Blame games and democratic responsiveness

The link between opinion and policy is central to the functioning of representative democracy. Democracies are responsive to their citizens' preferences if citizens can influence governments' policy output. This article conceptualizes political blame games about policy controversies as venues of democratic responsiveness to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the opinion-policy link in policy-heavy, conflictual democracies. The article shows how political actors convert public feedback to a policy controversy into blame game interactions, which in turn lead to political and policy responses by the government. A comparative-historical analysis of nine blame games in the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland reveals how institutions structure blame game interactions, and thus influence a political system's responsiveness during blame games. The analysis suggests that an important, yet neglected, expression of democratic quality of political systems is their ability to translate blame game interactions into policy responses. The study of blame games as venues of democratic responsiveness thus provides a new conceptual tool for assessing the health of representative democracies in more conflictual times

Political challengers and norm erosion in advanced democracies

How do politicians in advanced democracies get away with violating political norms? Although norm violators confront a powerful establishment that can penalize them, norm violations currently occur in many advanced democracies. This article analyzes the conflicts between norm-violating challengers and established politicians and parties as norm defenders in multiparty systems to contribute to the discipline's understanding of norm erosion processes. Based on diachronic and synchronic comparisons of conflicts over norm violations in Austria and Germany, the article reveals how political challengers can already damage democratic norms from a position of institutional weakness. Norm violators that make ambiguous provocations and can leverage their previously acquired democratic credentials, can more credibly dispel attempts to stigmatize them as undemocratic. In doing so, they turn the tables on the political establishment and portray its sanctions as a form of ‘excessive retaliation’ that constitutes a norm violation in itself. The article concludes with the unsettling finding that (verbal) norm protection can facilitate norm erosion

Policy’s role in democratic conflict management

This article proposes rethinking democratic conflict management by acknowledging the increasingly important role policy plays in it. As the debate on the health of democracy intensifies, research on how democracies manage and absorb political and societal conflicts becomes broadly relevant. Existing theories and perspectives view conflict management through the lens of elections and other institutional mechanisms, or they examine the social and economic preconditions for successful conflict management while inadequately understanding how policies contribute to conflict management. The article develops a theoretical framework that allows for the analysis of how policies’ material and interpretive effects influence societal conflicts and thereby strengthen (or weaken) democracy. While the article focuses on hypothesis-generation rather than hypothesis-testing, it draws on a large variety of policy and case examples to corroborate and illustrate the theoretical expectations embodied in the framework. Insights into policy’s role in democratic conflict management expand our understanding of the challenges to democracy in the twenty-first century and create new possibilities for comparative, policy-focused research into what makes democracy work

The long and winding road to fiscal adjustment: how the IMF judges austerity programmes

IMF judgements on whether government austerity programmes can be successfully implemented are carefully followed by international financial markets. Markus Hinterleitner, Fritz Sager and Eva Thomann analyse the way the organisation has judged the credibility of austerity programmes in 14 European countries. They find that the IMF considers implementation credibility in its evaluations of austerity programs, and uses these to push its own agenda

How Do Credit Rating Agencies Rate? An Implementation Perspective on the Assessment of Austerity Programs during the European Debt Crisis

During the recent European debt crisis, credit rating agencies (CRAs) and the ratings they were producing became a frequent bone of contention. We analyze which factors are considered by CRAs when they judge a state's credibility in implementing an announced austerity program. The results of a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of credit ratings show that implementation-related factors had a comparatively minor impact while the level of economic competitiveness of the evaluated country displayed high explanatory power. The findings highlight the desolate implications for less competitive countries that emanate from credit ratings and their influence on refinancing costs. While competitive states are deemed better able to generate future growth and therefore get positive evaluations, less competitive states cannot prevent (further) downgrades in the short or middle-term by announcing austerity programs

