46 research outputs found
The Need for Governmental Inefficiency in Plato’s Republic
In book II of Plato’s Republic, Socrates discusses the cities of necessity and luxury
(372d-373a). Discussions of these cities have often focused on citizens desiring
more than they need, which creates a demand for luxury. Yet the second part of the
equation, which is not usually recognized, is that there must be sufficient supply to
meet this demand. The focus of this article is on the importance of supply in the
discussion of the first two cities in book II of the Republic. This article argues that
the way Plato models the cities makes it the case that a surplus above levels of
necessity will be generated from time to time. That the unwanted surplus cannot be
spontaneously disposed of entails that the first two cities are institutionally
incomplete. A government is needed in order to coordinate the disposal of the
surplus supply the city will produce
No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy
Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either be an account of well-being, provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which well-being is constituted by endorsed veridical experiences. This account refers back to theories of well-being but does so as agnostically as possible. An intermediate account of well-being is meant as a policy guiding compromise between the different theories of well-being that make claims regarding what constitutes well-being. An intermediate account does as well as can be hoped for in providing a basis for well-being policy
The Narrowed Domain of Disagreement for Well-Being Policy
in recent years, policy makers have shown increasing interest in implementing policies aimed at promoting individual well-being. But how should policy makers choose their well-being policies? a seemingly reasonable first step is to settle on an agreed-upon definition of well-being. yet there currently is significant disagreement on how well-being ought to be characterized, and agreement on the correct view of well-being does not appear to be forthcoming. Nevertheless, i argue in this paper that there are several
reasons to think that the domain of well-being in the public policy context is narrower than that of well-being in general, which makes agreement on how to understand well-being in the public policy context more likely
Well-Being Coherentism
Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the
question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually
prior to measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist
commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures
independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach
helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize wellbeing and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to
well-being science
From Models to Experiments
In this paper we discuss James Buchanan’s contribution in the narrow domain of understanding committee voting under majority rule. We then go on to discuss Charles Plott’s seminal experimental work on the topic that sparked a wave of public choice experimental work. However, given Plott’s claims that Buchanan influenced him significantly, it is puzzling that his work with Morris Fiorina explores a question outside of those which Buchanan and Tullock found interesting. We suggest several ways to resolve this tension. Our chapter concludes by discussing a lacuna in the experimental public choice literature in which Buchanan was particularly interested—logrolling, or vote trading
Well-Being Coherentism
Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually prior to measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize well-being and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science
Well-Being Coherentism
Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually prior to measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize well-being and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science