Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing Symposium on Unfinished Feminist Business

The public/private distinction has been a target of thoroughgoing feminist critique for quite some time now. Indeed, attacking the public/private line has been one of the primary concerns (if not the primary concern) of feminist legal theorizing for over two decades. If Carole Pateman is correct, one would think that this particular problem might be assigned to the category of finished business by this time. In this Essay, I do argue that the critique is, in certain ways, finished business in that it is no longer particularly useful in its most common forms. More importantly, however, I suggest several ways in which various critiques of the public/private line have left much business unfinished

Straying from the Path of the Law after One Hundred Years, The

What common ground can be found between modern feminist legal theory and a century-old essay advocating understanding the law from the perspective of the bad man ? The question admits of no simple answer. Feminists, including myself, might agree with some irony that [i]f you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man but would add that this is precisely the problem. Of course, Holmes does not use the concept of the bad man in a feminist sense to suggest that the law empowers the bad man at the expense of women. Indeed, except for a passing reference to Mrs. Quickly\u27s misplaced interest in headwear, he does not mention women at all. Nonetheless this essay reveals common ground between Holmes\u27s thought and feminist legal theory that is both wide and significant. Feminism\u27s departures from The Path - and there are many - reveal just as readily our different destination

Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing Symposium on Unfinished Feminist Business

The public/private distinction has been a target of thoroughgoing feminist critique for quite some time now. Indeed, attacking the public/private line has been one of the primary concerns (if not the primary concern) of feminist legal theorizing for over two decades. If Carole Pateman is correct, one would think that this particular problem might be assigned to the category of finished business by this time. In this Essay, I do argue that the critique is, in certain ways, finished business in that it is no longer particularly useful in its most common forms. More importantly, however, I suggest several ways in which various critiques of the public/private line have left much business unfinished

Democracy and Feminism

Although feminist legal theory has had an important impact on most areas of legal doctrine and theory over the last two decades, its contribution to the debate over constitutional interpretation has been comparatively small. In this Article, Professor Higgins explores reasons for the limited dialogue between mainstream constitutional theory and feminist theory concerning questions of democracy, constitutionalism, and judicial review. She argues that mainstream constitutional theory tends to take for granted the capacity of the individual to make choices, leaving the social construction of those choices largely unexamined. In contrast, feminist legal theory\u27s emphasis on the importance of constraints on women\u27s choices has led to a neglect of questions of citizenship and sovereignty within a democratic system. By comparing mainstream constitutional theory and feminist theory, Professor Higgins highlights the existing limitations of both. She argues both that mainstream constitutional theory must take into account feminist arguments concerning constraints on individual choice and that feminist theory must take seriously the mainstream debate over democratic legitimacy. Integrating these distinct concerns, she suggests a framework for constitutional interpretation that reflects a feminist conception of citizenship under conditions of inequality

Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture, and Women\u27s Inheritance Rights in Ghana

This Report presents the findings of a Fordham delegation. It consists of three parts. Part I sets out Ghana\u27s obligations under international law as they relate to issues of women\u27s equality generally and inheritance rights specifically. Part II describes the sources of Ghanaian law relevant to the issue. Part II begins with a very general description of the Ghanaian family. It then proceeds to analyze in some detail customary law governing marriage and property, including the customary law of intestate succession, which governed estates prior to 1985. Part II then describes both constitutional and statutory law relevant to intestate succession, particularly Law 111 which created for the first time a right for spouses to inherit from the estate. Finally, Part III presents the delegation\u27s findings with respect to a range of problems women face in claiming their rights under the statutory regime. Part III describes and documents the problems and then offers recommendations designed to address them

Gender Equality and Customary Marriage: Bargaining in the Shadow of Post-Apartheid Legal Pluralism

This Report represents the culmination of a year-long project undertaken by the Crowley Program in International Human Rights at the Fordham Law School to study issues surrounding women and customary law marriages in South Africa in light of its international legal commitments. This Report presents the findings of this research effort. Following this introduction, Part I of this Report describes South Africa\u27s international and domestic legal obligations regarding culture and gender equality, particularly with respect to marriage, divorce, and family formation. Part I then sketches two distinct approaches to the tension between customary law and gender equality, both of which may be found in the domestic law regulating the family. Part II evaluates the effectiveness of the two approaches with reference to data collected in the course of several hundred interviews with South African men and women in May and June 2006. Part II also offers tentative conclusions and suggestions for reform

Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing

In this Essay, Higgins explores the various uses of the public/private distinction in feminist theorizing. She suggests that feminist attacks on the public/private line tend to overstate the threat that the concept poses to women\u27s equality and to understate the potential value of the distinction in feminist theory. Acknowledging that, despite thoroughgoing theoretical critiques, the public/private line persists in practice, Higgins offers a qualified revival of the distinction in feminist theory and suggests ways of refocusing and refining it to respond to existing critiques

Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing

In this Essay, Higgins explores the various uses of the public/private distinction in feminist theorizing. She suggests that feminist attacks on the public/private line tend to overstate the threat that the concept poses to women\u27s equality and to understate the potential value of the distinction in feminist theory. Acknowledging that, despite thoroughgoing theoretical critiques, the public/private line persists in practice, Higgins offers a qualified revival of the distinction in feminist theory and suggests ways of refocusing and refining it to respond to existing critiques