Device for mechanically stabilizing web ribbon buttons during growth initiation

The invention relates to a stabilization device for stabilizing dendritic web seed buttons during initiation of crystal growth from a float melt zone. The invention includes angular maintenance means for maintaining a constant angular orientation between the axis of a growth initiation seed and the upper surface of a web button during withdrawal of the web button from the melt. In the preferred embodiment, the angular means includes an adjustable elevation tube which surrounds the seed, the weight of which may be selectively supported by the seed button during web button withdrawal

Preparation of cellulose acetate with acetic acid

Thesis (B.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Chemistry, 1936.by Edward H. Taubman.B.S

Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights

This Article applies an information-cost theory of property to water law. Because of its fluidity, exclusion is difficult in the case of water and gives way to rule of proper use, i.e., governance regimes. Looking at water through this lens reveals that prior appropriation employs more governance and riparianism rests more on a foundation of exclusion than is commonly thought. The development of increasing amounts of exclusion and governance are both compatible with a broadly Demsetzian account that is sensitive to the nature of the resource. Moreover, hybrids between prior appropriation and riparianism are not anomalous. Exclusion strategies based on boundaries and quantification allow for rights to be formal and modular, but this approach is particularly challenging in the case of water and other fugitive resources. The challenges of exclusion that water and other fugitive resources present often lead to a semicommons in which elements of private and common property both coexist and interact

Rose's Human Nature of Property

Many social theories claim to have the human being at their center. That has been more a matter of theory than practice in many of those theories. But in the case of Carol Rose’s scholarship on property it could not be more true. In many of her works, Carol develops sophisticated theories about property by focusing in on characters. While they are sometimes humorous and colorful, the characters capture something important about human nature, and Carol, like an older tradition that we could learn a lot from, explores property through the lens of human nature. In it she finds many twists and turns. I will focus on how the characters of the ninny and the scoundrel call for crystals and mud1—bright line rules and vague standards, yes, but quite a bit more than that. In Carol’s view a variety of the tragedy of the commons with crystals and mud leads to endless cycling between crystals and mud.2 At the end I will argue that human nature may also lead to a sort of equilibrium in the law, an equilibrium we could associate with the traditions of law versus equity. But for that to occur we do need some significant degree of moral consensus, upon which we can ground our equitable interventions. This need for moral consensus takes us back to Carol’s insights about human nature and to her humanistic bourgeois view of property based on narrative. Carol points out that famous accounts of property from Locke and Blackstone to Demsetz all involve a view—or views—of human nature.3 All of them ground a picture of property in self-interest, possible enlightened self-interest, but then import covertly a more cooperative or even altruistic aspect of people when it comes time to set up the property system.4 A system of private property requires collective action, and a world of narrowly rational utility maximizers—a character Carol once called “RUM” with, I think, the British meaning of “odd” in mind5—would have a difficult time getting the system off the ground. 1 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577–78, 587 (1988) [hereinafter Rose, Crystals and Mud] (describing the “characters” who muck up bright line rules to include “ninnies, hard-luck cases, and the occasional scoundrels who take advantage of them”). 2 Id. at 595–604. 3 Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 38–39 (1990) [hereinafter Rose, Property as Storytelling]. 4 Id. at 38–40. 5 Carol M. Rose, “Enough, and as Good” of What?, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 417–22 (1987) (introducing the fictional character “Rational Utility Maximizer,” or “RUM”)

Community and Custom in Property

Community custom has played a limited but important role in the law of property. In addition to a few major historic examples such as mining camp rules and whaling, property law sometimes relies on community custom, for example in adverse possession, nuisance law, and beach access. This Article proposes an informational theory of custom in property law. Custom is subject to a communicative tradeoff in the law: all else being equal, informationally demanding customs require an audience with a high degree of common knowledge. General customs already known throughout society do not require much extra publicity from the law, and the law can easily draw on such customs. By contrast, customs that vary by community raise the question of the need for processing by non-expert audiences, i.e., outgroup dutyholders and government officials. This tradeoff helps explain the differential receptiveness to various customs and the process by which they are formalized if they are adopted into the law. The information-cost theory suggests that enthusiasts and skeptics of custom have both tended to ignore this process. The theory is then applied to some suggestive evidence from grazing customs and the pedis possessio doctrine in mining law, under which miners have pre-discovery rights to the spot being worked. Finally, the information-cost theory of custom sheds some light on the history and controversies over the numerus clausus (standardization and limitation of the set of basic property forms) and on the question of baselines of property entitlements in the law of takings