Knowledge, Belief, and Assertion

The traditional answer to the question what it is to make an\ud assertion appeals to belief (see Grice 1989 and Searle\ud 1969). To assert something, so the analysis goes, is to\ud express a belief by way of uttering a sentence. Timothy\ud Williamson claims (1) that on the traditional analysis\ud assertion is constitutively governed by the truth rule (242):1\ud One must: assert p only if p is true.\ud He argues (2) that the traditional analysis is mistaken, and\ud (3) that assertion is constitutively governed by the\ud knowledge rule instead (243):\ud One must: assert p only if one knows p.\ud I will argue that all three of these claims are false

Establishments as Material rather than Immaterial Objects

ABSTARCT: When people go shopping, they enter a building. But the shop cannot be identified with the building, because it would remain the same shop if it moved to another building or if it became an e-store. Daniel Korman [2019] uses these two observations to argue that establishments are immaterial objects. However, all that follows is that establishments are not buildings. I argue that establishments are organisations or corporate agents that are constituted by people. This entails that they are material objects. Korman’s observations can be accommodated in terms of the further observation that corporate agents can but need not own or rent buildings

How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment? Dumbfounding and Disengagement

Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people’s behavior, that moral reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically, Albert Bandura’s experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often does contribute effectively to the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments

Acceptance-dependence:A social kind of response-dependence

Neither Johnston's nor Wright's account of response-dependence offers a complete picture of response-dependence, as they do not apply to all concepts that are intrinsically related to our mental responses. In order to (begin to) remedy this situation, a new conception of response-dependence is introduced that I call "acceptance-dependence". This account applies to concepts such as goal, constitutional, and money, the first two of which have mistakenly been taken to be response-dependent in another sense. Whereas on Johnston's and Wright's accounts response-dependent concepts depend on counterfactual responses of individuals, acceptance-dependent concepts depend on the actual responses of groups of people. This implies that concepts of the latter kind are less objective than concepts of the former kind

Who wants to grant robots rights?

The robot rights debate has thus far proceeded without any reliable data concerning the public opinion about robots and the rights they should have. We have administered an online survey (n = 200) that investigates layman's attitudes towards granting particular rights to robots. Furthermore, we have asked them for what reasons they are willing to grant them those rights. Finally, we have administered general perceptions of robots regarding appearance, capacities, and traits. Results show that rights can be divided in sociopolitical and computing dimensions, and reasons into cognition and compassion dimensions. People generally have a positive view on robot interaction capacities. Attitudes towards robot rights depend on age and experience as well as on the cognitive and affective capacities people believe robots will ever possess. Our results suggest that the robot rights debate stands to benefit greatly from a common understanding of the capacity potentials of future robots

Who Wants to Grant Robots Rights?

The robot rights debate has thus far proceeded without any reliable data concerning the public opinion about robots and the rights they should have. We have administered an online survey (n = 439) that investigates layman’s attitudes toward granting particular rights to robots. Furthermore, we have asked them the reasons for their willingness to grant them those rights. Finally, we have administered general perceptions of robots regarding appearance, capacities, and traits. Results show that rights can be divided in sociopolitical and robot dimensions. Reasons can be distinguished along cognition and compassion dimensions. People generally have a positive view about robot interaction capacities. We found that people are more willing to grant basic robot rights such as access to energy and the right to update to robots than sociopolitical rights such as voting rights and the right to own property. Attitudes toward granting rights to robots depend on the cognitive and affective capacities people believe robots possess or will possess in the future. Our results suggest that the robot rights debate stands to benefit greatly from a common understanding of the capacity potentials of future robots