Anticipatory and reactive forms of blame avoidance: of foxes and lions

Blame avoidance behavior (BAB) encompasses all kinds of integrity-protecting activities by officeholders in the face of potentially blame-attracting events. Although considered essential for a realistic understanding of politics and policymaking, a general understanding of this multi-faceted behavioral phenomenon and its implications has been lacking to date. We argue that this is due to the lack of careful conceptualization of various forms of BAB. Crucially, the difference between anticipatory and reactive forms of BAB is largely neglected in the literature. This paper links anticipatory and reactive forms of BAB as two consecutive decision situations. It exposes dependence relationships between the situations that trigger BAB, the rationalities at work, the resources and strategies applied by blame-avoiding actors, and the various consequences thereof. The paper concludes that anticipatory and reactive BAB are distinct phenomena that require specific research approaches to assess their relevance for the workings of polities

Policy failures, blame games and changes to policy practice

Studies examining the policy implications of elite polarisation usually concentrate on policy formulation and change, but neglect the impact of Polarisation on the day-to-day application of policies. Applying the method of causal process tracing to the Swiss “Carlos” case, a blame game triggered by the reporting about an expensive therapy setting for a youth offender, this article exposes and explains a hitherto neglected, but highly important, mechanism between political elites engaging in blame generation and changes in policy practice. A policy’s distance and visibility to mass publics, as well as the incentives and resources of elites to engage in blame generation, explain the dynamics within blame games, which, in turn, effect organisational and behavioural changes that help institutionalise a more politicised policy practice. Politicised policy practice can make an important difference to policy target populations, as well as damage output legitimacy and undermine democracy

Reconciling Perspectives on Blame Avoidance Behaviour

Blame avoidance behaviour (BAB) has become an increasingly popular topic in political science. However, the preconditions of BAB, its presence and consequences in various areas and in different political systems largely remain a black box. In order to generate a better understanding of BAB and its importance for the workings of democratic political systems, the scattered literature on BAB needs to be assessed and structured. This article offers a comprehensive review of the literature on blame avoidance. It departs from Weaver’s concept of blame avoidance and subsequently differentiates between work on BAB in comparative welfare state research and work on BAB in public policy and administration. It is argued that between these two strands of literature a bifurcation exists since both perspectives rarely draw on each other to create a more general understanding of BAB. Advantages from existing approaches must be combined to assess the phenomenon of blame avoidance in a more comprehensive way. </jats:p

Salami tactics and the implementation of large-scale public projects

This article builds on the literature on policy failure and blame management to analyse the implementation of large-scale public projects, which frequently suffer from cost overruns and delays. The article addresses a hitherto neglected blame management strategy used by politicians overseeing implementation: the stepwise announcement of delays and/or cost overruns, often referred to as ‘salami tactics’. I assert that politicians apply salami tactics in order to reduce and deflect the blame for a project that turns out to be more expensive, or takes longer to complete, than initially communicated. The empirical section examines the use of salami tactics in two large-scale public projects that resulted in delays and cost overruns: the Berlin Brandenburg Airport in Germany and the Swiss National Exposition Expo.02. Both cases confirm my arguments regarding the blame-reducing and blame-deflecting effects of salami tactics and reveal that this strategy can cause projects to lock-in on a self-undermining path

Policy Controversies and Political Blame Games

In modern, policy-heavy democracies, blame games about policy controversies are commonplace. Despite their ubiquity, blame games are notoriously difficult to study. This book elevates them to the place they deserve in the study of politics and public policy. Blame games are microcosms of conflictual politics that yield unique insights into democracies under pressure. Based on an original framework and the comparison of fifteen blame games in the UK, Germany, Switzerland, and the US, it exposes the institutionalized forms of conflict management that democracies have developed to manage policy controversies. Whether failed infrastructure projects, food scandals, security issues, or flawed policy reforms, democracies manage policy controversies in an idiosyncratic manner. This book is addressed not only to researchers and students interested in political conflict in the fields of political science, public policy, public administration, and political communication, but to everyone concerned about the functioning of democracy in more conflictual times. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core