Two Patterns of Price Dynamics were Observed in Greenhouse Gases Emissions Trading Experiment: An Application of Point Equilibrium,

This paper compares efficiencies of double auction and bilateral trading in GHG emission trading experiments with the addition of two rules, abatement irreversibility of GHG emissions and non-compliance penalty, to Hizen and Saijo (1998). Using a new concept of equilibrium, we found that (i) Results were grouped into two cases. In one case, excessive reductions occurred at the early stage of the experiment and efficiency was relatively low. In the other case, excessive reduction did not occur at the early stage of experiment and efficiency was relatively high. (ii) In both cases, efficiency of double auction was higher than that of bilateral trading. (iii) Emissions trading lowered emissions reduction costs. (iv) Excessive emissions reduction occurred in almost all the sessions.

Two Patterns of Price Dynamics were Observed in Greenhouse Gases Emissions Trading Experiments: An Application of Point Equilibrium

This paper compares efficiencies of double auction and bilateral trading in GHG emission trading experiments with the addition of two rules, abatement irreversibility of GHG emissions and non-compliance penalty, to Hizen and Saijo (1998). Using a new concept of equilibrium, we found that (i) Results were grouped into two cases. In one case, excessive reductions occurred at the early stage of the experiment and efficiency was relatively low. In the other case, excessive reduction did not occur at the early stage of experiment and efficiency was relatively high. (ii) In both cases, efficiency of double auction was higher than that of bilateral trading. (iii) Emissions trading lowered emissions reduction costs. (iv) Excessive emissions reduction occurred in almost all the sessions.

Olympic Athlete Selection

Olympic athlete selection procedures are different among countries and events, and famous athletes are often reported to have lost their selection races. This paper analyzes what kind of procedure is more likely to select high-ability athletes while preventing low-ability athletes from being selected by chance. Our game-theoretic model shows that the answer depends on how sharply high-ability athletes’ race results fluctuate relative to those of low-ability athletes. Athletes’ strategic choice of participation in races turns out to be crucial in addressing this question, and there are cases in which having only one race is desirable, even if the selection can involve multiple races.Yoichi Hizen and Ryo Okui (2009) “Olympic Athlete Selection,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 9: Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 46. Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol9/iss1/art4

Electoral systems of Japan

The Japanese Diet has undergone three electoral reforms since 1983. This dissertation studies the electoral systems from a game-theoretic perspective. Chapter 1 surveys the history of Japanese Diet elections and discusses the research topics which are dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3 and topics which will be dealt with in the future. Chapter 2 compares the three electoral systems with which the House of Councillors has experimented, that is, single nontransferable voting (SNTV), closed-list proportional representation (PR) and open-list PR. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a least preferred candidate whose winning is Pareto inferior to any other electoral outcome, and examine whether he wins under each electoral system. The result is that he never wins under SNTV; he wins in some multiple equilibria under open-list PR, but the probability of his winning is high only when some voters use a weakly dominated strategy; and he wins with high probability in any equilibrium under closed-list PR because the seat-seeking party ranks him higher in the PR list. This result partially supports Japan\u27s 2001 transition from closed-list PR to open-list PR. Chapter 3 analyzes the mixed electoral system introduced in the House of Representatives in 1996, which is a mixture of the single-member district (SMD) and the PR systems. One characteristic of the Japanese variant is that each candidate can run in both tiers (dual candidacy) and dual candidates can be ranked either individually or equally in the PR list. We examine how voters cast their SMD and PR votes according to the order of candidates chosen by parties in their PR list, and in turn how parties rank their candidates to maximize the expected number of seats. We show that, under some assumptions of voters\u27 preferences, no use of dual candidacy and the use of dual candidacy accompanied by equal ranking are realized in equilibrium as optimal strategies for parties, while the use of dual candidacy accompanied by individual ranking is not. This result is consistent with actual observations made of the last three elections

Electoral systems of Japan

The Japanese Diet has undergone three electoral reforms since 1983. This dissertation studies the electoral systems from a game-theoretic perspective. Chapter 1 surveys the history of Japanese Diet elections and discusses the research topics which are dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3 and topics which will be dealt with in the future. Chapter 2 compares the three electoral systems with which the House of Councillors has experimented, that is, single nontransferable voting (SNTV), closed-list proportional representation (PR) and open-list PR. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a least preferred candidate whose winning is Pareto inferior to any other electoral outcome, and examine whether he wins under each electoral system. The result is that he never wins under SNTV; he wins in some multiple equilibria under open-list PR, but the probability of his winning is high only when some voters use a weakly dominated strategy; and he wins with high probability in any equilibrium under closed-list PR because the seat-seeking party ranks him higher in the PR list. This result partially supports Japan\u27s 2001 transition from closed-list PR to open-list PR. Chapter 3 analyzes the mixed electoral system introduced in the House of Representatives in 1996, which is a mixture of the single-member district (SMD) and the PR systems. One characteristic of the Japanese variant is that each candidate can run in both tiers (dual candidacy) and dual candidates can be ranked either individually or equally in the PR list. We examine how voters cast their SMD and PR votes according to the order of candidates chosen by parties in their PR list, and in turn how parties rank their candidates to maximize the expected number of seats. We show that, under some assumptions of voters\u27 preferences, no use of dual candidacy and the use of dual candidacy accompanied by equal ranking are realized in equilibrium as optimal strategies for parties, while the use of dual candidacy accompanied by individual ranking is not. This result is consistent with actual observations made of the last three elections

Does a Least-Preferred Candidate Win a Seat? A Comparison of Three Electoral Systems

In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR