main problems raised by spatial data. The first one is heterogeneity : statisticians must take account of the fact that spatial units may not be directly comparable. They must correct for differences in size, form, structure and so on. The second one is interaction among units located in space, the intensity of which decreases with distance. These interactions lead to spatial autoregression and spatial autocorrelation. Then, the paper introduces to the main instruments used to represent and analyze spatial autocorrelation and autoregression : spatial graphs, weight matrices, contiguity matrices. It presents the main tests used to detect spatial autocorrelation, color tests on qualitative data, Moran and Geary tests for quantitative data. It shows how these tests can be interpreted. An illustrative example is also provided. Last, the paper shows how to deal with spatial autocorrelation and autoregression on the example of linear models. The main types of spatial linear models are presented : spatially autore-gressive, spatially autocorrelated and their combination. Then, we explain why least squares methods are not well suited to estimate this type of models. Most often, econometric analysis will rest upon maximum likelihood methods. The paper shows how to use these methods in the specific context of spatial models, in order to find parameters estimates and to make tests on them.Cet article d'initiation à l'économétrie sur données spatiales met l'accent sur les principaux problèmes rencontrés dans l'utilisation de ces données : hétérogénéité des observations, interactions liées à la proximité. La présence de ces dernières conduit à s'intéresser à l'autocorrélation spatiale. L'article montre comment la représenter en pratique. Il montre ensuite comment en tester la présence dans les données. Enfin, il présente les principaux modèles linéaires qui en tiennent compte et leurs procédures d'estimation.Jayet Hubert. Économétrie et données spatiales : une introduction à la pratique. In: Cahiers d'Economie et sociologie rurales, N°58-59, 1er et 2e trimestres 2001. Économie spatiale et géographique. Applications à l'agriculture, l'agro-alimentaire et l'espace rural. pp. 105-129