Triple Play Time

Abstract: Digital convergence thrusts telephony, television and the internet into the socalled 'triple play' offerings, creating new forms of rivalry between cable operators and telephone companies. Markets participants feel compelled to enter new industries to survive, even though their core competencies are limited to their primary market. The outcome of triple play competition is likely to depend on the speed of the development of new technologies and the adaptation of the regulatory environment. In the short run, telephone companies will enjoy an advantage attributable to switching costs. However, this advantage will erode as younger subscribers switch to telephony on the internet.triple play; bundling; digital convergence; broadband access; television and telephone

First-Degree Discrimination by a Duopoly: Pricing and Quality Choice

The paper examines under what conditions vertically differentiated duopolists engage in first-degree price discrimination. Each firm decides on a pricing regime at a first stage and sets prices at a second stage. The paper shows that when unit cost is an increasing and convex function of quality, the discriminatory regime is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of such two-stage game. In contrast to the case of horizontal differentiation, the discriminatory equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto-dominated by a bilateral commitment to uniform pricing. Also, the quality choices of perfectly discriminating duopolists are welfare maximizing. The paper explains why a threat of entry may elicit price discrimination by an incumbent monopolist.competition in pricing regimes, duopoly, quality choice

Competition Policy and Innovation

L'article analyse les complémentarités et les tensions entre la concurrence et l'innovation tant du point de vue des instruments d'analyse que du point de vue des politiques économiques.competition for the market; patent thicket; pools

First degree discrimination in a competitive setting : pricing and quality choice

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated producers. First order price discrimination leading to personalized prices are the perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game where firms choose at the first stage to commit or not to a uniform price and compete at the second stage. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Finally, firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective.Price discrimination, price schedules, personalized prices, vertical differentiation.

La politique de concurrence et les mesures spéciales d’importation dans un marché nord-américain en voie d’intégration

Cet article cherche à faire ressortir les éléments communs ainsi que les facteurs qui différencient les lois sur le commerce de marchandises sous-évaluées et subventionnées de la Loi sur la concurrence. Des conflits entre ces deux domaines du droit sont analysés dans le contexte de l’Accord de libre-échange.This article brings to the fore the common elements as well as the differences between the laws on dumping and subsidized trade on one hand, and competition policy on the other. The conflicts between the two bodies of law are analysed in the context of the Free Trade Agreement

Competition and intellectual property in the European Union

This article shows how European courts have managed tensions between antitrust and intellectual protection in three areas: (1) Parallel imports and market segmentation; (2) Refusals to supply essential inputs protected by patents and copyrights; (3) Forms of conduct by copyright collectives.parallel imports, management of collective rights, licensing, essential facilities