Effects of the Quantitative Easing Policy: A Survey of Empirical Analyses

This paper surveys the empirical analyses that examine the effects of the Bank of Japan's (BOJ's) quantitative easing policy (QEP), which was implemented from March 2001 through March 2006. The survey confirms a clear effect whereby the commitment to maintain the QEP fostered the expectations that the zero interest rate would continue into the future, thereby lowering the yield curve centering on the short- to medium-term range. There were also phases in which an increase in the current account balances held by financial institutions at the BOJ bolstered this expectation. While the results were mixed as to whether expansion of the monetary base and altering the composition of the BOJ's balance sheet led to portfolio rebalancing, generally this effect, if any, was smaller than that stemming from the commitment. When viewing the QEP's impact on Japan's economy through various transmission channels, many of the analyses suggest that the QEP created an accommodative environment in terms of corporate financing. In particular, the QEP contained financial institutions' funding costs from the market and staved off financial institutions' funding uncertainties. The QEP's effect on raising aggregate demand and prices was often limited, due largely to the then progressing corporate balance-sheet adjustment, as well as the zero bound constraint on interest rates.Zero interest rate policy; Quantitative easing policy; Commitment; Zero bound constraint on interest rates; Deflation

A Historical Evaluation of Financial Accelerator Effects in Japan's Economy

In this paper, we carry out a historical evaluation of the financial accelerator effects, which were mainly generated by the changes in asset prices, operating on Japan's economy since the 1980s. For this purpose, we estimate a Japanese financial accelerator model, which is a modified version of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1999]'s model, and identify the historical exogenous shocks affecting the evolution of firms' net worth. As a result, we confirm that the estimated parameter on the corporate balance sheet channel is statistically significant. We also find that the identified net worth shocks, which change the amount of firms' debt holdings relative to their total values, produced a large and persistent impact on Japan's output and prices. This result strongly suggests that the negative financial accelerator effects were indispensable to explain the mechanism behind Japan's long stagnation during the 1990s and early 2000s, as well as indicating that the deflation of general prices since the late 1990s has been at least partly attributed to the same cause.

Japan's Deflation, Problems in the Financial System, and Monetary Policy

This paper offers three analyses of Japan's macroeconomic experience during the post-1990 period. First, we analyze various facets of deflation during the period, arguing that the deflation of general prices has by no means been a major factor for the stagnating economy. In contrast, the deflation of asset prices was closely related to the economic difficulty of the period. In particular, the negative shocks generated by sharp declines in asset prices in the early 1990s have been propagated and amplified by their interaction with the deterioration in the condition of the financial system. Some statistical evidence supports this view. Second, we analyze the effects of monetary policy adopted by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to fight deflation since the late 1990s. Given that short-term interest rates were already nearly zero in the mid-1990s, policy measures have focused on creating monetary easing effects beyond those created by zero interest rates alone. We show that the zero interest rate policy, which includes a commitment to maintain a zero interest rate for a longer period than that suggested by a baseline monetary policy rule, has produced strong effects on expected future short-term interest rates and thus the entire yield curve. Third, we argue that the BOJ has successfully prevented a repetition of the 1997-98 type liquidity crisis by directing market operations at addressing the financial-sector problems. These operations have taken the form of containing risk and liquidity premiums, particularly in the money market, through proactive provision of liquidity as well as the BOJ's own risk- taking activity.

A Historical Evaluation of Financial Accelerator Effects in Japan's Economy

In this paper, we carry out a historical evaluation of the financial accelerator effects, which were mainly generated by the changes in asset prices, operating on Japan's economy since the 1980s. For this purpose, we estimate a Japanese financial accelerator model, which is a modified version of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1999]'s model, and identify the historical exogenous shocks affecting the evolution of firms' net worth. As a result, we confirm that the estimated parameter on the corporate balance sheet channel is statistically significant. We also find that the identified net worth shocks, which change the amount of firms' debt holdings relative to their total values, produced a large and persistent impact on Japan's output and prices. This result strongly suggests that the negative financial accelerator effects were indispensable to explain the mechanism behind Japan's long stagnation during the 1990s and early 2000s, as well as indicating that the deflation of general prices since the late 1990s has been at least partly attributed to the same cause

The Central-Bank Balance Sheet as an Instrument of Monetary Policy

While many analyses of monetary policy consider only a target for a short-term nominal interest rate, other dimensions of policy have recently been of greater importance: changes in the supply of bank reserves, changes in the assets acquired by central banks, and changes in the interest rate paid on reserves. We extend a standard New Keynesian model to allow a role for the central bank's balance sheet in equilibrium determination, and consider the connections between these alternative dimensions of policy and traditional interest-rate policy. We distinguish between "quantitative easing" in the strict sense and targeted asset purchases by a central bank, and argue that while the former is likely be ineffective at all times, the latter dimension of policy can be effective when financial markets are sufficiently disrupted. Neither is a perfect substitute for conventional interest-rate policy, but purchases of illiquid assets are particularly likely to improve welfare when the zero lower bound on the policy rate is reached. We also consider optimal policy with regard to the payment of interest on reserves; in our model, this requires that the interest rate on reserves be kept near the target for the policy rate at all times

Transmission Channels and Welfare Implications of Unconventional Monetary Easing Policy in Japan

This paper examines the effects of the Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing Policy (QQE ) of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) by transmission channels in comparison with those of the Comprehensive Monetary Easing Policy (CE) and the subsequent monetary easing policies (2010-2012), based on the event study using financial market data. As for the QQE under normal market conditions, depreciation of foreign exchange rate in the context of portfolio balance channel functions quite strongly, while as for the CE, signaling channel through the commitment and credit easing channel at the dysfunctional markets work. The direct inflation expectation channel is weak for both QQE and CE, although the QQE has adopted various ways to exert a direct and strong influence on inflation expectation. It can be conjectured that the gradual rise in inflation expectation comes mainly from other channels like the depreciation of the yen. The most crucial characteristic of the QQE is to maximize the potential effects of easing policy by explicitly doubling and later tripling the purchased amount of JGBs and then the monetary base proportionally. The amount of JGB purchases by the BOJ surpasses the issuance amount of JGBs, thereby reducing the outstanding amount of JGBs in the markets. Shortage of safety assets would increase the convenience yield, which itself would reduce the economic welfare and not permeate the yields of other risky assets theoretically. This paper then examines the impact of reduction in JGBs on yield spreads between corporate bonds and JGBs based on money-in-utility type model applied to JGBs, and finds that at least severe scarcity situations of JGBs as safe assets are avoided, since the size of Japan’s public debt outstanding is the largest in the world. Even so, the event study shows no clear evidence that the decline in the yield of long-maturity JGBs induced by the QQE permeates the yields of corporate bonds. Recently demands for JGBs have been increasing from both domestic and foreign investors as collaterals after the Global Financial Crisis and from financial institutions that have to correspond to strengthened global liquidity regulation, while the Government of Japan is planning to consolidate the public debts. These recent changes as well as market expectation for future path of JGB amounts should also be taken account of to examine the scarcity of safe assets in case of further massive purchases of JGBs.2012～2016年度科学研究費補助金[基盤研究(S)]「長期デフレの解明」(研究代表者 東京大学経済学研究科・渡辺努, 課題番号：24223003