Europe In The Global Economy: Matching The U.S.?

Stadtentwicklung, Weltwirtschaft, Wettbewerb, Deutschland, Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, Vereinigte Staaten, Urban development, World economy, Competition, Germany, European Economic and Monetary Union, United States

“A very orderly retreat”: Democratic transition in East Germany, 1989-90

East Germany's 1989-90 democratisation is among the best known of East European transitions, but does not lend itself to comparative analysis, due to the singular way in which political reform and democratic consolidation were subsumed by Germany's unification process. Yet aspects of East Germany's democratisation have proved amenable to comparative approaches. This article reviews the comparative literature that refers to East Germany, and finds a schism between those who designate East Germany's transition “regime collapse” and others who contend that it exemplifies “transition through extrication”. It inquires into the merits of each position and finds in favour of the latter. Drawing on primary and secondary literature, as well as archival and interview sources, it portrays a communist elite that was, to a large extent, prepared to adapt to changing circumstances and capable of learning from “reference states” such as Poland. Although East Germany was the Soviet state in which the positions of existing elites were most threatened by democratic transition, here too a surprising number succeeded in maintaining their position while filing across the bridge to market society. A concluding section outlines the alchemy through which their bureaucratic power was transmuted into property and influence in the “new Germany”

Vor einer Eskalation in Afghanistan? Deutscher Auslandseinsatz auf dem Prüfstand. Diskussion mit Horst Teltschik, Bernhard Gertz und Conrad Schetter

Textdokumentation zur Veranstaltung der Osnabrücker Friedensgespräche am 11. Juni 200

Precluded or precedent-setting?: the "NATO enlargement question" in the triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow diplomacy of 1990/1991 and beyond

Controversy arose in the mid-1990s when Russian officials accused Western governments of reneging on binding pledges made to Moscow in 1990 during German unification diplomacy. According to the allegations, Western leaders had solemnly promised that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would never expand beyond Germany into Central and Eastern Europe. Were such pledges ever made? Was the Soviet Union betrayed, and if so, by whom, how, and when? Or have various tactical comments been misinterpreted in hindsight? This article seeks to offer new answers to these questions by exploring not simply U.S.-Soviet-West German triangular diplomacy in 1990 but also the evolution of different approaches, ideas, and visions regarding Germany's security arrangements and the wider European security architecture. These ideas were floated publicly and privately, at home and abroad, by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and other senior West German officials. In showing how ultimately a “unified Germany in NATO” came about after months of intense diplomacy in 1990 to resolve the “German question,” this article refutes the recently made claim that the extension of full membership to the whole of Germany was a precedent-setting expansion of NATO