Has Competition in the Japanese Banking Sector Improved?

This paper investigates whether competition in the Japanese banking sector has improved in the last quarter of the 20th century. By estimating the first order condition of profit maximization, together with the cost function and the inverse demand function, we found that competition had improved, especially in the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s. The results fail to reject a Cournot oligopoly for city banks for most of the period, while they do reject it for regional banks for the overall period. This suggests that competition among city banks was stronger than that among regional banks.Japanese banks, degree of competition, loan market.

Herd Behavior in the Japanese Loan Market: Evidence from Bank Panel Data

This paper investigates whether Japanese banks had been following herd behavior in the domestic loan market from 1975 through 2002. Applying the technique developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (LSV) (1992, J. of Fin. Econ.) to the data of loans outstanding to different types of borrowers, we obtain evidence indicative of the existence of herding. Consistent herding during the entire sample period is observed among regional banks, whereas city banks had been following a cyclical herd behavior with one peak around the bubble period in the late 1980s. Even after adjusting for herding resulting from rational or institutional factors, we still observe herding for regional banks in the entire period, whereas herding only in the bubble period remains for city banks. The results would indicate that regional banks had been consistently following irrational herd behavior, while city banks were frantic enough to herd only in the bubble period in the late 1980sherd behavior, LSV herding measure, adjusted herding measure, banks, loan market, Japan

Bank Size and Lending Relationships in Japan

Current theoretical and empirical research suggests that small banks have a comparative advantage in processing soft information and delivering relationship lending. The most comprehensive analysis of this view found using U.S. data that smaller SMEs borrow from smaller banks and smaller banks have stronger relationships with their borrowers (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005) (BMPRS). We employ essentially the same methodology as BMPRS on a unique Japanese data set and obtained findings that are quite interesting from an international comparison point of view. We found like BMPRS that larger firms tend to borrow from larger banks. However, unlike BMPRS we did not find that this was because larger firms are more transparent. Together these results imply that large banks do not necessarily have a comparative advantage in extending transactions-based lending. We also found like BMPRS that smaller banks have strong relationships with their borrowers. However, we find that banking relationships in the U.S. and Japan are strong in somewhat different dimensions. Our paper clarifies these and other interesting similarities and differences between the U.S. and Japan.

Empirical Determinants of Bargaining Power

This paper empirically investigates what determine bargaining power between a lender and a borrower who have continuing transactional relationships. Bargaining power is proxied by which side of the transaction, i.e. the lender or the borrower, usually incurs a shoe-leather cost when they have contact. The proxy is regressed on three types of variables that can potentially determine distribution: (i) lender's competition, (ii) the degree of informational asymmetry between the two parties, and (iii) borrower performance. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that intensive lender competition and borrowers' good performance increase the likelihood of the lender incurring the cost, or the borrower's power. We also obtain evidence suggesting that some lenders enjoy a status of informational monopoly and capture borrowers.

Loan officers and relationship lending to SMEs

Previous research suggests that loan officers play a critical role in relationship lending by producing soft information about SMEs. For the first time, we empirically confirm this hypothesis We also examine whether the role of loan officers differs from small to large banks as predicted by Stein (2002). While we find that small banks produce more soft information, the capacity and manner in which loan officers produce soft information does not seem to differ between large and small banks. This suggests that, although large banks may produce more soft information, they likely tend to concentrate their resources on transactions lending.Banks and banking ; Bank loans ; Commercial credit

Herd Behavior by Japanese Banks After Financial Deregulation in the 1980s

This paper empirically investigates whether Japanese banks followed herd behavior as a result of financial deregulation in the 1980s, and whether any observed herd behavior brought about inefficiencies that could have caused macroeconomic fluctuations. Using loan-portfolio data, the paper examines Granger-causalities in lending behavior by different types of banks. We find that Japanese banks inefficiently herd from the early through mid-1980s, the period immediately after financial deregulation began. However, contrary to anecdotal evidence, inefficient herd behavior is rarely observed in the 1990s. The herd behavior in the 1980s was more frequently observed in lending to new borrowers than to traditional borrowers. In addition, other banks were inclined to follow those banks that were considered more informed in lending to a specific industry, or that were large enough to adjust more effectively to the environment created by deregulation. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions in the literature and suggest the possibility that the herd behavior contributed to the asset price bubble in the late 1980s

Firm Growth and Efficiency in the Banking Industry : A New Test of the Efficient Structure Hypothesis

In this paper we propose a new test of the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis, which predicts that efficient firms come out ahead in competition and grow as a result. Our test has significant advantages over existing ones, because it is more direct, and can jointly test the so-called quiet-life hypothesis, which predicts that in a concentrated market firms do not minimize costs. We then apply this test to large banks in Japan. Consistent with the ES hypothesis, we find that more efficient banks become larger. We also find that market concentration reduces banks’ efficiency, which supports the quiet-life hypothesis. These findings imply that there is an intriguing growth-efficiency dynamic throughout banks’ life cycle, although our findings also suggest that the ES hypothesis dominates the quiet-life hypothesis in terms of economic impact

Firm Growth and Efficiency in the Banking Industry : A New Test of the Efficient Structure Hypothesis

This paper proposes a new test of the efficient structure hypothesis by directly examining the relation between firm efficiency and firm growth. This is also a test of the so-called quiet-life hypothesis.Applying this test to large banks in Japan, we find that more efficient banks become larger, which is consistent with the efficient structure hypothesis. We also find that market concentration reduces banks’ cost efficiency, which is consistent with the quiet-life hypothesis. These findings imply that there is an intriguing growth-efficiency dynamic throughout the life cycle of banks, although yet another finding suggests that the economic impact of the quiet-life hypothesis is less significant than that of the efficient structure hypothesis