1,444 research outputs found
Doctor of Philosophy
dissertationThis dissertation develops a theory on the use of costly collateral in a credit contract. Existing theories advocate the function of collateral as an incentive device to reduce moral hazard. However, they do not distinguish between the effects of collateral on moral hazard regarding \risk-taking" from those on moral hazard regarding \shirking". I study a model with two-dimensional moral hazard under two extreme market structures: perfect competition and monopoly. In the section \Risk-taking Moral Hazard" (Section 5), I isolate the effects of risk-taking from those of shirking. I also study adverse selection in which consumer has one of two types (good types and bad types). In the model, banks choose not to use collateral to mitigate risk-taking moral hazard. In a perfectly competitive market, there is a unique separating equilibrium with zero collateral for the bad-type borrower and positive collateral for the good-type. I show that the latter is caused by adverse selection. In the pure monopoly case, zero collateral is optimal for both types. In the section \Shirking Moral Hazard" (Section 6), I consider shirking moral hazard with a continuum of e ort levels, but no adverse selection. In this case, the second-best effort level depends on the trade-off between the marginal benefit of effort (in terms of increasing expected return of the agent's project) and the marginal cost (in terms of reducing limited-liability rents). When collateral is not very costly, it is possible that the good-type borrower exerts effort at a level that is higher than the rst-best, regardless of the market structure. In addition, a lower cost of collateral and/or more competition can improve Pareto efficiency of social welfare. In the section \Two-Dimensional Moral Hazard" (Section 7), I extend my results to the case in which both types of moral hazard exist. Regardless of the market structure, I show that collateral is not used to mitigate risk-taking but to encourage a more efficient effort level. But when the optimal collateral to induce e ort happens to be higher than the interest rate, collateral also reduces risk-taking as a side effect
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NAD tagSeq reveals that NAD+-capped RNAs are mostly produced from a large number of protein-coding genes in Arabidopsis.
The 5' end of a eukaryotic mRNA transcript generally has a 7-methylguanosine (m7G) cap that protects mRNA from degradation and mediates almost all other aspects of gene expression. Some RNAs in Escherichia coli, yeast, and mammals were recently found to contain an NAD+ cap. Here, we report the development of the method NAD tagSeq for transcriptome-wide identification and quantification of NAD+-capped RNAs (NAD-RNAs). The method uses an enzymatic reaction and then a click chemistry reaction to label NAD-RNAs with a synthetic RNA tag. The tagged RNA molecules can be enriched and directly sequenced using the Oxford Nanopore sequencing technology. NAD tagSeq can allow more accurate identification and quantification of NAD-RNAs, as well as reveal the sequences of whole NAD-RNA transcripts using single-molecule RNA sequencing. Using NAD tagSeq, we found that NAD-RNAs in Arabidopsis were produced by at least several thousand genes, most of which are protein-coding genes, with the majority of these transcripts coming from <200 genes. For some Arabidopsis genes, over 5% of their transcripts were NAD capped. Gene ontology terms overrepresented in the 2,000 genes that produced the highest numbers of NAD-RNAs are related to photosynthesis, protein synthesis, and responses to cytokinin and stresses. The NAD-RNAs in Arabidopsis generally have the same overall sequence structures as the canonical m7G-capped mRNAs, although most of them appear to have a shorter 5' untranslated region (5' UTR). The identification and quantification of NAD-RNAs and revelation of their sequence features can provide essential steps toward understanding the functions of NAD-RNAs
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